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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
There is a long tradition in the U.S. agriculture of managing supply to increase 
farm prices. Managed agricultural commodity markets continue to be a cornerstone of 
U.S. farm policy. These policies can be divided into two categories, the price support 
and set-aside domestic programs and border price control measures for trade. Price 
support programs for wheat, feed grains, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, sugar, rice and dairy 
products have generally kept the domestic prices of these commodities above the "market 
clearing" levels (Yanagida et al. 1987). On the other hand, tariffs, quotas and other 
border protection measures have insulated domestic markets, successfully keeping 
imports low and maintained higher domestic prices than in world markets. Sugar, beef, 
pork and dairy are examples of programs utilizing these trade restrictions. 
During 1981-85 the U.S. government spent an average of $12 billion per year on 
agricultural commodity programs. This was equal to nearly half of annual average net 
farm income for the period. The government also provided an additional several billion 
dollars per year in aid that does not show up in the annual budget; tax preferences, 
credit provisions and guarantees, privileges to agricultural marketing cooperatives etc. 
(Gardner 1985). These policies constitute subsidies to production, and tend to generate 
domestic commodity surpluses and downward pressure on world commodity prices. 
However, U.S. policy also held an annual average of 30 million acres of cropland out of 
production during 1981-1985. This figure is equal to 9 percent of total cropland 
harvested. In addition, marketings of commodities like peanuts and tobacco are 
restricted. Thus, net effect of U.S. commodity policies on total output and world market 
prices is not obvious. A list of the major programs and government costs by crop are 
given in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1, Major crops and commodity programs in the 
United States, 1985-1986^ 
Commodity 
Acres 
Planted 
Farm 
value 
Nature 
of 
program 
Government 
Expenses 
Feed grains 
(mil.) 
111.79 
($ bil) 
25.40 deficiency payments 
acreage diversion 
storage subsidies 
($ bil) 
12.21 
Wheat 64.73 7.64 deficiency payments 
acreage diversion 
storage subsidies 
price supports 
3.44 
Soybeans 61.58 10.57 price supports 1.60 
Hay 60.42 9.44 free market 0.00 
Cotton 10.23 3.99 deficiency payments 
acreage diversion 
storage incentives 
price supports 
2.15 
Flaxseed & 
Sunflower 
3.68 0.28 free market 0.00 
Rice 2.49 0.89 deficiency payments 
acreage diversion 
price supports 
0.95 
Sugar beet& 
and cane 
1.87 1.51 import quotas 
levies 
0.21 
Peanuts 1.47 1.00 marketing controls 
price supports 
0.04 
Tobacco 0.69 2.49 acreage/marketing 
controls, 
price supports 
0.25 
Vegetables 3.22 6.84 marketing orders 0.00 
Fruits & nuts 6.84 marketing orders 0.00 
®U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics. 
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Gardner (1981), Helen (1977) and Lin et al. (1981), among others, have 
calculated the direct and social costs of U.S. farm programs. Amidst an increasing 
number of farm foreclosures, low agricultural product prices and reduced farm exports 
there has been increased discussion of deregulating the domestic markets for 
commodities and researchers have tried to quantify the possible effects of deregulation; 
trade liberalization and reduced government involvement in the agricultural markets. 
USDA/ERS (1985), Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (1987a, 1987b, 
1988), Yanagida et al. (1987), Frohberg et al. (1988), Johnson et al. (1988), and 
Robinson et al. (1988) are a few such studies. 
Schmitz and Chambers (1986) have investigated the welfare implications of a 
target price-deficiency payment program for large open economies. Using a simple and 
stylized numerical example they calculated the deadweight loss for the U.S. wheat 
market. They found that the deadweight loss ranged from $75 million to $400 million 
under varied assumptions on domestic supply and export demand elasticities. 
Gardner (1985) has developed a comprehensive study to measuring the economic 
consequences of U.S. agricultural policy. Using a simple supply-demand framework he 
estimated the short run redistributional effects for 1984-1985 of U.S. farm commodity 
programs. These effects were obtained by solving stylized commodity specific supply-
demand models with and with out farm programs. His estimates are summarized in 
Table 1.2. 
The effects in Table 1.2 are short run impacts, given a one or two year period 
adjustment. Long run supply and demand elasticities are larger and imply smaller 
producer gains. The aggregate long run effects on U.S. farmers of abandonment of U.S. 
farm price supports is estimated to be a reduction of $11 billion in real income (Gardner 
1985). This was about half of U.S. annual average net farm income in 1983-1985, but 
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Table 1.2. Redistributional effects of U.S. farm policies^ 
consumers 
U.S. and Total Non-
Commodity Producers tax payers U.S. U.S. 
Billion Dollars 
Feed Grains 4.3 -6.5 -2.2 -0.6 
Wheat 3.2 -3.8 -0.6 -0.7 
Rice 0.6 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 
Cotton 1.4 -1.7 0.3 -0.2 
Sugar 1.8 -2.9 -1.1 0.4 
Dairy 1.7 -2.5 -0.8 n.e 
Tobacco 0.6 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 
Peanuts 0.1 -0.1 0.0 n.e 
Beef 0.5 -0.5 0.0 n.e 
Total 14.2 -19.2 -5.0 
^Gardner (1985). 
not estimated. 
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the estimate does not imply such a sharp decline over a ten or twenty year horizon. 
Long run elasticities for supply of non-land inputs owned by farmers are high enough 
that the returns to them over the long run are essentially determined by returns in the 
much larger nonfarm sector. 
Unfortunately, Gardner's calculations do not include a nonfarm sector or 
sufficient detail on input use to permit measurement of these effects. Thus, according 
to Gardner (1985), the effects of U.S policy liberalization would be a substantial short-
term farm income loss and asset-value write-down. In long-run, the effects are argued 
to be not as severe. Admittedly, however, these results are conjectural. Also, results are 
calculated based upon elasticities from unrelated econometric work on commodity market 
and program effects. These elasticities are not from a consistent framework. In 
addition, the estimates are based on single-market supply and demand characteristics for 
the most part, although a few elasticities are supposedly "chosen" to incorporate total 
adjustments in a rudimentary form. But these estimates are partial in nature and do not 
incorporate the full effects. 
Problem 
Until recently, estimates of the cost and economic effects of agricultural policies 
have been conducted largely with partial equilibrium models. Gardner (1985) and 
Schmitz and Chambers (1986) are two such studies. These partial equilibrium analyses 
ignore the linkages among markets in the agricultural sector and of the agricultural 
sector to the remainder of the economy; important among these being the interactions 
between product and input markets. The importance of these economic linkages is now 
well recognized (Fischer et al. 1988, Robinson and Roland-Hoist 1988, and Aradhyula 
et al. 1988). 
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Early work by Fox and Norcross (1952), and Schuh (1974) has led other studies 
on interactions between agricultural production, income and traditional features of 
macroeconomic policy (Shei 1978, Chambers and Just 1982). These and other studies 
have established linkages between agriculture and the rest of the economy and showed 
that there are large leakages out of and into agriculture, primarily via factor markets. 
Also, when there is an economy wide exogenous shock, as for tax or trade policy 
reform, the partial equilibrium approximations will be inadequate, particularly if 
agriculture is differentially affected (Hertel, 1986). 
Of course, even if the general equilibrium feedback effects are not large, the 
more comprehensive framework can still play an important role by tying the pieces of 
policy analysis together in a theoretically consistent framework. An important 
implication of these more recent studies is that when analyzing the effects of agricultural 
policies on crop and livestock production, factor markets must also be considered 
simultaneously. 
Realizing that the important linkages between agriculture and the rest of the 
economy are primarily through the factor markets, Adelman and Robinson (1986) used a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) to analyze exogenous shocks for agriculture. They 
constructed a SAM for the U.S. for the year 1982. The SAM describes the circular flow 
of money and goods in an economy. Using this SAM they derived multipliers, in much 
the same way they are derived in a traditional input-output framework. They found 
that leakages out of agriculture due to purchased inputs are large and that most of the 
value added in food production occurs between the farm gate and the consumer. These 
SAM results support a general equilibrium approach which emphasizes the simultaneous 
study of agricultural output and factor markets for evaluating farm policies. Yet, while 
the behavioral specification in the SAM multiplier analysis emphasizes important 
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linkages in the economy, it is too simple for much policy analysis - the SAM, however, 
forms a good foundation for the more general models known as computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. 
Hertel and Tsigas (1987) have expanded the work of Adelman and Robinson 
(1986). Using a general equilibrium model, they analyzed the economy-wide 
implications of a variety of different approaches to agricultural supply control that have 
surfaced in the recent U.S. farm policy debate. This is one of the few studies of 
agricultural policy in the U.S. using a general equilibrium framework. Based on 1984 
policy wedges, they found acreage restrictions result in large increases in "excess burden" 
and domestic welfare losses. However their study was limited in that the elasticities are 
not econometrically estimated. Most of the elasticities used were accumulated from 
different studies. Also, the factor market, which is the key in general equilibrium 
models, was not adequately modeled. Like many other CGE studies, Hertel and Tsigas 
calibrated for the required general equilibrium parameters instead of using to 
econometric estimation. This facile practice of calibration, in addition, precludes the 
researcher from using more flexible functional forms in representing the structure of 
economic system. Other applied general equilibrium models that explored U.S. 
agricultural policies include the basic linked system (Fischer et al. 1988, and Frohberg 
et al. 1988), COMGEM (Hughes and Penson 1980), and Tyers (1985). 
Production modules, comprising of output supply and input demand functions, 
form a key component of applied general equilibrium models. Several important gains 
have been made in estimating theoretically more sound output supply and input demand 
equations. Examples of these studies include Sidhu and Baanante (1981), McKay et ai. 
(1983), Shumway (1983), Lopez (1984), Ball (1988), and Shumway and Alexander (1988). 
These studies clearly establish the usefulness of dual framework in estimating supply 
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response. Notable among these studies are Shumway (1983), and Shumway and 
Alexander (1988). These studies have illustrated that for a multioutput firm, the profit 
function approach has several advantages over the cost function approach such as 
avoiding simultaneous equation bias. Crop supply and input demand functions for the 
U.S. agriculture have been successfully estimated in a theoretically more consistent 
framework. 
However even these production module studies do not fully reflect commodity 
polices. In these studies, reduced form representations of policy variables are used in 
the supply equations. For example in Shumway and Alexander (1988), government 
commodity policies are captured by including target prices and diversion payments in 
the profit function, de Gorter and Paddock (1985) convincingly argue that such 
representations of policy are not satisfactory especially when the model is intended for 
policy analysis and exploring technical production relations (as opposed to forecasting). 
Objectives 
This study constructs a crop sector model for the U.S. comprising of crop output 
supply and input demand equations. The supply module explicitly incorporates key 
agricultural commodity policy instruments; loan rates, target prices, set-aside 
requirements and diversion payments. And this is accomplished in a structural 
framework. A theoretical model directly incorporating these policy variables in crop 
producer decision process is developed. That is, policy instruments are directly 
incorporated into the model in a structural framework, extending the work of de Gorter 
and Paddock (1985). Resulting expressions are estimated using a profit function in a 
dual framework for the U.S. crops sector. 
In the functional specification and estimation of the model, the theoretical 
restrictions imposed by profit maximization and the technical response relations assumed 
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are maintained. This makes the model consistent with a general equilibrium framework 
for the agricultural sector. Thus, flexible functional forms and a structural 
representation of commodity policies are combined in the study. The specific objectives 
of the study are; 
1. To develop a theoretical model of the producer decisions on participation in 
voluntary commodity programs, 
2. To structurally incorporate the governmental program variables in output supply and 
input demand equations estimated in a dual framework, 
3. To estimate crop supply and input demand equations for the U.S. crop sector, and 
4. To evaluate and assess the implications from the empirical findings using the 
structural policy representation. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter I discusses the problem 
setting and the objectives of the study. Chapter II reviews and discusses various issues 
involved in the estimation of output supply and input demand equations and how policy 
variables are structurally incorporated. In Chapter III, a stylized theoretical model of the 
producer's decision is developed, incorporating the relevant features of the agricultural 
commodity policy. Chapter IV outlines how policy parameters are incorporated 
structurally in the empirical model. In Chapter V, estimation procedure is outlined. 
Data used in the estimation are also described in this Chapter. In Chapter VI, empirical 
results are presented, appraised and interpreted. Results of simulations that are possible 
given the elaborated policy structure are presented in Chapter VII. Finally, Chapter VIII 
contains a summary of the results in the study, an assessment of the findings and 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II. POLICY STRUCTURE OUTPUT SUPPLY AND INPUT DEMAND 
Commodity supply models are prominent in the applied agricultural economics 
literature. Supply relations have been estimated for a multitude of commodities and 
geographic locations (Askari and Cummings 1977). The purposes of such estimation are 
highly varied and include the search for basic knowledge of production relationships, 
policy inference and forecasting. The focus in this study is the first two of these 
objectives. This chapter reviews issues involved in the estimation of commodity supply 
and input demand equations followed by a discussion of policy variables treated in these 
models. 
Commodity supply and input demand analysis in the U.S. agricultural has been 
carried out both in a single market framework and multi-market framework. Single 
product analysis (see for example, Houck and Ryan 1972, Morzuch et al. 1980, and Burt 
and Worthington 1988) examines the product supply in isolation and generally 
incorporates a greater institutional detail. Multi-market models of applied production 
analysis permit the interactions of several products. Examples of such studies applied to 
the crop sector of U.S. agriculture include Arzac and Wilkinson (1979), Gadson et ai. 
(1982), Westcott and Hull (1985), Taylor (1987a, 1987b), Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (1987a, 1987b, 1988), and Johnson et al. (1988). The multi-market 
studies incorporate important interaction among crops. The functional form chosen in 
these models is mostly linear and the choice of explanatory variables is guided but not 
completely derived from the theory. Factor market effects are often omitted in these 
studies. The advantage of these parsimonious models is their ease of estimation and 
operation. Specification of equations is carried out without a rigorous foundation of the 
theory of the firm. The problem is that it is desirable to have models with a rigorous 
theoretical base. This would increase the confidence in the results. 
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Attention in this chapter is limited to studies which adhere more closely to the 
theoretical foundations of the theory of the firm. As desired, such studies typically 
simultaneously consider both the product supply and input demand together. The 
approach has been made more feasible by developments in duality theory and 
computational or estimation methods. 
Duality 
With competitive behavior and regular technology, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the production technology and the dual profit function 
(Chambers 1988). The technology characteristics can be examined directly using the 
primal approach or indirectly by a dual formulation. The product supply and input 
demand relationships to be developed, can be identified using either approach. The 
choice of approach is in large conditioned by data availability. 
Also, it is often easier to compute product supply and input demand relationships 
using the dual, since simultaneous solution of the first order equations for profit 
maximization is unnecessary. Also, the dual formulation does not require output specific 
input use (Shumway 1983, Lopez 1984). Aggregate input use is sufficient for applying 
the dual approach, whereas in primal approach, data on output specific input use are 
necessary for estimation. This difference in data requirements is an especially important 
advantage because, in the U.S., data on crop specific input use are generally not 
available at a market level. 
There are of course advantages of using a profit function approach in estimating 
multioutput production relations over the transformation, cost and revenue function 
approaches. In the profit function approach, no endogenous variables (output or input 
levels) are included as explanatory variables in the model to be estimated. Thus, the 
profit function approach circumvents the inconsistencies in the econometric estimation 
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due to simultaneous equations bias (Lopez 1984). Because of the availability of data and 
it is also possible to recover all econometrically relevant information on the technology 
from the estimated profit function, a dual approach is applied in the present study. 
At the time producer makes input and output decisions, output prices are not 
known. Previous studies have shown (Sandmo 1971, Aradhyula 1988) that when prices 
are not known ex ante, the risk neutral producer behaves as if prices are known with 
certainty and equal to the expected value. Hence, a profit function for a certainty case 
is equivalent to the expected profit function for a risk neutral producer. 
However, the assumption of risk-averse behavior might be more desirable. 
Though theoretically more appealing, several problems exist in empirically implementing 
the assumption of risk-averse behavior. Two common approaches to incorporate 
producer's risk-avoiding behavior are (1) specifying a direct functional form for the 
utility function and production function, and (2) approximating the risk premium with a 
finite number of terms (Holt 1987). However, these two approaches have the same 
disadvantages as the primal approach under risk-neutrality. 
A more appealing approach to incorporate risk-avoiding behavior in output 
supply equations would be to use an indirect specification of the expected utility 
function. This is much like using a profit function under certainty. More recently 
economists have begun to examine the implications of duality theory for specifying 
empirically tractable risk-responsive supply and input demand functions (Blair and 
Lusky 1977, Pope 1980, and Hallam et al. 1982). 
Although duality approach may prove useful in incorporating risk-averse 
producer behavior, it presently remains at an elementary stage from the standpoint of 
practical application. The development of this approach is currently in the beginning 
stages. Additional basic research will be required before the duality approach will be 
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useful as a tool for applied analysis of decisions under uncertainty (Holt 1987). In light 
of the state of present of theoretical developments, risk-neutral behavior is assumed in 
this study. This ensures that an expected profit function (i.e., profit function with 
expected prices, since profit is linear in prices) can be used to arrive at the output 
supply and input demand equations. -
Many firms produce several commodities and others have this alternative. Thus, 
production decisions about one commodity are likely to be associated with production 
decisions about others. It is important to examine the extent of production 
interrelationships in order to understand more accurately the effects of policy changes 
and shifts in economic conditions. Thus jointness in agricultural production is important 
for assessing adequately the production effects of price and policy changes. Several 
studies such as Shumway (1983), Lopez (1984), Shumway and Alexander (1988) have 
shown the value of using a multioutput-multiinput framework in U.S. agriculture. 
Profit Function 
Consider the production decision for a multiproduct firm with m outputs, n 
variable inputs, and k fixed inputs and exogenous variables. Then the variable or 
restricted profit function, here after the profit function, can be expressed as: 
(2.1) îr(P,R,Z) » max {FY - R'X; (Y,X,Z)eT} 
Y,X 
where 
IT is variable profit (i.e., gross returns less variable costs), 
T is the firm's production possibility set, 
P is a m X 1 vector of output prices, 
R is a n X 1 vector of input prices, 
Z is a k X 1 vector of fixed inputs. 
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Y is a m X 1 vector of outputs yj, y^, and 
X is a n X 1 vector of variable inputs, Xj, x^. 
Given profit maximization, the producer's problem is to choose the quantity of each 
output produced (yj s) and the quantity of each variable input employed (xj s). Thus, 
the profit function represents the maximum attainable profits, given the production 
technology and output and input prices. The profit function has the following 
properties (Lau 1978, Varian 1984, and Chambers 1988): 
(2.2.1) ?r(P,R,Z) > 0 for all P » 0: The profit function is a non-negative real valued 
function for all positive prices and any Z. 
(2.2.2) *(AP,AR,Z) = A%(P,R,Z) for all A > 0; The profit function is homogeneous of 
degree one in prices. 
(2.2.3) Profit function is convex and continuous in P and R for every fixed Z. 
(2.2.4) If P > p\ 5r(P,R,Z) > ff(P^,R,Z): The profit function is non-decreasing in 
output prices. 
(2.2.5) If R > R^, jr(P,R,Z) < 7r(P,R^,Z): The profit function is non-increasing in input 
prices. 
(2.2.6) The profit function is differentiable, only if there exists a unique profit 
maximizing supply or input. 
If the profit function is differentiable then: 
(2.3) 9ff(*)/3Pi = yj(P,R,Z) i = 1,2, ..., m, and 
(2.4) M')/ar; . -x;(P,R,Z) i = 1, 2, ..., n. 
This later set of properties is referred to as Hotelling's lemma. Equations (2.3) 
and (2.4) imply that output supply and input demand equations can be directly derived 
as the partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to output and input prices, 
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respectively. It is this property that makes profit function approach appealing for 
empirical work. 
Properties (2.2.3) and (2.2.6) yield two additional useful results. First, they imply 
that the matrix of second order derivatives of jr(P,R,Z) with respect to P and R given in 
(2.5), is positive semi definite. 
(2.5) H 
^ a2ff(.)/3pi3p j a V*)/aPi5rj -
- 3^ff(«)/9rj9pj 5^7r(*)/3r|3rj _ 
In the empirical work, convexity of a profit function is verified (imposed) by checking 
(imposing) the positive definiteness of this matrix. Second, by Young's theorem in 
calculus, cross partial derivatives as specified in (2.6) must be equal: 
a^îr(*)/5pjapj = ayj(o/apj = ayj(.)/ap- = a^)r(.)/apjap^, 
(2.6) -a^ir(*)/arjarj = axj(*)/arj = axj(*)/3rj = -a^7r(*)/arjarj, and 
a^5r(*)/apjarj = ay|(»)/arj = -axj(*)/ap| = a^7r(»)/arjapj 
Equations in (2.6) are generally referred to as symmetry restrictions. They insure that 
the matrix H is symmetric. 
To ensure that there is a duality with a corresponding production possibility set 
or transformation function, the profit function must satisfy the properties (2.2) to (2.6). 
Therefore it is imperative to verify that an empirically estimated profit function satisfies 
these properties. In the present study, the estimated profit function maintains all the 
theoretical restrictions in equations (2.2) through (2.6). 
Aggregation 
One of the most unattractive realities researchers face is that data generated and 
collected on a regular basis often do not confirm to the data or variables required by the 
theory. The preceding exposition on profit function and the implied product supply and 
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input demand equations is based on a firm-level theory. However, researchers do not 
always have access to firm level data that enable them to characterize satisfactorily the 
technology for a particular firm. Often, as in the present case, data are available only at 
a relatively high degree of aggregation, and the researcher is reduced to estimating 
industry functions (or at best, representative firm) on the basis of either cross-sectional 
or time series data. Thus, theoretically derived firm-level functions have to be 
translated into market-level functions. 
This use of market level data involves aggregation over firms. The transition 
from the firm level behavior to the analysis of industry level function is termed the 
"aggregation problem." The problem is similar in consumer theory where individual 
Marshallian demand functions are to be translated to market demand functions. The 
issues involved are, what functional forms for market functions are consistent with 
firm-level theory, what restrictions to be placed on firm-level functions to ensure they 
are consistent with the rules of aggregation. For a discussion of these and related topics 
see Green 1964, Gorman 1968, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, Daal and Merkies 1984, 
Blackorby and Schworm 1988, Chambers 1988, and Pope and Chambers 1988. 
When all firms face the same output and input prices and there are no fixed 
variables, then the aggregation problem does not impose restrictions on firm-level or 
market-level functions. For example, consider there are L number of firms. Then the 
market level profit function is given by: 
(2.7) n(p,R) = 
Applying Hotelling's lemma we get: 
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This aggregation rule is frequently invoked in empirical studies. But the presence of 
firm specific variables (For example, fixed inputs, and firm specific prices) impose some 
restrictions on the functional forms of both aggregate and firm-level profit functions. 
These are discussed in Gorman 1968, Blackorby and Schworm 1982, Chambers 1988, and 
Pope and Chambers 1988. Relevant results are summarized in Table 2.1. As explained 
in Chapter IV, results of both linear and non-linear aggregation rules given in Table 2.1 
are invoked in the present analysis. 
Flexible Functional Forms 
In a parametric analysis (econometric or programming), a first step is an 
assumption on the structure of technology. Traditionally this has meant specification of 
a production function involving very few parameters. However, advances in computer 
technology have made it practical to handle much more complicated functional forms. 
With this enhanced ability has come an increased desire for generality in representing 
technology in applied work. This desire, largely spurred by the work of Diewert (1971), 
has led to much interest in what are known as flexible functional forms (FFFs). 
In specifying functional forms for applied production analysis as in the present 
case, it is desirable to have estimable relationships that place relatively few prior 
restrictions on technology. Estimability typically implies a choice of form, and once the 
form is parameterized in accordance with the underlying economic theory (homogeneity, 
monotonicity, convexity, etc.), duality results guarantee the existence of a unique dual 
function. 
An algebraic functional form for a profit function ir(P,R;ô) is said to be flexible 
if at any given set of non-negative output and input prices (P and R), the parameter 
vector B can be chosen so that the profit function, the implied output supply and input 
demand functions, and their own and cross price elasticities are capable of assuming 
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Table 2.1. Summary of Aggregation Results^ 
Problem: 
Finding market level function g(w,b), such that, 
g(w,b)= gi(Wj,b) 
w = w(Wj,W2,...,Wj^) 
where, L » number of firms 
RgjuU?; 
Linear w (w » Wj): 
g(w,b) = v(b)»w + m(b) 
gj(w.,b) = v(b)»w. + m.(b) 
m(b) = E;=i ^{(b) 
Nonlinear w: 
g(w,b) = v(b)«h(w) + m(b) 
g.(w.,b) = v(b)«hj(Wj) + m.(b) 
h(w) = hi(w,) 
m(b) = ™i(b) 
^Chambers, 1988. 
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arbitrary values at the given set of prices subject only to the theoretical consistency 
(Chambers 1988). However, as Blackorby, Primont and Russel (1977), and Lopez (1985) 
point out flexible functional forms nevertheless impose some a priori restrictions, and all 
flexible functional forms are not equally suitable as dual representations of technology 
A primary goal of applied production analysis is empirical measurement of the 
economically relevant information that exhaustively characterizes the behavior of 
economic agents. For smooth technologies, this includes the value of the function (e.g., 
the level of production, profit), the gradient of the function (e.g., marginal 
productivities) and the Hessian (e.g., the matrix of elasticities). In other words, for any 
primal or dual technology with n netputs (outputs and negative inputs), there are 
i(a+l)(n+2) economically relevant effects. Therefore, in choosing a functional form, one 
rich enough in parameters to portray all of these effects should be the employed. 
A functional form is flexible if it does not impose a priori values to any of these 
i(n+l)(n+2) coefficients. The flexible form lets the data determine these effects. Thus, 
a functional form in n variables should have at least i(n+l)(n+2) parameters to be a FFF. 
This is best demonstrated by a counter example. Consider, a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in two inputs L, and K; y = aL^K^ with three parameters, where as there are 
i(3+l)(3+2) = 10 distinct economic effects to be captured. Obviously, the three 
parameters in Cobb-Douglas functional form cannot capture the 10 different effects. 
Thus Cobb-Douglas is not a FFF. A FFF on the other hand would have at least 10 
parameters. The flexible functional forms are designed to provide local, second-order 
approximations to arbitrary functional forms. For a discussion on flexibility criteria and 
other definitions see Diewert 1974, Blackorby et al. (1977, 1978), and Barnett (1983b, 
1985). 
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The common examples of FFFs are Diewert's (1971) generalized Leontief, the 
translog (Christensen et al. 1973) and normalized quadratic (Lau 1978). Recent 
additions include generalized McFadden (Diewert and Wales 1987), Harnett's (1983a) 
miniflex Laurent, and Gallant's (1981, 1982, 1984) Fourier flexible forms. For a review 
and discussion of alternative functional forms and choice among them see Rossi (1985), 
Griffen et al. (1987), Thompson (1988), and Baffes and Vasavada (1989). 
Normalized Quadratic Profit Function 
In the present study, a flexible functional form is used to represent the 
optimizing behavior of producers. Specifically, a normalized quadratic functional form 
is used to represent variable profit function. The normalized quadratic functional form 
represents a second order Taylor series approximation to the true and unknown profit 
function. For a technology with m outputs, n variable inputs (with m+n=q), and K 
fixed inputs or exogenous variables, market-level normalized (normalized by EP^) 
quadratic profit function is given by: 
(2.8) n*(P,Z) . ao * EÏl' ai EPj t ZM E?",' by EP; EPj f 
+ El=l ii|cl Z, * Ekl Zkl fik EP; Zfe 
where, 
n* is profit divided by the price of nth input (that is, normalized profit), 
EP- is expected price of ith netput, 
Zjç is quantity of kth fixed input or exogenous variable, and 
ag, a|, bjj, Cjj, djçj, and fjj^ are parameters to be estimated. Note that the vector P now 
contains prices of both outputs and inputs. In the present analysis there are thirteen 
crops (m=13), four variable inputs (n=4), one fixed input and three other exogenous 
variables (K=4), By Hotelling's lemma, the first derivatives of a normalized profit 
function with respect to normalized output prices and normalized variable input prices 
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are the output supply and (negative of) variable input demand equations (see equations 
2.3 and 2.4) 
Except for the numeraire input, all product supply and negative input demand 
equations derived from the normalized quadratic profit function are linear in normalized 
product and variable input prices and fixed input quantities; 
(2.9a) Yj = aj + by EPj + ^ik '=1' 2. •••. m 
(2.9b) -Xj = aj + Ejïi bjj EPj + j = 1, 2, n-1 
(2.9c) -X„ . ao - Ciîl'î^:,' EP; EPj * Ck Zfc + îf=l dk, Zfe 4 
Note that Z variables in equations (2.8) and (2.9) represent fixed inputs (such as capital 
stock) and exogenous variables (such as time for technology). For a fixed input Zj 
which represents an aggregate input level (for example, capital stock in the U.S. 
agriculture), consistent aggregation across firms requires that n*(P,Z) be affine in Zj 
i.e., a^II*(P,Z)/3ZjZj = djj = 0 (see Table 2.1). In such cases djj is set equal to zero a 
priori in the estimation. 
Normalized quadratic profit function has several advantages over other flexible 
functional forms such as translog or generalized Leontief. For a normalized quadratic 
profit function, the implied output supply and input demand equations are linear in 
variables and parameters (only the numeraire equation is nonlinear). This linearity is 
convenient in the estimation. More importantly, the matrix of second derivatives of a 
normalized quadratic profit function with respect to prices is constant. This constant 
matrix of second order derivatives has two desirable implications. First, this would 
make it easy to check the convexity of profit function in prices - by simply checking 
for the positive semi-definiteness of the matrix. Second, a constant matrix of second 
derivatives indicate that local convexity implies global convexity. 
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Thus, with a normalized profit function, one could impose global convexity 
restrictions by simply restricting the matrix of constant second derivatives to be positive 
semi-definite. Since the matrix of second derivatives is not constant, imposing global 
convexity is not so convenient with other flexible functional forms such as translog and 
generalized Leontief. Further more, previous studies have shown that a normalized 
quadratic function can be successfully used to represent the complex agricultural 
production technologies (Shumway 1983, Shumway et al. 1987, Moschini 1988a, and 
Shumway and Alexander 1988). In the present study a normalized quadratic functional 
form was used for the profit function and implied supply and demand equations (2.9) 
were estimated simultaneously. 
Policy Structure 
The estimation of the agricultural supply response to changing government 
commodity programs has been problematic due to the frequent adjustments in the 
commodity programs, as well as changes in underlying payment structures and supply 
reduction parameters (de Gorter and Paddock 1985). It is most common to incorporate 
the influence of commodity programs in reduced form framework, with variables like 
the effective support payment and diversion payment as explanatory variables in planted 
acres equations (Houck and Ryan 1972, Lee and Helmberger 1985). Even theoretically 
more elegant studies such as Ray (1982), Shumway (1983), Lopez (1984), Chang and 
Shumway (1988), and Shumway and Alexander (1988) have not used complete 
specification when incorporating policy variables. Policy representations in these studies 
are rudimentary. 
Due to the simplicity in introducing policy, in many of the studies that have 
reduced form representations of policy parameters, the objective according to which 
farmers make productions decisions is not explicitly and fully specified. Even in those 
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where an objective function is specified, explicit introduction of policy parameters into 
the objective function is neglected. A structural representation, on the other hand, 
completely specifies an objective function including the policy structure conditioning 
producer behavior . Relevant policy variables are embedded explicitly in this decision 
making process of the individual producer. 
This discussion of policy raises the famous Lucas critique (Lucas 1981, page 
126), "... given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision 
rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with 
changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any 
change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models.... It 
implies that comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current 
macroeconometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models over 
the sample period..." 
Reduced form representations of policy are more susceptible to Lucas criticism 
than a structural representations. Narayana and Parikh (1988) contend that for small 
changes in policy, the parameters of structural models are likely to be more stable than 
those of the reduced form models. Models with more structure are relatively more 
robust in the sense that their parameters can be expected to hold under policy 
simulations outside the observed range of data. However, in light of the Lucas critique, 
the temptation of evaluating big changes in policy should be resisted. That is, caution 
should be deployed in the use of a model for the policy analysis even if the model has a 
structural representation. Of course, even the most structural representation of policy is 
in fact an approximation. 
de Gorter and Paddock (1985) point out, that reduced form representations of 
policy in the U.S. crop sector suffer from one additional problem. The composite 
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variables (such as effective support price in Houck and Ryan 1972, and Shumway and 
Alexander 1988) used to represent policy in reduced form, ignore the voluntary nature 
of the commodity programs, and impose questionable restrictions on the effects of 
changing policy parameters. Specifically, these studies fail to develop a consistent 
analytical framework that distinguishes the factors affecting a producer decision to 
participate in voluntary programs from factors affecting the choice by participant and 
non-participants on the level of production. But more satisfactory models of supply 
response for the purposes of forecasting, econometric policy evaluation and economic 
welfare analysis require a more complete identification of the structural parameters 
governing production and price determination. These ideas lead de Gorter and Paddock 
(1985) to advance a com supply response model that explicitly accounted for the discrete 
program participation choice, as well as the continuous planting decision. 
Summary 
In this study policy variables are incorporated in a structural framework, 
following de Gorter and Paddock (1985). Their conceptual and methodological 
frameworks are extended. The participation rate in the voluntary commodity programs 
is endogenized. This structural implementation of these policy variables in a 
theoretically consistent framework represents a contribution to improved agricultural 
policy evaluation. 
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CHAPTER HI. THEORETICAL CROPS COMPONENT SPECIFICATION 
This chapter provides a brief review of key policy instruments in the U.S. 
commodity program. This is followed by a presentation of a stylized theoretical model of 
producers decision process regarding participation in the voluntary commodity programs. 
Relevant policy variables are embedded explicitly in this decision making process of the 
individual producer. 
Policy Instruments and U.S. Farm Programs 
Present U.S. farm policy has evolved over the past 50 years. Legislation 
authorizing programs in the U.S. to support farm prices and income, or to curtail planted 
acreage generally provides a range within which programs can be administered. In 
practice, program provisions are specified for one year at a time with considerations 
given to expected supply, demand, and price relationships. The structure of policy 
differs from commodity to commodity. For a list of the existing commodity programs 
see Table 1.1. Different policy instruments are used in administering these farm 
programs. Selected instruments for U.S. commodity programs are reviewed in this 
section as a basis for the present analysis. This review of program operations, which is 
neither exhaustive not inclusive, will stress the key policy instruments that have played 
an important role in postwar production decisions of crop producers. More complete 
details of the U.S. crop programs can be found in Brandow (1977), Cochrane and Ryan 
(1976), Lee and Helmberger (1982), Paarlberg (1980), USDA (1984), and Glaser (1986). 
Market price supports 
All of the major supported commodities have a form of market price floor. 
Generally, Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a federal institution, removes the 
commodities from market at designated support price levels. For most of the supported 
commodities, including the grains, the price floor is determined by the "loan rate", a 
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price paid to farmers who place grain in storage near harvest time. The farmer has the 
option of repaying the loan and selling the commodity on the market, or turning the 
commodity over to the CCC in payment for the loan plus interest. This option along 
with the voluntary nature of the programs results in the CCC acquiring as much 
commodity as it is necessary to maintain the market price near the loan rate. Because no 
significant export taxes, subsidies or quantitative export restrictions exist, the loan rates 
have historically supported commodity prices in the world trade (Gardner, 1985)^. 
Target prices 
This legislated price provides price insurance to farmers by making payments to 
farmers to supplement market receipts if the market price falls below the target price. 
The payments are roughly sufficient to guarantee producers the target price; "rough" 
because the payments are based on U.S. average prices and historical "base" yields, not 
on each producer's actual price and actual yield. These government transfers made to 
farmers are referred to as deficiency payments. The payment rate is per unit of output 
(bushel, pound or hundredweight depending on the crop) and is derived using the 
following formula: 
deficiency payment = [target price - max(market price, loan rate)]>Base yield. 
Of course, when market price exceeds the target price, there is no deficiency payment. 
Typically, farmers have to idle acreage to qualify for program participation and 
deficiency payments. 
Acreage controls 
Payments made to farmers for not growing crops were a mainstay of 1950s 
programs (the "Soil Bank") and evolved into the "set-asides" and voluntary paid 
diversions. Set-asides require farmers to idle a fraction, typically 10-20 percent, of an 
acreage base to qualify for target prices and CCC loans. "Base" acreage (or acreage 
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allotments and later called "national program acreage") is predetermined for each 
producer using historical acreage. In several years, participating producers have had the 
option to receive diversion payments for idling additional acreage (up to a maximum). 
These voluntary paid diversion programs are essentially offers by the government to rent 
a farmer's land, which is then left idle. An important feature of these programs is their 
voluntary nature; the decision to participate in these programs is left to individual 
farmers. 
Other instruments of farm policy include reserve stocks of commodities (example, 
farmer-owned reserve program for grains), export subsidies, disaster payments, 
subsidized credit and insurance, tax-shelter, etc. See Brandow (1977), Cochrane and 
Ryan (1976), Lee and Helmberger (1982), Paarlberg (1980), USDA (1984), and Glaser 
(1986) for details. 
The Model Program 
Consider a stylized voluntary government program which includes acreage 
reduction, an established base acreage, and a guaranteed support price for participating 
firms. The acreage restriction is represented by the set-aside parameter SET where, SET 
e [0, 1]. The parameter SET is the portion of the base acreage, LB, which a participant 
must idle to comply with program provisions. Thus, SET is the share of the base acres 
idled, or the set-aside requirement. In other words, due to the set-aside acreage 
restriction, a participant using (planting) L units of land qiust control L/(1-SET) units of 
land . The guaranteed minimum price that participants are eligible to receive is denoted 
by P^j. The set of program parameters in this stylized but structural policy model is 
then given by (Pj^, SET)^. In the full development of the policy structure, a paid-
diversion program is also included. 
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An important aspect of the government program structure is that participants are 
guaranteed a minimum price for their production. If the market price is below P^, 
the participant can, in essence, sell to the government and receive the minimum price. 
If the market price is above Pj^, participants can sell at the higher free-market price. 
This feature of the government program alters the first moment of the price distribution, 
the expected price. Of course, the guaranteed minimum price also alters higher 
moments of the unknown farm price's distribution, although higher moments do not 
concern the risk neutral producer. In essence, the imposition of a minimum price 
truncates the distribution of possible price outcomes for program participants (Eeckhoudt 
and Hansen, 1980). This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
If a new random variable PP (participant price) is defined such that: 
then the truncated cumulative probability density function, G(PP) is defined as: 
and the expected price for the participant producers E[PP] can be expressed as: 
(3.3) E(PP) = EPP = H(Pn^).Pnj +/« FP h(FP) dp 
Pm 
where, 
FP is random unknown farm price with E(FP) = ENP 
h(FP) is subjective probability density function of FP, 
H(FP) is subjective cumulative function of FP, 
PjQ is target or minimum guaranteed price to the program participants, and 
PP is price received by the participants. 
(3.1) PP. 
(3.2) G(PP) = 
if FP > P^ 
p 
m 
E ( F P )  
Figure 3.1. Truncation of a hypothetical probability distribution of price at the 
guaranteed minimum price 
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The minimum price is the truncation point for the original price distribution (see 
Figure 3.1). The probability H(Pg^) that price will fall below is represented by the 
hatched area in Figure 3.1. The value H(Pg^) is assigned to the point P^^ in the 
truncation process. The distribution for PP is referred to in statistical literature as a 
"mixed distribution" since it has both discrete and continuous components. Note that the 
expected price for the non-participant producer is simply the expected market price, 
denoted by ENP. Obviously, 
(3.4) EPP » E(PP) > ENP « E(FP) if H(P;^) > 0. 
Thus, the expected price for a participant is higher than for the non-participant. This is 
the incentive to participate in the commodity program. Of course, in return to this 
higher expected price, participants idle a proportion (SET) of their base acreage. 
Differentiating (3.3) with respect to Pj^ gives, 
(3.5) dE(PP)/dPn^ = H(P^) > 0. 
Equation (3.5) shows that the expected price for participants E(PP), increases as 
increases. 
The Participation Decision 
The producer decision model is developed to determine participation in 
commodity programs and input utilization. The basic features of voluntary commodity 
programs to be incorporated include price supports (direct payments from 1961 to 1977 
and deficiency payments thereafter), which are conditional on an amount of the 
participating producers' base acreage being diverted (the set-aside). 
An important feature of U.S. commodity programs is that they are voluntary. 
Supply response models for commodities subject to voluntary government programs must 
explicitly consider the discrete nature of the participation decision (Holt, 1987). One 
method of explicitly treating this decision problem is to use a microeconomic model of 
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discrete/continuous choice in production (for example, Duncan, 1980; Hanenmann and 
Tsur, 1982; Just and Zilberman, 1983; Hall and Duncan, 1984). Although these models 
are primarily designed to handle disaggregated, firm-level data, de Gorter and Paddock 
(1985) have adopted this basic framework to analyze aggregate commodity program 
participation decisions. 
To keep the analysis tractable, we begin with the following assumptions. Later, 
these assumptions will be relaxed and the problem re-examined. The firm produces one 
crop. The price of the output is unknown at the time input decisions are made. That 
is, the producers choose whether to participate in the government program or not before 
observing the final price. Also, the participant must choose input levels gx ante. This 
assumption is consistent with present day regulation of agricultural markets. The 
production process involves two inputs, land (L) and a composite non-land input (K). 
We assume the producer is risk neutral. Although the assumption is restrictive, it 
simplifies the analysis. Also, there is evidence which supports the assumption that 
producers are profit maximizers (see, for example, Gardner and Chavas, 1979; Pope, 
1981; Shumway and Alexander, 1988). Also, under risk-neutrality, translating 
theoretical model into empirical structure is relatively simple using an expected profit 
function. On the other hand, risk aversion would necessitate the inclusion of variance 
and other higher moments of the distribution of the unknown random prices. 
Non-participant 
The objective function for a firm that does not participant in the government 
program is: 
(3.6) Max E(5r) = ENP.f(L, K) - r L - w K 
where, 
E(jr) is the expected profits of the firm. 
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BNP is the expected farm price, 
f(*) is a twice differentiable production function, 
L is the amount of land input used, 
K is the amount of non-land input used, and 
r is the rental price of land, and 
w is the price of non-land input. 
The choice variables in (3.6) are L and K. Note that ENP = E(FP). First order 
necessary and second order sufficient conditions for (3.6) are given by (3.7) and (3.8) 
respectively. 
(3.7a) ENP.fL(L, K) - r =. 0 
(3.7b) ENP.fjj_(L, K) - w - 0 
( 3 . 8 a )  f L L ( L ,  K ) < 0  
( 3 . 8 b )  f K K ( L .  K ) < 0  
(3.8c) IS I = fLL(L, K).fKK(L, K) -. K)>0 
If equations (3.8a), (3.8b), and (3.8c) hold, equations (3.7a) and (3.7b) can be 
solved for the optimal amounts land and non-land input (L*^ and K*^) as functions of 
ENP, r and w: 
(3.9a) L° = L°(ENP, r, w), and 
(3.9b) K° = K°(ENP, r, w). 
Equation (3.9) represent optimal input demands. The superscript n denotes the non-
participant firm. 
Substituting the and K" in (3.6) we obtain the optimal output and 
maximum expected profits 
(3.10) y° - f(L"(ENP, r, w), K"(ENP, r, w)) 
= y°(ENP, r, w), and 
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(3.11) 5r° = ENP.f(L"(ENP, r, w), K°(ENP, r, w)) 
- r L°(ENP, r, w) - w K"(ENP, r, w) 
= îr°(ENP, r, w). 
Equation (3.11) corresponds to the indirect profit function of equation (2.1). 
Participant 
For the firm to comply with the regulations of the commodity program, i.e., for 
a program participant, the objective is : 
(3.12) Max E(ff) = EPP.f(L, K) - r L/(1-SET) - w K 
where, 
SET is the set-aside requirement, and 
EPP is the expected price to the participant. 
Other variables are as defined earlier. Note that r/(l-SET) can be interpreted as the 
effective price of land for the participant. Thus, a participating producer has an higher 
expected output price (EPP > ENP) and a higher land input price (r/(l-SET) > r). The 
choice variables in (3.12), as in (3.6), are L and K. 
The first order necessary and second order sufficient conditions for (3.12) are 
(3.13) and (3.14), respectively. 
(3.13a) EPP.fL(L, K) - r/(l-SET) « 0 
(3.13b) EPP.fK^(L, K) - w = 0 
(3.14a) fLL(L, K) < 0 
(3.14b) fKK^L. K) < 0 
(3.14c) fLL(L, K).fi^K(L. K) - fLK(L, K).fK^L<L, K) > 0 
Under the second order sufficient conditions in (3.14a), (3.14b), and (3.14c), 
equations (3.13a) and (3.13b) can be solved for the optimal amounts of land and non-
land input (L* and K*) to yield: 
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(3.15a) L» » L*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w), and 
(3.15b) K» = K»(EPP, r/(l-SET), w). 
Equations (3.15) represent the optimal demands for land and non-land inputs, 
respectively, for the program participants. The superscript * is used to denote a 
participant producer. Substituting expressions for L* and K* in (3.12), yields the 
optimal output, y* and maximum expected profit tt, i.e., 
(3.16) y* = f(L*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w), K»(EPP, r/(l-SET), w)) 
= y*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w), and 
(3.17) ir* = EPP.f(L»(EPP, r/(l-SET), w), K»(EPP, r/(l-SET), w)) 
- r L*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w) - w K*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w) 
- T*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w). 
Note that EPF, the expected output price for the participant is a function of P^ (see 
equation (3.3)). Also, from the envelope theorem (Silberberg 1978, p 168), taking the 
partial derivative of the objective function with.respect to EPF, the supply function is: 
a**(EFP, r/(l-SET), w)/3EPF = y*(EPP, r/(l-SET), w), 
and hence, 
Ar*(EPP, r/d-SET), w)/5Pnj = 0:r*(.)/aEPP^).(aEPP/aP^) 
= H(Pnj).y*(EPP, r/d-SET), w). 
The marginal rate of technical substitution of non-land input for land is defined 
by: 
MRTS - (3f(.)/aL)/(3f(.)/aK) = fK(*)/fL(-). 
From equation (3,13), the MRTS for a participant is: 
MRTS* = r/w(l-SET) 
Likewise the MRTS for a non-participant is determined from equation (3.7) is: 
MRTS*^ = r/w. 
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Thus, for a given level of output MRTS* > MRTS° i.e., for a given level of output, 
participants use the non-land input more intensively. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
In Figure 3.2 line CI represents the factor price ratio of r/w{l-SET) for the participants 
while line C2 represents the relevant factor price ratio for the non-participant. Since 0 
£ SET < 1, CI is steeper than C2, representing a higher "effective" rental price of land 
for participants. Curve jtq represents an isoquant for the given level of output yg = F(L, 
K). For this level of output, points 1 and 2 where CI and C2 are tangent to yg, 
represent optimal factor mix. Clearly, for this output yg, 
K-i/Li > K2/L2 
This condition holds at any given level of y. However, in general, y* and y" would be 
different and no inference could be drawn'^ on the relative magnitudes of Kj*/Lj* and 
K2°/L2°. 
Participation 
. The producer will choose to participate in the commodity program iff :r* > tt". 
Conversely, the producer will not participate in the commodity program if jt* < tt". It 
might be noted that the participation decision differs from producer to producer based 
on available technology given by f(L, K), and the expectations as given by h(FP). In the 
present analysis, it is assumed that technology (and not price expectations) differ among 
firms. Comparative statics analysis yields the sensitivity of producer decisions to the 
government program parameters, SET and as well as the underlying distribution 
h(FP). 
First the effects of a change in target price are investigated. Note that a change 
in target price effects the program participant through a change in EPP, the expected 
price for the participant. Specifically, for a program participant, a change in target 
36 
K 
C2 
Figure 3.2. Factor intensities for participants and non-participants in a 
commodity program 
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price effects the optimal input use (and hence production) via the equation (3.5). 
Differentiating equation (3.13) with respect to EPF and rearranging, yields 
(3.18a) aL»/SEPP = (l/EPP).[fK^(.).fLK^(') - IS |. and 
(3.18b) aKVaEPP = (l/EPP).[fL(0-fLK(*) " W')'fLL(')]/ I ^ I • 
In general, no refutable implications emerge from these expressions per se, i.e., the signs 
of expressions in equations (3.18a) and (3.18b) can not be established (Silberberg 1978, 
page 113, and Beattie and Taylor 1985, pages 120-123). 
Using ôEPP/ôPjjj from equation (3.5) we obtain, 
(3.19a) dh*/a?^ = H(P^).(l/EPP).[fK.(.).fLK(*> " IS 1, and 
(3.19b) = H(P^).(l/EPP).[fL(.)-fLK(-) " I ^ I • 
Again, as in the standard micro theory, the signs of expressions in equations (3.19) can 
not be established. An increase in the target price, P^, can lead to an increase or a 
decrease in the use of either factor, since the sign of fLK.(*) is unknown. However, it 
can be shown that both dL*/3?j^ and 9K*/9Pjjj can not be negative simultaneously. 
That is, if target price increases then the use of at least one input must go up. This is 
because, an Increase in target price will cause an increase in production for the program 
participant, and it is impossible, with positive marginal products, to produce more 
output with less of both factors. 
To demonstrate dy*/d?^ > 0, differentiate equation (3.16) with respect to P^: 
(3.20) dy*/a?^ = (8EPP/aPg^).(ay*/aEPP) 
= H(P^).(ay*/aEPP) > 0. 
The second term on the right hand side of equation (3.20) is positive, since supply 
curves are positively sloped (Silberberg 1978, pages 113-114)^. Thus, the supply 
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function for a participant is positively sloped both in target price and expected price 
space. 
Note that the first order necessary conditions for non-participant given in 
equation (3.7) do not contain the parameter, Thus, for a producer who chooses to 
be non-participant, target price has no effect on the optimal input use and level of 
production. Finally, we can investigate how a change in target price effects the 
participation decision itself. 
Let Z » JT* - Then, a variable v, will not affect the participation decision iff 
dZ/dv = 0. If dZ/dv > (<) 0, then an increase in v would make the commodity program 
more (less) attractive. We now can make the following result: 
Result 1: 
An increase (decrease) in target price will make participation in the commodity 
program more profitable and hence will not decrease (increase) the number of 
program participants. 
Proof: 
az/dPj^ . (dt* - = ajr*(.)/ap^ - ajr"(.)/5Pn, = y* H(p^) - o > o qed. 
A strict inequality is not used since it is possible that H(P^) is zero. 
Thus, a change in the target price may well result in a change in the 
participation decision. Investigation of these effects of target prices on output (when the 
change in target price induces the producer to switch the participation decision) is 
complicated. The question is, what would happen to the level of production, if a 
producer moves from being a non-participant to a participant or vice versa? This is an 
important result because there is an ongoing debate on the effects of current farm 
programs on farm production (output). 
The producer is indifferent between the participation in the commodity program, 
if t*(K*, L*) = f"(K", L°). Then, the effect of a change in P^^ on the output when 
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the change in results in a switch in program decision, can be obtained by comparing 
y* to y° at the point, 5r*(K*, L*) = 7r°(K°, L°). The sign of (y* - y°) evaluated at (jt* 
- • 0) is, in general, indeterminate. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
In Figure 3.3, the supply curve of a non-participant producer is given by the 
horizontal line y^. The supply curve of the same producer, if a participant, is the 
positively slopped curve y*. For a program participant, note that profits at point G 
would be higher than at A. The objective is to generate a composite supply curve which 
has participation decisions embedded. 
There exists a sufficiently low support price such that < 0. Let D be such 
a point. Now suppose Pj^ increases. For small changes in P^^, the producer may remain 
as a non-participant. Then, as shown earlier, output y^ will not change. Hence, the 
producer will remain or stay on the horizontal line y°. But as P^ increases, tt* will 
increase and at some P^^, ff* will equal ir". At this point the producer will be 
indifferent between participation and non-participation. However, at this point y* could 
be different from y**. Any further increase in P^ will make the producer a participant. 
When the producer makes this jump, output can go up or go down. Thus, the composite 
supply curve could be discontinuous. It could drop as the policy makers perhaps hope. 
That is, the supply curve as a function of P^, could be DEABCG or DEBCG or 
DEBFCG. However, the first derivative of supply curve with respect to the support 
price Pjjj, when it exists, is always positive. 
Carrying-out a similar analysis for the set-aside parameter SET, we obtain: 
(3.21 ) aL*/aSET I =. [fK.K(*)rl/[EPP«( 1 -SET)^. | S j ] < 0, 
(3.22) 9K^/3SET| = - (fK_L(«)r]/tEPP.(l-SET)2. |S|], and 
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Figure 3.3. Composite output supply curve of the firm 
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(3.23) ay*/aSET, »f|r (.).3K*/ÔSET + fx (•).aL*/SSET 
I 
- r'[fKW'%L(') + fL(')'fKK(')]/[EPP'(l-SET)2. | S | ]. 
Again, except in the case of equation (3.21), refutable implications do not follow 
from these comparative statics. In general, the effect of a change in the set-aside 
requirement on total production and non-land input use is ambiguous. This is similar to 
the result obtained when the price of an input is changed (Silberberg 1978). Because the 
parameter SET does not explicitly enter the equation (3.7), a change in set-aside 
parameter has no effect on the non-participant producer so long as the producer 
continues to remain a non-participant. Of course, a change in SET might very well 
effect the participation decision itself. 
Result 3: 
An decrease (increase) in set-aside rate will make participation more profitable 
and hence will not decrease (increase) the number of firms participating in the 
commodity program. 
Proof: 
SZ/aSET - (air* - a?r°)/aSET = a7r*/aSET - a^^/aSET = - L*(.)r/(1-SET)^ < 0 QED. 
As in the case of support price, effects on the level of output when the shock in the 
SET causes the producer to switch the program decision, are indeterminate. 
Paid-diversion program 
Now the model is modified to include a paid-diversion program. The paid-
diversion program in the U. S. has changed over the time and varied across the crops. 
Typically, under the paid-diversion program, government rents crop land from the 
willing producer for a specified rent. This land is then left idled. See USDA (1984) for 
details of paid-diversion program in the U.S. and how it evolved over time. Consider a 
stylized paid-diversion program which stipulates a paid-diversion payment rate (D) in 
S/acre of idled land®, and an idle acre requirement, DIV. Like set-aside programs, 
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paid-diversion program is voluntary; the decision to participate in the paid-diversion 
program is left to the individual producer. The participating producer has to idle 
lOO'DIV percent of the eligible crop acreage (the base acreage) to remain in compliance 
with the program requirements. That is, for each acre planted, the producer must 
control 1/(1-DIV) acres of land. In return for this, the participating producer gets paid 
$D per acre idled. 
Although to remain eligible for paid-diversion payments, the producer must also 
participate in the set-aside program, examining the paid-diversion program in isolation 
would bring out the required results. Also, in the past, there were periods when only a 
paid-diversion program was in effect further indicating the necessity of examining the 
paid-diversion program in isolation. Expected profit for a participant is: 
(3.24) jr = EFP.f(L, K) - r L /(1-DIV) - w K + L.D.DIV/(1-DIV) 
a * « EFP*f(L, K)-rL»7-wK 
where, 
ij - [1/(1-DIV) - (D/r).DIV/( 1-DIV)], 
DIV = fraction of base acres to be idled (idle acres requirement), 
D = paid-diversion payment rate, $/acre of idled land, 
and other variables are as defined above. Unlike in set-aside program, both participants 
and non-participants receive the same market price for the output. Note that the 
objective for the non-participant is nested in equation (3.24). In fact, when equation 
(3.24) is evaluated at DIV = D = 0, then 7 = 1 and profits for the non-participants 
EFP*f(L, K) - r L - w K, are obtained. Clearly, if DIV and D are set by the policy 
maker such that >; > 1 then the paid diversion program is not profitable for the 
producer. If ij > 1, the effective rental value of land for the participant is ft} > r and 
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hence paid-diversion program is not profitable. Thus, a condition for the producer to 
participate in paid-diversion program is: 
(3.25) fj = [1/(1-DIV) - (D/r).DIV/(l-DIV)] <1. 
Multiplying both sides by r«(l-DIV) and by rearranging inequality (3.25) can be 
rewritten: 
r - (D).DIV < r.(l-DIV) 
which, after collecting terms can be further simplified to: 
- (D).DIV < - r.DIV, 
or simply: 
(3.26) D>r. 
Equation (3.26) indicates that a paid-diversion program as specified, is profitable 
to the producer if diversion payments per acre are higher than the rental price of the 
land^. Note that, in recent Farm bills paid-diversion programs are a part of a package 
which requires that producers enroll in the set-aside program to be eligible for the paid-
diversion program. 
Multiproduct Firm 
Results are now extended to multiproduct firms. Consider a technology of m 
outputs (y|, ..., yjjj) and n inputs (Xj, ..., Xjj). Sakai (1974) has examined the behavior 
of a firm with such a technology. Sakai has shown that for a such multioutput 
multiinput firm, own price elasticities for outputs (inputs) are positive (negative), i.e., 
output supply curves are positively sloped and input demand curves are negatively 
sloped. Sakai has further shown that, in general, cross price effects are ambiguous. See 
Sakai (1974), and Henderson and Quandt (1980, pages 98-101) for details. 
Consider a voluntary commodity program for g of the m outputs. Similar to the 
single product case, the set of program parameters is given by (P^j, SETj; i=l, ..., g). 
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Further, assume that there are no cross compliance restrictions^. Thus, in this stylized 
model, voluntary commodity programs exist for g outputs and producer has to decide for 
which of these crops it is beneficial to participate in the program. This involves solving 
gC0+gCl+gC2+ ...+gCg-l+gCg expected profit maximization problems, where gCr = 
g!/IrN(g-r)!]. For example, if commodity programs exist for two crops (g = 2) - say, rice 
and cotton - then the producer has the option of participating in the programs of both 
rice and cotton, only rice, only cotton, or none at all; the producer chooses the option 
where expected profits are the highest. For expository purpose, the producers decision 
problems under non-participation and participation in all crops is examined here. 
Non-participant 
The objective function for a firm that does not participant in the government 
program for any crop is: 
(3.27) Max E(ff) = ENP-yj - rj . Xji) + A^y, Ym» *11' Xnn) 
where, 
E(ir) is the expected profits of the firm, 
yj is the amount of ith output produced, 
Xji is the amount of jth input used for the production of ith good, 
ENPj is the expected farm price of ith output, 
rj is the price of jth input, 
f(*) is a twice differentiable implicit production function, and 
A is the Lagrange multiplier. 
The choice variables in (3.27) are yj and xjj. First order necessary for (3.27) are given 
by: 
(3.28a) ENPj + A* 9f(*)/ayj = 0, i=l, ..., m, 
(3.28b) rj + A • af(«)/9Xjj = 0, j = 1, ..., n; i = 1, ..., m, and 
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(3.28c) r(yj, ..., Ygji *11» *12* •••» ™ 
Participant 
The objective function under simultaneous participation in commodity programs 
of all crops is: 
(3.29) Mm E(») - if,, EPPj-yj + zSg+l ENPj-y; - Ej° 2 rj • (g., Xj|) 
- '1 • Œi=i Xji/(l-SETi)) + Af(y,, ..., y^j, Xjj, .... 
where, 
SETj is the set-aside requirement for ith crop, and 
EPPj is the expected price of ith product to the participant. 
Other variables are as defined earlier. Note that x^ is the land input. As in the single 
product case, rj/(l-SETj) can be interpreted as the effective price of land used for ith 
crop. Thus, for ith good, a participating producer has an higher expected output price 
(EPPj > ENPj) and a higher land input price (rj/(l-SETj) > r^). The first order 
necessary and second order sufficient conditions for (3.29) are: 
(3.30a) EPPj + A . af(.)/ayj - 0, i = 1, ..., g, 
(3.30b) ENPj + A . 3f(.)/ayi = 0, i = g+1, ..., m, 
(3.30c) rj/(l-SETj) + A • af(.)/3xii = 0, i= 1 m, 
(3,30d) rj + A • 3f(*)/3xjj = 0, j = 2, ..., n; i = 1, ..., m, and 
(3.30e) f(y|, ..., y^, *iii *i2« *nn^ ~ 
Participation in all commodities is preferred to complete non-participation if 
expected profits from (3.29) are higher that those in (3.27). Equation (3.29) depicts the 
case when participation in all commodities is desired (Note that only g crops have the 
program.). It is, of course, possible that participation in a few of the g crops is desired; 
in this case equation (3.29) should be modified accordingly. In general, the producer 
solves gC0+gCl+gC2+ ...+gCg-l+gCg expected profit maximization scenarios (Equations 
46 
(3.27) and (3.29) represent two such scenarios.) and chooses the one where the expected 
profits are maximum. Using arguments similar to the single product firm, it can be 
shown that an increase (decrease) in the target price (set-aside requirement) of ith crop 
will make participation in the commodity program more profitable and hence will not 
decrease the number of participants in the ith crop's program. At this level of 
generality, cross commodity effects can not be quantified. In general, results obtained 
under these general conditions are indeterminate. 
Summary 
In this chapter a brief review of key policy instruments for U.S. commodity 
programs is provided. A theoretical model directly incorporating policy instruments in 
crop producer decision process is developed. The theoretical model indicated that, 
among other things, an increase (decrease) in target price (set-aside requirement) will 
increase the number of program participants. The preceding exposition indicated that in 
general, it is impossible to determine all the effects of small changes in program 
parameters on crop output and input use without incorporating a number of specialized 
assumptions. This shows that even though some insights into the implications of a 
commodity program can be obtained from the stylized model, it is necessary to obtain 
empirical information to verify these results. 
In conclusion, two points are worth noting here. First it should be noted that the 
analysis carried so far is for an individual producer. Market level analysis can be 
achieved by utilizing aggregations over individual expected profit functions, output 
supply functions, and input demand functions. However, as firm level analysis 
suggested, this market level generalization would not have much to offer. Second, the 
decision to participate in commodity programs clearly depends on the expected price 
distribution and as rational expectations hypothesis suggests, this expected price 
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distribution in turn depends upon what is anticipated on the general market participation 
level or the output level. Choi and Johnson (1987) examined the participation decision 
under rational expectations hypothesis. Rational expectations hypothesis is not used in 
the analysis, because this would introduce difficulties in the ensuing elaborate empirical 
model. 
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End Notes 
1. The Food Security Act of 1985 provides for marketing loans. Marketing loans allow 
producers to repay nonrecourse price support loans at less than the announced loan 
rates. See Glaser (1986), and Hanthorn and Glauber (1987) for details. 
2. The base acreage LB is determined for each producer on the basis of his historical 
plantings. Due to set-aside restriction, a participating producer faces the inequality 
constrain L < (1-SET)*LB. This inequality constraint is not explicitly used in the 
present stylized model for expositional convenience and the program parameter LB 
does not appear in the stylized model. However, in the empirical work that follows 
LB enters exogenously in the model. 
3. Commodity programs typically contain two "support" prices, the loan rate and target 
price. Since target prices are always higher than loan rates, the target price might be 
considered as the price floor for program participants. Target price, if it exists, 
corresponds to in the model. The model does not explicitly distinguish loan rates 
and target prices, a drawback. 
4. However, if the production function is homogeneous in inputs then the expansion 
paths are linear. In this case the factor ratio K/L is independent of the level of 
output. Hence we get K*/L* > K°/L" (Choi and Johnson, 1987). 
5. This can be easily proved for the present case using the expression, (ay*/3EPP) = 
fl{_(.)'5K»/9EPP + fL(.)'aL*/aEPP and equation (3.18). 
6. In recent years, paid-diversion payment is specified in the program in $/unit of the 
output (For example 1.75 $/bushel of corn in the year 1988). This payment rate is 
multiplied by a specified program yield to obtain payment per an acre of idled land. 
7. If D is sufficiently larger than r, then it is possible for r) to be negative and there 
will be no finite maximum for the problem in (3.24). Hence, for a finite solution to 
(3.24) we must also assume that »; > 0 which implies D < r/DIV. This condition is 
assured in reality where supply of land is extremely inelastic. Also, producers face 
an additional constraint requiring that acres planted should not exceed the program 
specified base acres. 
8. Cross compliance requirements place restrictions on acres planted by participating 
multicrop producer. See Cochrane and Ryan (1976) and Glaser (1986) for historical 
details on cross compliance restrictions. 
49 
CHAPTER IV. ISSUES IN EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter shows how the theoretical model developed in Chapter III can be 
integrated with supply module discussed in Chapter II for empirical implementation. A 
number of special structural assumptions are required for application of the model. 
These and other issues for empirical implementation of policy and other variables are 
discussed in this chapter. 
In the present study, crop supply module comprises of thirteen outputs (crops) 
four variable inputs and one fixed input. The 13 crops are: wheat, rice, corn, other 
coarse grains, soybeans, hay, cotton, peanuts, flaxseed and sunflower, sugar cane and 
sugar beet, tobacco, vegetables, fruits and nuts. These represent over 95 percent of U.S. 
agriculture in terms of acres planted and value of production. This 13 crop list for the 
U.S., will represent the most dis-aggregated estimation of crop supply response analysis. 
The four variable inputs are land, fertilizer, operating capital, and labor. Value of 
durable farm machinery is the fixed input. 
Following the discussion in Chapter II, a normalized quadratic restricted profit 
function is used. It is restricted because there is a fixed input. Wage rate of labor is 
used as the numeraire price. Thirteen output supply and four input demand equations 
are derived from the normalized quadratic profit function. Of these, the input demand 
equation for the numeraire good, labor, is non-linear. The other sixteen equations are 
linear. Policy variables are incorporated into all equations directly in a structural way. 
Policy Implementation 
The commodity program provisions in the U.S. have included a number of 
complex features and provisions. Moreover, these provisions have changed considerably 
over the sample period. To make the present study manageable, a overall general 
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structure is developed to reflect these changing characteristics of program provisions. 
The following treatment for program variables is one such stylized representation. 
Though the commodity programs have been continuously evolving over the 
sample period, three basic features have remained fairly constant for the food and feed 
grain programs. These include commodity loan activities of the CCC, price support or 
deficiency payments with set-aside requirements, and paid diversion programs. The 
program parameters incorporated in the present study include these three basic features. 
Of the 13 crops in the present study, for 5 crops (hay, flaxseed and sunflower, 
sugarcane and sugarbeet, vegetables and fruits and nuts) no policy variables were 
explicitly incorporated. These crops do not have direct domestic price support policies 
(see Table 1.1). Import quotas for sugar are significant, but modeling import quotas is 
beyond the scope of the present study. For the remaining 8 crops in the model (wheat, 
rice, corn, other coarse grains, soybeans, cotton, peanuts, and tobacco) policy parameters 
are explicitly introduced for the estimated output supply and input demand equations. 
Also, for soybeans and peanuts only loan rates exist. Hence, for these two crops only 
loan rates are modeled. All the producers of soybeans and peanuts are treated as 
program participants. The government program for tobacco specifies a target price but 
is not voluntary. Target price for tobacco are also incorporated in the estimated output 
supply and input demand equations. Policies for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, 
and cotton were modeled in the most detail. Programs for these five crops involve a 
decision by the producers whether or not to participate. 
Target prices and loan rates 
The exposition in Chapter III demonstrated that target prices and loan rates 
effectively truncate the distribution of expected prices for the producers who participate 
in commodity programs. For these program participants, target prices and loan rates 
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alter the expected prices. Specifically, the expected price is higher with support prices. 
To the producers who continue to remain non-participants in commodity programs, 
target prices have no effect on the expected prices^ This has two implications. First, 
the target prices and loan rates enter the output supply response functions via the 
expected prices; higher the target price higher the expected price. Second, we have two 
distinct expected prices, one for participants and one for non-participants. However, 
data are available only at the aggregate level; data on production and input use are not 
available for program participants and non-participants separately. Hence, only one 
supply response function aggregated for all producers - both participants and non-
participants - can be estimated. This necessitates aggregation of the expected prices of 
participants and non-participants. Hence, a method had to be devised to aggregate the 
expected price of participants and non-participants. 
One obvious choice for aggregating prices is to weigh the expected prices by 
participation rates'. This intuitively appealing method was used. More specifically, 
aggregate expected price for i^^ crop is derived as: 
(4.1) EPj = PAR-EPPj + (1 - PARi).ENPj, 
where, 
EPj = aggregate, expected price for i^^ crop, 
PARj = program participation rate, 
EPPj = expected price for program participants, and 
ENPj = expected price for non-participants. 
Given participation rate (defined in detail later), EPj in (4.1) is a linear aggregator of 
EPPj and ENPj. However, participation rate itself is endogenous and a function of 
prices. Thus, the aggregate measure of price, EP|, in equation (4.1) represents nonlinear 
aggregation of individual firm's prices. This non-linear aggregation of firm specific 
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prices imposes certain restrictions on the functional forms of aggregate market-level 
profit function (see Table 2.1). To maintain theoretical consistency, these aggregation 
restrictions are maintained in the specification of market-level profit function. 
Simple adaptive expectations are used to derive the expected prices. Specifically, 
expected price for non-program participants is defined as the market price, lagged one 
period. Using more sophisticated approaches such as rational expectations (Muth, 1961; 
Goodwin and Sheffrin, 1982) would substantially complicate the present model. To,keep 
the study manageable, simple adaptive expectations are used instead. Expected price for 
program participants is defined as the maximum of current target price, loan rate, and 
lagged market price. 
The treatment given in equation (4.1) is relevant only for wheat, rice, corn, other 
coarse grains, and cotton for which the program participation rate in endogenized. For 
soybean and peanuts expected price simply equals maximum of current loan rate and 
market price lagged one period. For tobacco, the aggregate expected price equals the 
maximum of the current target price and market price lagged one price. For the 
remaining 5 crops (hay, flaxseed and sunflower, sugarcane and sugarbeet, vegetables and 
fruits and nuts) aggregate expected price was set equal to market price, lagged one 
period. 
Set-aside requirements 
As explained in Chapter III, set-aside requirements increase the "effective" rental 
price of land input to program participants. Thus, to be consistent with the theoretical 
model in Chapter III, set-aside requirements should enter the empirical model through 
the rental price of land. However, set-aside requirements are crop specific and 
depending on the commodity program provisions, differ from crop to crop. Hence, the 
set-aside requirements affect rental price of land in a crop specific manner. The 
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implication is that effective rental price of land depends on where the land input is 
being used. The higher the set-aside requirements for i^^ crop (relative to crop) the 
higher is the rental price of land planted to i*^ crop. 
Following the treatment in Chapter III, rental price of land for crop i for a 
program participant is defined as RENT/(l-SETj), where RENT is the rental price of 
land and SET^ is the set-aside requirements. For a non-participant the rental value of 
land remains to be RENT. Similar to crop output price, rental price of land had to be 
aggregated over participants and non participants. As before, participation rate is used 
as the weight. 
The aggregate rental price of land used for i^^ crop is given by: 
(4.2) ARENTj = PARj . RENT/(l-SETj) + (1-PARj) . RENT 
where, 
ARENTj = aggregate effective rental price of land for ith crop, $/acre, 
RENT = rental price of land, $/acre, 
PARTj = participation rate in i^^ crops' commodity program, and 
SETj = set-aside requirements for i*^ crop. 
Like the output price, the specification of "effective" rental value of land input in 
equation (4.2) is relevant only for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains and cotton. For 
the remaining 8 crops in the model, there is no acreage reduction program. Hence the 
rental price of land for these 8 crops simply equal to RENT. 
Diversion oavments 
The essential feature of the paid-diversion instrument is that government 
effectively rents a certain percent of land at an announced price from willing producers. 
This "diverted" land is left idle. Though paid-diversion programs have changed 
considerably over the sample period this feature remained the same. In the present 
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study, paid-diversion programs are incorporated in the product supply equations for 
wheat, com and other coarse grains. 
A similar program was legislated in the 1981 Farm Bill for rice. However lack 
of observations prevented incorporating the paid-diversion program in the supply 
equations for rice. The paid-diversion program for cotton has changed over the sample 
period, making it difficult to model in a stylized fashion. For this reason, a paid-
diversion program for cotton is not specified in the output supply equations. 
The discussion in Chapter III indicated that a paid-diversion program has two 
distinct effects on the production. First, a paid-diversion program has no effect on the 
non-participant producer's production as long as the producer continues to remain a 
non-participant^. Second, the program has a direct effect, though not unambiguous in 
direction, on the production of the participant. 
Of course, the paid-diversion program will have a definite influence on the 
participation decision itsçlf. This implies that at aggregate level, effect of paid-
diversion program is best represented by weighing with the participation rate. 
Accordingly, paid-diversion program in the supply equations of wheat, corn and other 
coarse grains is represented by a multiplicative variable. This variable is obtained by 
taking the multiplicative product of participation rate, paid-diversion payment rate 
(PDF), and paid-diversion idle acres requirement (DIV)^. 
Program participation 
One of the keys to analyzing effects of commodity policies is the identification 
of the proportion of producers participating in the programs. The conceptual 
foundations of the supply response model developed in Chapter III indicated that the 
group supply functions could be determined by aggregating over all participants and 
non-participants. This would require data on the number of producers eligible for 
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government programs who participate and the number of producers eligible that do not 
participate. Unfortunately, these data are not generally available. However, there are 
data available on the number of acres under participating farms. Although there is not a 
one-to-one correspondence between the number of acres and number of producers, it 
was felt that these data represented a reasonable proxy. Accordingly, participation rate 
for a crop was defined as the percent of base acres (eligible acres) brought under the 
control of program provisions. 
Participation rate is an important indicator of the effectiveness or popularity of a 
commodity program. Structural aggregate supply response analysis must reflect changes 
in program participation. Reduced form representations of policies fail to recognize the 
changes in participation rate explicitly. Thus, the policy results from such reduced form 
studies are difficult to apply in circumstances other than those that existed in the 
sample. Unlike previous supply response studies (e.g., Shumway and Alexander 1988, 
and Ball 1988), participation rates are endogenized in this study. 
The conceptual model set up in Chapter III indicated that participation rate in 
the commodity program for crop depends on: 
(4.3) PAR; = f(n*^ - n°b, 
where, 
PARj = participation rate (proportion of base acres under program), 
n** • profits for program participant, 
= profits for non-program participant, and 
3f(.)/5(ii»^ - > 0. 
Unfortunately, however, a direct empirical implementation of (4.3) is not possible 
because data are not available for II*' and 11**^ However, the analysis in Chapter III, 
showed that among other variables target prices and set-aside requirements explain the 
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difference between II** and 11°'. Specifically, the comparative statics analysis in Chapter 
in indicated that a(n** - > 0, 5(n** - n°*)/3SETj < 0, and 3(n*' -
II°')/9PDPj > 0, where TPj is the target price of i^^ crop, SETj is the set-aside 
requirement for i*^ crop, and PDF' is the deficiency payment per unit of i^^ crop. 
These comparative statics results are used in specifying an empirical version of 
equation (4.3). Additionally, selected restrictions are placed on the functional form so 
that participation rate is bound between 0 and 1. These restrictions are warranted 
because the dependent variable, PAR-, itself is bound between 0 and 1 by definition. 
The exact functional form for participation rate is: 
(4.4) PARj = l-exp[-{aii.(TPji/FPjt_j).(l-SETi-DIVj) + aj2'(PDPi/FP^(_i).DIVj)], 
where, 
TPj » target price for i^^ crop, 
FPit_i = farm price of ith crop, lagged one period, 
a^ and a^2 ^re parameters to be estimated and other variables are as defined earlier. 
Variables without a time subscript refer to current period. A prior, we expect ajj and 
ajj2 to be positive. 
The functional form of equation (4.4) has several desirable properties. First, the 
functional form ensures that for TP^ > 0, PDPjt ^ 0, FPj_| >0,0 < SETj < 1, and 0 < 
DIVj < 1 predicted values for PARj are bound between 0 and 1. The simple linear 
functional form used by .previous studies (Skold and Westhoff, 1988) does not satisfy this 
restriction. Other desirable properties of the specification in (4.4) become evident by 
observing its first and second derivatives, 
(4.5a) aPARj/aTPj = (1 - PAR|).(a;i/FPj(_i)(l - SET; - DIVj) > 0, 
(4.5b) SPARj/aPDPj = (1 - PARi).(ai2/FPit_i).DIVi > 0, 
(4.5c) aPARj/SSETi = (PAR- - l).a;^.(TP/FP|^_j) < 0, 
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(4.5d) SPARi/aOIVi = (1 - PARj).{-ai|(TPi/FPit.j) + a;2(PDP/FP^(_^)}, 
and 
(4.6a) a^PARj/arPi^ » -(aPAR/aTP.).(a^/FP;|^_i)(l - SETj - DIVj) < 0, 
(4.6b) a^PARj/SPDPi^ « -(SPARi/ÔPDPp.(aj2/FPit_i)'DIVj< 0, 
(4.6c) a^PARj/aSETj^ . -(aPARj/aSETj).aj2'(TP(/FP|^_j) > 0, and 
(4.6d) a^pARj/SDIVi^ = (aPARj/aDIVi).(ai2(TPj/FPjt.j).DIVi - (aii(PDPj/FPjj_j)). 
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) indicate that the participation rate approaches 1 as 
target price (TPj) or paid-diversion payment rate (PDPj) approach infinity. Thus, for a 
sufficiently large target price or paid-diversion payment rate, policy maker can assure 
that all producers participate in the commodity programs. These properties of the 
participation rate equation are illustrated in panel 1 and panel 2 of Figure 4.1. As 
shown in the Figure 4.1, when target price and paid-diversion payment rate are zero, 
then there is no participation in the program (PARj = 0). 
The first derivative of equation (4.4) with respect to set-aside requirement is 
given in equation (4.5c) which indicates that participation rate is inversely related to set-
aside requirement rate. Evaluating equation (4.4) at SETj = 1 (which of course implies 
DIVj = 0) gives a participation rate of 0 as desired. 
While SPARj/SSETj is clearly non-positive, the sign of aPARj/aOIVj in equation 
(4.5d) can not be ascertained with out the knowledge of parameters ajj and aj2, and the 
level of policy parameters TPj, and PDPj in relation to the market price (FPj). This is 
because an increase in DIVj has two effects, acting in opposite directions. Since an 
increase in DIV- reduces acres available for planting there is a potential loss of gross 
revenue leading to a negative effect on the participation rate. On the other hand, an 
increase in DIVj makes the program more attractive; leading to a positive effect on the 
program participation. The overall net effect of a change in DIVj on program 
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Figure 4.1. Response of program participation rate to target price and 
paid-diversion payment rate 
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participation rate can not be obtained without knowing the values of parameters a^ and 
a|2> Empirical estimation of equation (4.4) will reveal these coefficients. 
Program participation rate equations are estimated for wheat, rice, corn, other 
coarse grains, and cotton. For other crops in the study, similar programs do not exist 
and hence program participation equations are not necessary. Note that the treatment of 
policy variables and their incorporation in empirical model follows closely the theoretical 
specification in Chapter III. This structural representation, as opposed to reduced form 
representation, will enrich the policy analyzing capability of the estimated crop module. 
Fixed Variables and Technology 
Value of durable farm machinery is treated as a fixed variable. As indicated in 
Chapter n, exact linear aggregation of the fixed input across the firms imposes 
restrictions on the functional form of the profit function. Specifically, it requires that 
profit function be affine in the fixed input - value of durable farm equipment (see 
Table 2.1). This condition is maintained in the specification and the estimation of the 
supply module^. 
Various technological advancements like hybrid seed development, better crop 
protection measures, improved soil tillage practices etc., have enhanced crop yields over 
the sample period. To capture the effects of such technical progress on crop yields and 
input productivity, a time variable is included in the model. This time variable is used 
in the thirteen crop supply and four input demand equations. 
Other fixed variables in the model include four dummy variables. These dummy 
variables are used in the output supply equations for corn, peanuts and flaxseed and 
sunflower. Extremely bad weather coupled with an aggressive payment-in-kind (PIK) 
program resulted in a dramatically lower corn production in year IPSS'^. To capture 
these effects, a dummy variable for year 1983 was used in the corn supply equation. 
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Similarly, to capture the effects of a bad weather year, a dummy variable for year 1980 
was used in the product supply equation of peanuts^. Flaxseed and sunflower 
production were the most erratic. Two dummy variables, one for year 1979 and for 
years later to 1977 were used in the production equation of flaxseed and sunflower. 
Comparative Statics^ 
Before proceeding to estimation it will be worthwhile to ascertain how the 
market level empirical specification of the policy in the supply module behaves. This 
can be evaluated by examining the comparative statics of the empirical model. The 
relevant equations for the program crops (wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, and 
cotton) are: 
(4.7a) Yj « a| + by EPj + Ek=i ^ij^k. 
(4.7b) EPj - PAR-EPPi + (1 - PARP'ENPj, 
(4.7c) EPPj = max(TPi, FFPt_,), 
(4.7d) ENP. = FPj_j, 
(4.7f) EPj4 = ARENTj = PAR; . RENT/(l-SETj) + (l-PARj) • RENT, and 
(4.7e) PAR; . l-exp[-{aii.(TPti/FPit_j).(l-SETi-DIVi) + aj|2'(PDP/FPj(_i).DIV;)]. 
Equations (4.7b) through (4.7f) are definitional equations and have no parameters to be 
estimated. Note that while equations (4.7a) and (4.7f) are estimated for the program 
crops, only (4.7a) is estimated for the remaining 8 crops (soybeans, hay, peanuts, 
flaxseed and sunflower, sugarcane and sugarbeet, tobacco, vegetables, and fruits and 
nuts). Also, for these 8 crops equations (4.7b) through (4.7f) are not appropriate and are 
replaced by: 
(4.8a) epj = fpj.j, and 
(4.8b) EPj4» rent. 
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The comparative statics analysis for the non-program crops is straight forward and hence 
is not presented. The comparative statics analysis is carried out here only for the 
program crops whose equations are given by (4.7). 
Changes in target prices 
To analyze the effects of a change in target price of ith crop on the production 
differentiate (4.7a) with respect to TPj; 
(4.9) aVj/ÔTPj = by (9EPi/3TPi) + b^^^ (aARENT/aTPj). 
By the convexity of the profit function, bjj > 0 implying a positively sloped supply 
function. For a normal technology (Sakai, 1974), we expect < 0, a priori. 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4.9) is positive. To show this, using 
equations (4.7b) and (4.7c), the first term in equation (4.9) can be rewritten as: 
aEPj/aTPj = (EPPi-ENPpKaPARj/aTPi) + PARj.(aEPP/aTP^). 
From equations (4.7c) and (4.7d), (EPPj-ENPj) > 0; that is, expected price for program 
participant is not less than that for the non-participant. Second, from equation (4.5a), 
(aPARj/aTPj) > 0; that is, participation rate increases as target price increases. Finally, 
from equation (4.7c) we obtain (ôEPPj/aTPj) > 0. Thus, the first term on the right hand 
side of equation (4.9) is non-negative; bjj«(aEP|/aTPj) > 0. This positive effect signifies 
an expansion effect of the target price; higher the target price higher the production. 
The second term on the right hand side of equation (4.9), bj|4«(aARENTj/aTPj) 
is non-positive. This can be shown by differentiating the right hand side of equation 
(4.7f) with respect to TPj; 
(aARENTj/aTPj) = RENT.[SETj/(l-SETj)].(aPARi/aTPi). 
But, since set-aside requirements (SETj) are always between 0 and 1, and (aPARj/aTPj) 
> 0 (from equation 4.5a), we obtain (aARENTj/aTPj) > 0. Thus, the second term on the 
right hand side of (4.9) is negative, as claimed. This negative effect of an increase in 
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target price on production is due to an increase in the participation rate and the 
associated loss in acres due to set-aside requirements. Thus, equation (4.9) indicates that 
an increase in target price would have two distinct effects on production acting in 
opposite directions. The effect on producers who are already program participants is 
positive. In fact, when (4.9) is evaluated at PARj = 1, we unambiguously obtain 
aYj/aTPj > 0. 
Changes in set-aside requirements 
To investigate, the effects of a change in set-aside requirements on the 
production, differentiate equation (4.7a) with respect to SETj; 
(4.10) aY|/aSET. » bji (JEPyaSETj) + bij4 (aARENTj/SSETj). 
The first term on the right hand side of (4,9) is non-positive, because from equation 
(4.7b) we get, 
(aEPj/aSETj) = (EPPj .- ENPi).(3PARj/3SETj). 
From equation (4.5c), we know (9PARj/3SET|) < 0. Thus, the first term on the RHS of 
equation (4.10) is non-positive. The sign of second term on the RHS of equation (4.10) 
is positive because from equation (4.7f) we get: 
(aARENTj/ÔSETj) - [RENT;.SETy( 1 -SET;)].(aPAR|/aSETj) 
- PAR-RENTjAl-SETj)^, 
which is clearly negative. However when multiplied by bjj^, the second term on the 
RHS of (4.10) becomes positive thus making the whole expression in (4.10) in 
determinate in sign. As in the case of target price, a change in set-aside requirement 
has two distinct and opposite effects on the total production. 
The comparative static results from the empirical model are consistent with the 
results obtained from the theoretical model set up Chapter III. To obtain, tangible 
unambiguous results it is necessary to estimate the parameters of the model. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has focussed on the structural and technological assumptions 
necessary to empirically implement the theoretical model developed in Chapter III. An 
important feature of the model includes aggregate output supply and input demand 
equations which are consistent with expected profit maximization by individual agents. 
Thirteen output supply and four input demand equations are derived from an aggregate 
normalized profit function. Policy variables (target prices, loan rates, set-aside 
requirements, paid-diversion payment rates, and paid-diversion requirements) are 
explicitly introduced in these output supply and input demand equations in a structural 
framework. Additionally, program participation rate equations that interact with output 
supply and input demand equations are outlined for estimation. These participation rate 
equations reflect the voluntary nature of the commodity programs. The structural model 
developed here represents a significant improvement over the way policy variables are 
introduced in previous studies of output supply and input demand analysis. 
A caveat is in order. Previous studies by Choi and Johnson (1987) and Holt 
(1987) have examined producer decisions in the context of voluntary commodity 
programs using rational expectations hypothesis (REH). This theoretically elegant REH 
lets the individual producer's price expectations a function of all relevant information 
including anticipated market output and anticipated total participation rate. 
Accordingly, when a policy parameter is changed,, the expectations change and hence, 
output and input levels of a non-participant might also change. This market feedback 
mechanism between participation non-participation and expected price is lost in a simple 
adaptive expectations framework used in the present study. However, in view of the 
ensuing large scale estimation, REH is not used in the present study. 
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End Notes 
1. This result is a direct consequence of lack of rational expectations hypothesis (REH). 
In the model, price expectations of the non-participant producer do not change when 
policy instruments are shocked. Hence, if the producer continues to remain a non-
participant even after a change in policy parameter, then the non-participant 
producer's optimal output and input levels are unchanged. On the other hand, if 
REH is used, then price expectations of the non-participant producer change as 
policy parameter is varied and hence output produced also changes. 
2. The paid-diversion requirement (DIV) variable used in the model differs from the 
actual instrument given in the program provisions. In the model, DIV is specified as 
exogenous. However, historically during certain year, producers had the option of 
choosing DIV (subject to an upper limit). The formula used to derive DIV is 
explained in Chapter V. 
3. More specifically, coefficients (d|^| in equation 2.8) for the quadratic terms of fixed 
variables are set to zero . 
4. Corn production was 4.2 billion bushels in year 1983, the lowest in the last 20 years. 
The average annual corn production for the previous two years was about 8.2 billion 
bushels. 
5. In 1980, peanut production was 2.3 billion pounds compared to an average of 4 
billion pounds in the previous two years. 
6. To simplify the results, no paid-diversion program is assumed in the comparative 
static analysis, i.e., results of the comparative static analysis are implicitly evaluated 
at DIVj = 0 or PDPj = 0. The ensuing empirical model incorporates a paid-diversion 
program as explained. 
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CHAPTER V. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
This chapter describes the data set used for the estimation. This documentation 
of the data base is followed by a description of the estimation procedures used for the 
empirical investigation of the supply module for the U.S. crops sector. 
Data 
Aggregate annual crop-year data for the U.S. were used in the estimation. The 
sample period extends from years 1950 to 1986. However, due to the lag structure 
involved in the specification of the analytical model, only 36 observations (1951-1986) 
are available for the estimation. Endogenous variables include the thirteen outputs 
(production of wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, soybeans, hay, cotton, peanuts, 
flaxseed and sunflower, sugarcane and sugarbeet, tobacco, vegetables, and fruits and 
nuts), four variable inputs (crop land used, quantity of fertilizer applied, quantity of 
operating capital used, and labor employed in crop sectors) and the commodity program 
participation rates for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, and cotton. The exogenous 
variables include the prices of outputs and variables inputs, target prices, set-aside 
requirements, paid-diversion payment rates, and paid-diversion idled acres requirements. 
Table 5.1 lists the variable definitions with explanations, units and sources of data. 
Complete data used for estimation are given Table A.l in the Appendix. Data for 
outputs and variable inputs are in terms of physical quantities rather than value. 
The Tornquist approximation to Divisia index was used as necessary to aggregate 
price data for the output and input groups. Value shares for outputs and expenditure 
shares for inputs are used as weights. Aggregate quantity indices are computed by 
dividing aggregate values and expenditures by the aggregate price indexes. The 
Tornquist approximation to Divisia price index for a group of n commodities is given by 
(Tornquist 1936, Diewert, 1976, Trivedi, 1981): 
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Table 5.1. Description of variables, units, and data sources 
Variable Explanation Units Source 
UHEPD Wheat, production Million bushels AS® 
RICPD Rice, production Million cwt AS 
CORPD Com, production Million bushels AS 
OCGPD Other coarse grains, production Index Derived 
SOYPD Soybeans, production Million bushels AS 
HAYPD Ail Hay, production Million tons AS 
COTPD Cotton, production Million pounds AS 
PNTPD • Peanuts, production Million pounds AS 
FXSPD Flaxseed and Sunflower, production Index Derived 
SUGPD Sugarcane and beet, production Index Derived 
TOBPD Tobacco, production Million pounds AS 
VEGPD Vegetables, production Million tons AS 
FUNPD Fruits and Nuts, production Index Derived 
INDUS Land use Million acres Derived 
FERUS Fertilizer use Million tons AS 
OPCUS Other operating capital Index Derived 
LABUS Labor use in Crop Production Million hours Derived 
WHEFP Wheat, farm price $/bushel AS 
RICFP Rice, farm price $/cwt AS 
CORFP Com, farm price $/bu AS 
OCGFP Other coarse grains, farm price DI (1950-1) Derived 
SOYFP Soybeans, farm price $/bu AS 
HAYFP All hay, farm price $/ton AS 
COTFP Cotton, farm price $/lb AS 
PNTFP Peanuts, farm price $/lb AS 
FXSFP Flaxseed and sunflower, farm price DI (1950-1) Derived 
SUGFP Sugarcane and beet, farm price DI (1950-1) Derived 
TOBFP Tobacco, farm price $/lb AS 
VEGFP Vegetable, farm price $/ton AS 
FUNFP Fruits and Nuts, farm price Index (1950-1) AS 
RENT Land, rental value $/acre Derived 
FERFP Fertilizer, farm price Index (1950-1) AS 
OPCFP Other operating capital, price DI (1950-1) Derived 
WAGE Farm wage rate $/hDur AS 
VFM Value of durable farm machinery 
used in the U.S. crop sector Billion $ AS 
^U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
various issues. 
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Table 5.1. (continued) 
WHEEP Wheat, aggregate expected price $/bushel AS 
RICEP Rice, aggregate expected price $/cwt AS 
COREP Com, aggregate expected price $/bu AS 
OCGEP Other coarse grains, aggregate 
expected price DI (1950-1) Derived 
SOYEP Soybeans, aggregate expected price $/bu AS 
HAYEP All hay, aggregate expected price $/ton AS 
COTEP Cotton, aggregate expected price $/lb AS 
PNTEP Peanuts, aggregate expected price $/lb AS 
FXSEP Flaxseed and sunflower, aggregate 
expected price DI (1950-1) Derived 
SUGEP Sugarcane and beet, aggregate 
TOBEP 
expectedprice DI (1950-•1) Derived 
Tobacco, aggregate expected price $/lb AS 
VEGEP Vegetable, aggregate expected price $/ton AS 
FUNEP Fruits and Nuts, aggregate expected 
price Index (1950-1) AS 
WHETP Wheat, target price $/bu AS 
RICTP Rice, target price $/cwt AS 
CORTP Com, target price $/bu AS 
OCGTP Other coarse grains, target price $/bu Derived 
COTTP Cotton, target price $/lb AS 
TOBTP Tobacco, target price $/lb AS 
WHEI& Wheat, loan rate $/bu AS 
RICLR Rice, loan rate $/cwt AS 
CORLR Com, loan rate $/bu AS 
OCGLR Other coarse grains, loan rate $/bu Derived 
SOYLR Cotton, loan rate $/lb AS 
PNTLR Tobacco, loan rate $/lb AS 
UHESET Wheat, set-aside requirement % AS 
RICSET Rice, set-aside requirement % AS 
CORSET Com, set-aside requirement % AS 
OCGSET Other c.gr., set-aside requirement % Derived 
COTSET Cotton, set-aside requirement % AS 
WHEPAR Wheat, participation rate % AS 
RICPAR Rice, participation rate % AS 
CORPAR Com, participation rate % AS 
OCGPAR Other c.gr., participation rate % Derived 
COTPAR Cotton, participation rate % AS 
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Table 5.1. (continued) 
WHEPDP Wheat, paid-diversion payment rate $/bu AS 
RICPDP Rice, paid-diversion payment rate $/cwt AS 
CORPDP Com, paid-diversion payment rate $/bu AS 
OCGPDP OCG paid-diversion payment rate $/bu Derived 
COTPDP Cotton, paid-diversion payment rate $/lb AS 
WHEDIV Wheat, diversion requirement % AS 
RICDIV Rice, diversion requirement % AS 
CORDIV Com, diversion requirement % AS 
OCGDIV Other c.gr., diversion requirement % Derived 
COTDIV Cotton, diversion requirement % AS 
DUH83 Dummy for year 1983 Derived 
DUH80 Dummy for year 1980 - Derived 
DUM79 Dummy for year 1979 - Derived 
SFT77 Dummy for years after 1977 Derived 
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(5.1) Dt= Eii(l/2){Pit • Qit/Et + Pit.i -Qit-i/Et-i) • log(Pit/Pit.i) , and 
(5.2) Pj = Pj_j.exp(Dj), 
where, 
Et - E£i Pit • Qit. 
P|t = Price of ith good, 
Qjj = Production of ith good, and 
Pj = Divisia price index. 
The implicit quantity index, Qj, is obtained by: 
(5.3) Qt = Ej/Pj. 
Output and input quantities and their respective prices are scaled such that the units of 
gross returns (production times output price) and expenditures (input use times input 
price) are always millions of dollars. 
Output variables 
Data for the production and farm prices of wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, hay, 
cotton, peanuts, tobacco, and vegetables were collected from various issues of 
Agricultural Statistics (USDA). These data are presented in Table A.l in the Appendix. 
Since data for these nine crops are readily available, aggregation of data is not necessary. 
The remaining four output groups (other coarse grains, flaxseed and sunflower, 
sugarcane and sugarbeet, and fruits and nuts), however, represent more than one crop. 
Hence some aggregation is necessary to arrive at the output and price measures for these 
four groups. 
Other coarse grains (OCG) This aggregate output category comprises of 
barley, oats, sorghum and rye. Farm price of OCG (OCGFP) was derived using a 
Divisia price index as specified in equations (5.1) and (5.2). Aggregate production index 
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for OCG (OCGPD) was obtained by using the formula in equation (5.3). The derived 
price and quantity indices are given Table A.l. 
Sugarcane and suearbeet (SUG) A Divisia price index was used to aggregate 
the farm prices of sugarcane and sugarbeet. An implicit quantity index was obtained by 
dividing the aggregate value of sugarcane and sugarbeet by the Divisia price index. 
Data on production and prices for sugarcane and sugarbeet were collected from 
Agricultural Statistics. The derived price and quantity indices are presented in Table 
A.l. 
Flaxseed and sunflower fFXS) This output group comprises of flaxseed and 
sunflower. Divisia price index and implicit quantity index are developed by using (5.2) 
and (5.3). Data were collected from various issues of Agricultural Statistics. 
Fruits and nuts fFUN) Using the available data on aggregate price index and 
cash receipts for fruits and nuts, an implicit quantity index was obtained. 
Policy variables 
As mentioned earlier, the commodity programs for U S. crops have changed 
during the sample period. During some years there are no government programs for 
certain crops. Data for policy variables by crop were then collected only for those years 
in which a program existed for that crop. 
Target prices Data on target prices for wheat, rice, corn, cotton, and tobacco 
were collected from various issues of Agricultural Statistics. Target prices for sorghum, 
barley, and oats were aggregated into a Divisia target price index for OCG. For other 
crops, there are no target prices. Data on target prices are presented in Table A.l. A 
value of zero under target price in Table A.l indicates that there is no target price for 
that crop in that particular year. 
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Loan rates During program years, data on loan rates for wheat, rice, corn, 
soybeans, and peanuts were collected from various issues of Agricultural Statistics. Loan 
rates for sorghum, barley, oats, and rye are aggregated into a Divisia loan rate index for 
OCG using value shares as weights. For other crops, there are no loan rates. Data on 
loan rates are presented in Table A.l. As with target prices, a value of zero for loan 
rate in Table A.l indicates that there is no loan rate for that crop in that particular year. 
Set-aside requirements During sample years, set-aside requirements for wheat, 
rice, com, other coarse grains, and cotton are derived as follows: 
(5.4) SETj- SACjASACi + DAC; + PAC;) i = 1,2,3,4,7 
where, 
SETj = set-aside requirement for i^^ crop (fraction of base aces to be idled), 
SACj « area idled under set-aside for i^^ crop, million acres, 
DACj » area idled under paid-diversion program for i*^ crop, million acres, and 
PACj • area planted in the program for i^^ crop, million acres. 
Program planted acres and idled acres for other coarse grains were obtained by 
adding the respective acres for sorghum, barley, and oats. These data were collected 
from ASCS fact sheets. A value of zero for SETj in Table A.l indicates that the 
program provisions for that crop in that particular year did not contain acreage 
reduction program (hence no set-aside requirements). 
Participation Rates During sample years, program participation rate for crop 
z, is defined as: 
(5.5) PAR; . (SACj + DACj + PACj)/BACj i = 1,2,3,4,7 
where, 
PAR; = participation rate (fraction of base acres in compliance with the program 
for i^^ crop, and 
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BACj = base area (eligible for the program) for i*^ crop, million acres. 
Other variables are as defined in (5.4). Data on base acres were obtained from ASCS 
fact sheets. Base aces for OCG were obtained by adding those of sorghum, barley, and 
oats. 
Diversion payments During sample years, diversion payments per unit of 
output is derived by using the following formula: 
(5.6) DPAi = DVPj / (DACj.PYDj)i = 1,2,3,4,7 
where, 
DPAj = diversion payments per unit of i^^ crop, 
DVPj = total paid-diversion payments to farmers of i^^ crop, million $, and 
PYDj " program yield of crop. 
Total paid-diversion payments to OCG farmers were obtained by adding the payments to 
sorghum, barley, and oats producers. 
Variable inputs 
Land Data on land use were obtained by adding the total acres planted under 
the thirteen crops (for sugarcane and hay acres harvested is used instead), total acres 
idled under commodity programs and total acres idled under the Conservation Reserve 
Program. Data on acres planted were collected from Agricultural Statistics. Data on 
acres idled were collected from ASCS fact sheets. Data on the total land use are 
presented in Table A.l. 
Rental value of land An approach similar to user cost of capital (Branson 
1979) was used to compute rental price of land. Specifically, the following formula was 
used to arrive at the rental price of land: 
(5.7) RENT = V.(ir + tr) - g 
where 
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RENT = user cost or rental price of land, 
V = Value of agricultural land, $/acre, 
ir = nominal interest rate, 
tr « real estate tax rate, and 
g » expected rate of change of RENT (expected capital gain). 
Data on the value of agricultural land, interest rate and taxes were collected from 
various issues of Agricultural Statistics. The interest rate used was the average interest 
rate on new loans of federal land banks. Finally expected price changes to measure 
expected capital gain (g) is obtained by taking a ten year average of actual inflation rate 
(Moschini, 1988b). 
Fertilizer The input which contributes to crop production is not fertilizer per 
se, but rather the actual nutrients contained in fertilizer. The primary nutrients are; 
nitrogen (N), available phosphoric acid (P2O5) and potash (K2O). These nutrients are 
sold in various combinations. Mixed grade fertilizers contain more than one nutrient. 
To keep the model manageable, it is desirable to treat fertilizer as a single input in the 
production process. Data are available (in Agricultural Statistics) on the use of all 
fertilizers containing primary nutrients. Since different fertilizers contain different 
quantities of the primary nutrients, this data, as such, are not useful. Data on total 
fertilizer was then derived by using the formula: 
(5.8) FERUS = ALLFER . (N% + P% + K%) 
where, 
FERUS = total primary nutrients use, in million tons, 
ALLFER = quantity of all fertilizers containing primary nutrients used, 
N% = Nitrogen percentage in the ALLFER, 
P% " Phosphoric acid percentage in ALLFER, and 
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K% « Potash percentage in ALLFER. 
Data on all these variables were obtained from Agricultural Statistics. The variable 
FERUS was employed as aggregate fertilizer input use in the estimation. Data on 
fertilizer price index (FERFP) was collected from Agricultural Statistics. Data on 
FERUS and FERFP are presented in the Table A.l. 
Operating capital Operating capital comprises of expenditures on seed, lime, 
pesticides, petroleum products, electricity and other production expenses. The last 
category includes repairs and maintenance of capital items, machine hire and custom 
work, marketing, storage and transportation expenses, and other items reported as 
"miscellaneous expenses" in Economic Indicators in Farm Sector (USDA, 1986). 
Miscellaneous expenses consist of production fees, farm supplies, tool and shop 
equipment, insurance of motor vehicles, management expenses, etc. Crop sector specific 
data are not available on the use of (expenses of) petroleum products, electricity and 
other input use. However data on total use of these variables for the whole U.S. 
agricultural sector are available (USDA, Agricultural Statistics and USDA, 1986). Hence 
a method had to be designed to derive the use of these inputs in the U.S. crop sector. 
It is then assumed that the share of the expenses for petroleum products, electricity, and 
other input use in crop sector is proportional to the share of crop sector's cash receipts 
in total agricultural sectors' cash receipts (Thirtle 1985). For example, expenses for 
petroleum products in the crop sector are obtained by multiplying total expenses for 
petroleum products in the U.S. agriculture with crop sector's share in total cash receipts 
for the U.S. agriculture. 
Producer price indexes are available for seed, lime, agricultural chemicals, 
energy, electricity. Price index of farm services is used as the price of "miscellaneous" 
input category. Using these prices and expenditure shares, a Divisia price index for the 
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aggregate operating capital (OPCFP), was developed. An aggregate quantity index 
(OPCUS) was obtained by dividing the operating capital expenses by aggregate Divisia 
price index. Both the price and quantity indices are presented in Table A.l. 
Labor Data on farm wages to labor and total farm labor use in the U.S. crop 
sector were collected from various issues of Agricultural Statistics. No distinction is 
made between hired labor and family labor. Both hired and family labor were 
aggregated into one category, total labor. Treating hired and family labor separately 
would have greatly increased the number of parameters to be estimated. These 
additional computational burdens are deemed to outweigh possible gains in insight in the 
technology. Moreover, several previous studies (for example: Weaver, 1983; Thirtle, 
1985; Hertel and McKinze, 1986; and Moschini, 1988a) have demonstrated that total 
labor use can be aggregated into one category by assuming separability in hired and 
family labor. In the estimation, wage rate is used as the numeraire. 
Fixed input Durable farm machinery 
The only fixed variable in the study is the total stock of durable farm machinery. 
Data on value of farm machinery are collected from various issues of Agricultural 
Statistics. Data are, however, available only at the aggregate level for the U.S. 
agricultural sector. Data on value of farm machinery used for the U.S. crop sector alone 
are not available. It is assumed that the share of the durable farm machinery used for 
crop sector in the total, is proportional to the share of crop sector's cash receipts in the 
total agricultural sector's cash receipts (Thirtle 1985). 
Estimation 
The complete list of equations to be estimated is: 
(5.9) Yi = a; + Ejfi bjj EPj + f^Z^ + f^z^z '=1.2 13 
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(5.10) -Xj =» aj + Xljai EPj + + f^Z2 i = 14, 15, 16 
(5.11) -Xj7 = ag - Zj=i by EPj'EPj + CjZj + 
(5.12) PARi - l-exp[-{aii.(TPj/FPit.i).(l-SETi-DIVi) + aj2.(PDP/FP.^_^).DIV^}] 
i = wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, and cotton. 
where, 
Yj • production of ith crop, 
Xj = quantity of ith input used in the U.S. crop sector, 
EPj = expected price of ith netput (i=l,...,13 are outputs; i=14,...,17 are inputs), 
Zj > quantity of fixed input (value of durable farm equipment), 
Z2 = time variable, 
PARj =» commodity program participation rate, 
TP' = target price of ith crop, 
FP- = farm price of ith crop, 
SETj = set-aside requirement for ith crop, 
DFVj = paid-diversion requirement for ith crop, 
PDPj • paid-diversion payment rate for ith crop, 
and ag, aj, by, Cj^, djç|, fjj^, aj2, and aj2 are parameters estimated. Variables without a 
time subscript refer to the current period. A total of 22 equations (13 supply equations, 
4 input demand equation, and 5 participation equations) are estimated 
The profit function was not included in the system of equations to be estimated. 
At first glance, one is tempted to include the profit function on grounds that since the 
supply and input demand equations were derived from it, it surely constitutes additional 
information which should be brought to the estimation problem. This however is not 
the case. All information (that is, quantities and prices) needed to determine profit 
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exactly is already included in the problem as it stands. Since profit in a time period is 
a linear combination of outputs and inputs, it can be shown that full covariance matrix 
of a system in which the profit function is included is singular (Shumway et al., 1987). 
The profit function is not included since it is just one of an infinite number of arbitrary 
linear combinations of the dependent variables which might be calculated, none of which 
adds any new information. 
Estimation of participation rate equations 
The participation rate equations (five of them, one each for wheat, rice, corn, 
other coarse grains, and cotton) in (5.12) are estimated separately from the rest of the 
equations. Data on the variables in equation (5.4) are available only for those years in 
the sample period during which government program existed. For example, in the case 
of wheat, voluntary acreage reduction programs are present only in 17 (1962-66, 1969-
73, 1978-79, 1982-86) of the 37 sample period years (1950-1986). So equation (5.12) for 
wheat is relevant only for these 17 years. Hence the five equations in (5.12) are 
estimated independent of equations (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11). 
Though equation (5.4) is non-linear in parameters, it can be easily transformed 
into a linear form: 
(5.13) RRj . aij.(TPi/FPit.j).(l-SETi-DIVi) + ajj^POPi/FPit.j).DIVj 
where, 
i = l , 2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  7  ( w h e a t ,  r i c e ,  c o r n ,  o t h e r  c o a r s e  g r a i n s ,  a n d  c o t t o n ) ,  a n d  
RR| = -log(l-PARj). 
Thus RRj is an intrinsic transformation variable. Participation equations for each of the 
5 crops are estimated by ordinary least squares in this linear form. 
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Estimation of output supply and input demand equations 
Equations (5.9) through (5.11) are derived from the normalized quadratic profit 
function. In the empirical estimation, it is desirable to test and possibly maintain the 
properties of the profit function to ensure that there exists a genuine primal technology 
(see Chapter II). How these desirable properties of the profit function are maintained 
during the estimation is now discussed. 
All prices on the right hand side of equations (5.9) through (5.11) are normalized 
by wage rate. Hence, these equations are homogeneous of degree zero in all prices. 
This of course holds, by design, with an arbitrary normalized profit function. Thus, the 
choice of the functional form ensured that the profit function is homogeneous of degree 
one in all output and input prices. 
Symmetry of profit function in cross partials requires that the following 
condition must hold in equations (5.9) through (5.11): 
(5.14) by - bji .V i,j e [1, .... 16] 
That is, equations (5.9) through (5.11) are to be estimated subject to the constraint (5.14) 
in order for the underlying profit function to be symmetric in cross partials. The 
symmetry condition in equation (5.14) is maintained in the present study during the 
estimation. 
Monotonicity of the normalized quadratic profit function requires that predicted 
Yj and Xj must be non-negative for all prices. In the present study monotonicity of the 
profit function is not explicitly imposed in the estimation. However, after the estimated 
parameters are obtained, this property is evaluated at each sample point. 
Finally the estimated profit function is to be tested (and possibly imposed) for 
the convexity. The normalized profit function is convex if the matrix of by coefficients 
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in equations (5.9) through (5.11) is positive semi-definite. That is, convexity of profit 
function requires that, in equations (5.9) through (5.11) the following must hold: 
(5.15) [bjj] is positive semi-definite 
One obvious way to check for the convexity of profit function is to first estimate 
equations (5.9) through (5.11), get the estimated parameters by*, and then check if [bjj] 
is indeed positive semi-definite. While this method enables us to check for the 
convexity after estimation, it does not provide a way to explicitly impose convexity. To 
impose (or to test statistically) the property of convexity, bjj in equations (5.9) through 
(5.11) are to be reparameterized subject to (5.15). 
Two conceptually manageable estimation (reparameterization) procedures for 
maintaining the necessary curvature constraints are; eigenvalue decomposition and 
Cholesky factorization. Both methods would of course yield the same [by] matrix. The 
method based on eigenvalue decomposition relies on the property that a real symmetric 
matrix is positive-semi definite if and only if all its eigenvalues are non-negative. In 
this method, matrix [by] is reparameterized, implied eigenvalues of the matrix are 
calculated and convexity if imposed by constraining the smallest eigenvalue to be non-
negative. Though the method has no conceptual difficulties, it requires a great deal of 
computation compared to the Cholesky factorization. Hence in the present study 
Cholesky factorization is used to test and impose the convexity of profit function. 
Choleskv factorization 
Letting B be the 16x16 matrix of by coefficients (from equations 5.9 through 
5.11), the restricted profit function will be convex if B is positive semi-definite. 
Following Lau (1978), an imposition of global convexity of profit function is possible if 
B is estimated in Cholesky factorization. Lau (1978) has shown that almost every real 
symmetric matrix B can be represented in the nonlinear Cholesky factorization, B = 
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L*D*L', where L is a mxm unit lower triangular matrix (Ljj = 1, Ljj = 0 j>i) and D is 
diagonal matrix whose elements Djj are referred to as Cholesky values. Note that there 
are m Cholesky values since D is a mxm matrix. Lau has further shown that every 
symmetric positive semi-definite matrix B has Cholesky factorization with unique L and 
D. Finally, matrix B will be positive semi-definite if and only if all Cholesky values are 
non-negative. This property is exploited in testing the convexity of the profit function. 
That is, the convexity of the profit function can be tested by simply testing for the non-
negativeness of all the m Cholesky values. In other words convexity of profit function 
implies and is implied by > 0 V i. 
Similarly, convexity of the profit function can be imposed by replacing the 
matrix B in (5.9) through (5.11) by L*D*L' and constraining D such that D|| > 0 V i. In 
the present study convexity is tested as well as imposed in this manner. The complete 
mapping of matrices L*D*L' into B is given in Appendix B. 
A few points are worth noting about estimating profit function via Cholesky 
factorization. First, symmetry condition has to be maintained to carry-out Cholesky 
factorization. Hence, tests for convexity are conditional on maintaining the symmetry of 
the profit function. Second, Cholesky factorization reparameterizes only the by 
coefficients. Other coefficients are estimated as they appear in equations (5.9) through 
(5.11). Third, the total number of parameters to be estimated remains unchanged. After 
imposing symmetry, the original specification in equations (5.9) through (5.11) have 136 
unique bjj coefficients to be estimated. In the Cholesky factorization, instead of 
estimating these 136 bjj coefficients directly, we would instead estimate 16 Djj 
coefficients and 120 Ly (L|j, j<i) coefficients. Finally, since bjj coefficients are now 
replaced by the non-linear functions of Djj and Ljj coefficients, the estimated equations 
become non-linear in parameters (see Appendix B). 
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Because of shared parameters and because production decisions on one crop may 
be affected by or associated with decisions on another, contemporaneous correlation 
among product supply and input demand equations is likely. To account for this 
correlation properly, the thirteen output supply and three variable input demand 
equations were estimated simultaneously as a system using full information methods. 
Equations (5.9) through (5.11) form a set of seemingly unrelated equations. 
Full information maximum likelihood estimator 
The stochastic version of the nonlinear system of output supply and input 
demand equations can be written as: 
y I - fj(X,/9) + ej 
^2 " + ®2 
(5.16) 
+ ®M 
where, y and X represent endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. Letting e' 
= (cj', 02% .... ej^')i it is assumed that E[ee'] = where E is an (MxM) covariance 
matrix whose (i,j) element is given by ajj, where E[ejej'] = The same matrix X 
and the same coefficient vector appear in all equations to allow for the possibility that 
some explanatory variables, and some coefficients, can be common to more than one 
equation. Each equation can, of course, be a different nonlinear function of Z and p. 
With the additional assumption that the errors are normally distributed, the log-
likelihood function for p and E can be written as 
(5.17) L(j9,E) » - iTM.log(29r) - ilog I S01j I - ie'(S"^ 01^)6 
= - iTM.log(2jr) - iT-log | E | - itr[SE"'] 
where, S is an (MxM) matrix with (i,j)th element equal to ej'ej = [yi-fj(X,^)]'[yj-
f^(X,/9)]. Nonlinear maximization of (5.17) with respect to all the elements in and E 
would be a daunting task for the present case where M is relatively large at 17. 
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Fortunately, it is possible to obtain an analytical expression for the maximum likelihood 
estimator for 2 as a function of and to therefore concentrate the likelihood function so 
that it is a function of )S alone. In this regard, it is more convenient to differentiate 
L09,S) with respect to 2"' than E. It can be shown that (see Dhrymes 1978, Harvey 
1985, and Judge et al. 1988), 
(5.18) aïog I 2-^ I /aS-l - E, and atrlSE-^/aS"' = S. 
Noting that -(T/2)log |2| = (T/2)log | E"^ |, and using the results in (5.18) we have 
(5.19) aL/aE"^ » (T/2)E - iS 
Setting this derivative equal to 0 and solving for E yields the estimator 
(5.20) E* - S/T. 
Note that S is a function of p. Substituting (5.20) into (5.17) leads to the concentrated 
log-likelihood function 
(5.21) = constant - iT log | S | 
Thus, the maximum likelihood estimator fi*, is that value of p that minimizes 
ej'ej ... 
®M'®I ••• ®M'®M 
Thus, maximizing concentrated likelihood function is equivalent to minimizing the 
generalized sum of squares function. The maximum likelihood estimator for E is S/T, 
evaluated at fi*. Under the stated stochastic assumptions, the maximum likelihood 
estimators are consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient. The 
parameter estimates are obtained using Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DPP) algorithm 
(Powell, 1971) with numerical derivatives as implemented in GQ-OPT, version 4.02. 
(5.22) |S| « 
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Summary 
This chapter has described in detail the data and estimation procedures used to 
empirically implement the model outlined in Chapter IV. A number of specialized data 
are required to estimate the crop sector model consisting of 13 output supply and 4 input 
demand equations. Sources and formulae used for deriving data are presented in this 
chapter. A full information maximum likelihood procedure used for estimation is also 
outlined in this chapter. 
85 
CHAPTER VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Previous Chapters have developed a specification of output supply and input 
demand equations with policy structure for U.S. crops. Empirical results for the 
estimated model are presented and appraised in this chapter. 
Output Supply and Input Demand Equations 
Maximum likelihood estimates of output supply and input demand equations 
maintaining symmetry, homogeneity and convexity are reported in Table 6.1. Note that 
all equations are originally linear in parameters. However, as shown in Chapter IV, 
parameters were estimated after a reparameterization imposing Cholesky factorization. 
Hence, the estimation process gives parameter estimates of Cholesky values (djj) and 
lower diagonal elements of matrix L. Estimated parameters of the price variables in 
Table 6.1 are calculated from a nonlinear combination of the estimated Cholesky 
factorization parameters. The standard errors of the bjj parameters are computed by 
linearizing these nonlinear functions using a Taylor series expansion of the first order 
and then applying the standard results for variance and covariance of linear functions of 
random variables (Kmenta 1986, pages 486-487). Hence the t-ratios for estimated 
parameters of the price variables in Table 6.1 are only approximate. 
Monotonicity of profit function (9n/3pj > 0) implies that the predicted output 
and (negative of) input quantities must be non-negative. Model simulation with 
estimated parameters indicated that monotonicity was not violated at the sample points. 
Note that normalized quadratic functional form maintains homogeneity in prices. 
Symmetry is maintained and not tested chiefly to save degrees of freedom in an already 
highly parameterized modelé Besides, when Cholesky factorization is used, maintaining 
symmetry is necessary in order to test for convexity. 
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Table 6.1. Maximum likelihood estimates of output supply and 
input demand equations maintaining symmetry and convexity® 
WHEPDt - -308.567 + 0.245*VFM^^ + 0.162*YEAR^ 
(3.857) (8.030) (258.059) 
+ 0.498*WHEEP^ - 0.058*RICEP^ + 0.022*COREP^. + 1.243*0CGEP^ 
(56.380) (1.989) (55.725) (64.806) 
- 0.031*SOYEP^ + 0.351*HAYEP^ - 0.501*COTEPj. + 1.157*PNTEP(. 
(39.556) (66.404) (53.411) (12.205) 
- 0.173*FXSEPt - 0.568*SUGEPt + 2.469*T0BEP^. - 1.218*VEGEPj. 
(35.133) (1.376) (0.083) (10.101) 
+ 0.651*FUNEPt - 0.013*RENTt^*[l+WHEPAR(.*WHEDIV^/(l-WHESET^.)] 
(7.580) (1.555) 
- 0.047*FEREPt - 2.011*OPCEPc - 1.648*WHEPAR^*WHEDIV,.*WHEPDP^. 
(0.499) (0.060) (1.497) 
R-square - 0.93 
RICPDj. - -44.548 + 0.002*VFM(. + 0.023*YEARj. 
(4.455) (0.763) (44.640) 
- 0.058*WHEEPt + 0.061*RICEPt + 0.080*COElEPj. - 0.245*OCGEP^ 
(1.989) (5.318) (7.205) (9.005) 
- 0.029*SOYEPt^ - 0.059*HAYEPj^ - 0.019*COTEPr - 0.123*PNTEP^ 
(7.170) (3.196) (0.501) (0.293) 
+ 0.039*FXSEPt + 0.133*SUGEPr - 0.313*TOBEP^ + 0.126*VEGEP^ 
(98.158) (5.514) (1.369) (1.876) 
- 0.124*FUNEP^ + 0.056*RENTt*[l+RICPARr*RICDIVt/(l-RlCSETt)] 
(0.891) (0.090) 
- 0.101*FEREP(^ + 0.300*OPCEPr 
(2.291) (32.963) 
R-square - 0.84 
^Variable explanations are given in Table 5.1. Figures in 
parentheses are absolute values of t-ratios. 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
CORPDj^ - -2764.651 + 0.269*VFM(^ + 1.427*YEARt 
(2764.614) (3,166) (1094.417) 
+ 0.022*WHEEP^ + 0.080*RICEP^ + 1.301*COREP(^ - 1.879*OCGEP^^ 
(55.725) (7.205) (54.917) (3.881) 
- 0.160*SOYEP^ + 0.164*HAYEPj^ - 1.089*GOTEP^ - 2.437*PNTEPt 
(0.724) (0.633) (1.488) (0.736) 
+ 0.294*FXSEP^ - 0.210*SUGEPt + 3.161*TOBEP^^ - 0.449*VEGEPt 
(2.273) (6.165) (0.032) (12.226) 
- 0.309*FUNEP^ - 0.042*RENTt*[l+C0RPARf*CORDIVf/(l-CORSETr)] 
(1.847) (6.758) 
+ 1.140*FEREPt - 0.195*OPCEPt - 36.338*C0RPARr*C0RDIVt*C0RPDPtt 
(0.806) (1.564) (35.966) 
R-square - 0.94 
OCGPD^ - -656.859 - 0.202*VFM(^ + 0.344*YEARt 
(656.831) (5.433) (324.904) 
+ 1.243*WHEEP^ - 0.245*RICEPt - 1.879*COREP^^ + 9.234*0CGEPt 
(64.806) (9.005) (3.881) (6.929) 
+ 0.054*SOYEP^ + 0.804*HAYEP^ - 3.246*C0TEPt + 2.447*PNTEP^^ 
(32.660) (58.699) (0.870) (5.000) 
- 2.961*EXSEPt - 1.168*SUGEPt + 3.398*TOBEP^^ - 7.623*VEGEPr 
(72.735) (15.963) (0.315) (2.355) 
+ 2.802*FUNEPt + 0.066*RENT^*[1+OCGPAR^*OCGDIV^/(1-OCGSET^)] 
(3.519) (2.109) 
- 2.117*FEREPt - 3.193*OPCEPt - 16.359*OCGPAR^*OCGDIV,.*OCGPDP^^ 
(158.382) (10.604) (15.843) 
R-square - 0.57 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
SOYPDj. - -1002.740 + 0.041*VFM^ + 0.514*YEARj^ 
(1002.664) (1.338) (593.920) 
- 0.031*WHEEP^ - 0.029*RICEPt - 0.160*COREP^^ + 0.054*OCGEP' 
(39.556) (7.170) (0.724) (32.660) 
+ 0.758*SOYEP_ + 0.217*HAYEP^ + 1.668*COTEP^^ + 2.305*PNTEP^ 
(17.144) (113.234) (0.253) (7.586) 
- 0.226*FXSEPt + 0.206*SUGEPt - 0.227*TOBEPj^ + 1.268*VEGEP^ 
(33.704) (6.280 ) (1.409) (10.487) 
- 0.198*FUNEP_ + 0.313*RENTr 
(46.145) (59.743) 
- 0.413*FEREPt - 2.396*0PCEPt 
(24.366) (1.384) 
R-square - 0.94 
-274. 
(274.794) 
HAYPD^. - 810 
+ 0.351*WHEEP. 
(66.404) 
- 0.001*VFMj 
(0.138) 
+ 0.145*YEARf 
(250.032) 
0.059*RICEPt + 
(3.196) 
0.164*C0REPt + 
(0.633) 
0.804*OCGEP( 
(58.699) 
+ 0.217*SOYEP^ + 0.508*HAYEPj^ - 0.082*C0TEPr + 0.970*PNTEPr 
(113.234) (36.765) (0.234) (0.617) 
- 0.263*FXSEPt - 0.406*SUGEPt + 2.295*T0BEPr - 0.971*VEGEPr 
(10.891) (0.014) (0.151) (3.337) 
+ 0.459*FUNEPj^ + 0.183*RENTr 
(1.611) (0.378) 
- 0.015*FEREP^ - 2.230*OPCEPr 
(0.146) (2.928) 
R-square - 0.82 
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Table 6,1. (continued) 
COTPDç - -2506.362 .0.4510*VFM^ + 1.293*YEAR^^ 
(2.944) (1.485) (275.835) 
- 0.501*WHEEP^ - 0.019*RICEPt - 1.089*COREPt - 3.246*OCGEPj^ 
(53.411) (0.501) (1.488) (0.870) 
+ 1.668*SOYEP^ - 0.082*HAYEP^ +138.351*COTEP^ + 19.582*PNTEPt 
(0.253) (0.234) (0.859) (0.924) 
+ 2.068*FXSEPt + 5.575*SUGEPt - 31.041*TOBEP^ + 10.999*VEGEP^ 
(1.412) (1.647) (6.353) (0.429) 
- 7.341*FUNEPt - 1.715*RENTt*[l+C0TPARt*C0TDIVr/(l-C0TSETr)] 
(0.738) (0.033) 
- 5.595*FEREPj^ + 14.823*0PCEP^ 
(1.376) (0.106) 
R-square - 0.33 
PNTPDj. - -1696.629 + 0.021*VFM^ + 0.874*YEAR^ - 18.347DUM80t 
(1.944) (0.287) (477.513) (17.986)) 
+ 1.157*WHEEPt - 0.123*RICEPt - 2.437*C0REP^ + 2.447*0CGEP^ 
(12.205) (0.293) (0.736) (5.000) 
+ 2.305*SOYEP_ + 0.970*HAYEP^ +19.582*COTEP^^ +20.311*PNTEP^ 
(7.586) (0.617) (0.924) (17.887) 
+ 1.117*FXSEP^ + 0.196*SUGEPt - 5.389*T0BEf' + 7.855*VEGEPr 
(1.020) (23.428) (2,753) (2.203) 
- 0,014*FUNEP^ + 0.849*RENTt 
(3.511 ) (17.400) 
- 4.209*FEREPt -11.258*OPCEPj^ 
(11.816) (0.956) 
R-square - 0.93 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
FLXPDj. - -38.004 
(37.915) 
+ 0,052*VFM^ + 0.019*YEAR^ + 1.692*DUM79^ 
(2.736) (33.368) (4.187)) 
- 0.173*WHEEPt + 0.039*RICEPt + 0.294*COREPt - 2.961*0CGEPj^ 
(35.133 ) (98.158) (2.273) (72.735) 
- 0.226*SOYEP^ - 0.263*HAYEP^ + 2.068*COTEP^^ + 1.117*PNTEP^^ 
(33.704) (10.891) (1.412) (1.020) 
+ 1.855*FXSEPt + 0.097*SUGEPt - 1.723*TOBEP,^ + 3.541*VEGEPt 
(2.985) (37.330) (21.446) (11.259) 
- 0.737*FUNEP_ - 0.282*RENTj^ 
(3.942) (30.310) 
+ 0.326*FEREP^ + 1.167*OPCEP^ + 0.152*SFT77 
R-square - 0.82 
SUGPDj. - -376.505 - 0.115*VFM(^ + 0.194*YEARt 
(376.456) (8.909) (313.486) 
- 0.568*WHEEP^ + 0.133*RICEPt - 0,210*COREPj^ - 1.168*OCGEP^^ 
(1.376) (5.514) (6.165) (15.963) 
+ 0.206*SOYEP^ - 0.406*HAYEPj^ + 5.575*C0TEPt + 0.196*PNTEP^ 
(6.280) (0.014) (1.647) (23.428) 
+ 0.097*FXSEPt + 1.884*SUGEPt - 5.309*T0BEPj^ + 2.692*VEGEP^ 
(37.330) (0.081) (0.749) (2.855) 
- 0.620*FUNEP^ + 0.981*RENTr 
(1.716) (0.148) 
- 0.655*FEREPt + 1.601*OPCEPr 
(2.780) (2.985) 
R-square - 0.87 
(0.684) (11.758) (0.273) 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
TOBPDr - 247.632 
(2.144) 
+ 0.162*VFM^ - 0.122*YEARt 
(2.259) (76.477) 
+ 2.469*WHEEPt - 0.313*RICEPt + 3.161*COREP^ + 3.398*OCGEP^ 
(0.083) (1.369) (0.032) (0.315) 
- 0.227*S0YEP(. + 2.295*HAYEP^ - 31.041*COTEP^^ - 5.389*PNTEPr 
(1.409) (0.151) (6.353) (2.753) 
- 1.723*FXSEPt - 5.309*SUGEPr + 35.736*TOBEP^ - 10.732*VEGEPr 
(21.446) (0.749) (0.887) (2.059) 
+ 4.539*FUNEP^ - 0.746*RENT^^ 
(0.283) (5.946) 
+ 6.241*FEREPj. - 15.987*OPCEPj^ 
(3.455) (1.709) 
R-square - 0.45 
VEGPDj. - -611.901 - 0.081*VFMj^ + 0.322*YEARt 
(6.119) (2.096) (249.391) 
- 1.218*WHEEPt + 0.126*RICEPt - 0.449*COREPr - 7.623*0CGEPr 
(10.101) (1.876) (12.226) (2.355) 
+ 1.268*S0YEP^ - 0.971*HAYEP^ + 10.999*COTEPr + 7.855*PNTEPr 
(10.487) (3.337) (0.429) (2.203) 
+ 3.541*FXSEPt + 2.692*SUGEPt - 10.732*TOBEPr + 15.749*VEGEPr 
(11.259) (2.855) (2.059) (1.197) 
- 2.888*FUNEP^ + 0.882*RENTt 
(7.396) (5.961) 
+ 0.211*FEREPt - 1.669*OPCEP^ 
(0.647) (1.343) 
R-square - 0.84 
Table 6.1, (continued) 
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FUNPDj. - -479.578 + 0.076*VFM^ + 0.250*YEARt 
(4.441) (2.020) (226.184) 
+ 0.651*WHEEP^ - 0.124*RlGEPt - 0.309*GOEŒP^^ + 2.802*0CGEPt 
(7.580) (0.891) (1.847) (3.519) 
- 0.198*SOYEP^ + 0.459*HAYEP^ - 7.341*C0TEPt - 0.014*PNTEPc 
(46.145) (1.611) (0.738) (3.511) 
- 0.737*FXSEPt - 0.620*SUGEPt + 4.539*T0BEPt - 2.888*VEGEPc 
(3.942) (1.716) (0.283) (7.396) 
+ 2.829*FUNEPt + 0.876*RENT^^ 
(0.187) (9.414) 
+ 1.383*FEREPj^ - 4.081*0PGEPt 
(4.451) (4.163) 
R-square - 0.90 
LANUSj. - -71.594 - 0.196*VFMj^ + 0.018*YEARj^ 
(7.459)) (5.046) (19.137) 
- 0.013*WHEEPj. + 0.056*RIGEPt - 0.042*COREPt + 0.066*0CGEPj^ 
(1.555) (0.090) (6.758) (2.109) 
+ 0.313*SOYEP^ + 0.183*HAYEPj^ - 1.715*COTEP^ + 0.849*PNTEPr 
(59.743) (0.378) (0.033) (17.400) 
- 0.282*FXSEPj. + 0.981*SUGEPt - 0.746*TOBEPt + 0.882*VEGEPt 
(30.310) (0.148) (5.946) (5.961) 
+ 0.876*FUNEP(^ + 3.462*RENTt 
(9.414) (2.095) 
+ 0.120*FEREPt - 2.226*0PGEPt 
(3.077) (3.351) 
R-square - 0.57 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
FERUS^ - 602.852 - 0.040*VFM^ - 0.317*YEARt 
(2.101) (0.979) (317.864) 
- 0.047*WHEEPj. - 0.101*RICEPt + 1.140*COREP^^ - 2.117*0CGEPt 
(0.499) (2.291) (0.806) (158.382) 
- 0.413*SOYEP^ - 0.015*HAYEP^ - 5.595*COTEP^^ - 4.209*PNTEPt 
(24.366) (0.146) (1.376) (11.816) 
+ 0.326*FXSEPt - 0.655*SUGEPt + 6.241*T0BEPr + 0.211*VEGEPt 
(0.684) (2.780) (3.455) (0.647) 
+ 1.383*FUNEPt + 0.120*RENTt 
(4.451) (3.077) 
+ 5.932*FEREPt - 1.321*0PCEPt 
(5.846) (0.375) 
R-square - 0.93 
OPCUSt - -763.803 - 0.780*VFM^ + 0.357*YEARj^ 
(3.801) (9.232) (155.970) 
- 2.011*WHEEPt + 0.300*RICEPt - 0.195*COREPt - 3.193*0CGEPt 
(0.060) (32.963) (1.564) (10.604) 
- 2.396*S0YEPc - 2.230*HAYEP^ + 14.823*C0TEPt - 11.258*PNTEPr 
(1.384) (2.928) (0,106) (0.956) 
+ 1.167*FXSEPj. + 1.601*SUGEPr - 15.987*TOBEP^ - 1.669*VEGEPc 
(11.758) (2.985) (1.709) (1.343) 
- 4.081*FUNEP^ - 2.226*RENTr 
(4.163) (3.351) 
- 1.321*FEREPt + 58.424*0PCEPt 
(0.375) (0.488) 
R-Square -  0 . 9 8  
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
LABUS^^ - 1558.480 + 0.297*VFM^ - 0.799YEAR^^ 
(7.559) (8.350) (7.578) 
- (1/2) l\ti l]ti bij EPi.EPj 
R-Square - 0.97 
System statistics: 
Log-likelihood value: - 870.414 R*^ - 0.99° 
This equation was estimated conditional on the rest of the 
system. 
®Baxter-Craigg R-square, see text for details. 
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Test for convexity of profit function 
Since the model was estimated in Cholesky factorization a test for the convexity 
of the estimated profit function can be carried-out easily. Results in Table 6.1 are 
estimated maintaining convexity. However, to test for the convexity, unrestricted profit 
function (i.e., without imposing curvature constraints) had to be estimated. Given the 
reparameterization of [bjj] matrix by Cholesky factorization, convexity is satisfied if the 
estimated Cholesky values (Djj) are all non-negative. 
The parameters of Cholesky diagonal matrix D, directly estimated by the model 
are presented in Table 6.2. The estimates of the model without convexity restrictions 
are given under the column head, unrestricted model. Estimates indicate that 7 of the 
sixteen Cholesky values are negative, violating the convexity property. To assess this 
violation statistically, the null hypothesis of convexity is expressed as; 
Hg: Djj > 0 i = 1, ..., 16, 
which is tested against. 
^A" ^ii ® for at least one i. 
Thus, Hq will be violated if at least one Djj is negative and statistically significant 
(Morey, 1986). A natural way to proceed is to use 16 one tailed tests. However in order 
to control for the overall level of significance, the level of significance of each one-
tailed test must be scaled-down accordingly. In this situation, the Bonferroni t-statistics 
can be used to test for the significance of the individual Djj. If the overall level of 
significance of the test is 0.05, having 16 simultaneous restrictions implies that the one-
tailed critical value of the Bonferroni t-statistics for the individual t-ratios is given by 
the Student t-distribution at the 0.05/16 or 0.003125 significance level. The critical 
value is 2.734 for oo degrees of freedom. It follows that D33, D44, Dgg, Dgg, D99, 
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Table 6.2. Cholesky values (D^^) of restricted and 
unrestricted models 
i -Unrestricted Model-^ —Restricted Model-
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
(Dii) (Oil) 
1 0.275 9.306 0.498 56.380 
2 0.062 4.070 0.055 78.226 
3 -2.738 -7.662 1.176 7.435 
4 -3.339 -10.417 3.245 1.947 
5 0.522 11.673 0.724 27.644 
6 -0.516 -7.612 0.133 23.863 
7 162.667 1.627 130.321 1.550 
8 -1.526 -3.346 0.324 11.199 
9 -0.607 -13.605 0.269 41.799 
10 1.718 15.240 0.875 18.158 
11 15.405 17.005 5.948 1.811 
12 -0.393 -2.329 1.422 2.168 
13 -2.695 -10.143 1.070 4.366 
14 1.442 4.610 2.004 5.014 
15 5.915 7.541 1.326 4.232 
16 35.564 3.556 33.954 1.424 
^Convexity not imposed, symmetry imposed. 
^Convexity and symmetry imposed. 
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^1313 significantly negative and hence the null hypothesis of convexity is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance. 
In spite of this difficulty the estimated profit function still provides a second 
order approximation to the data-generating variable profit function which is convex in 
prices (McKay et al., 1983). However a non-convex normalized profit function is 
inconsistent with profit maximization, the basic behavioral postulate of the theory of 
production. Furthermore, convexity is necessary for the profit function to be a dual to 
a well defined technology. The implication is, that any analysis with a non-convex 
profit function would be clouded. Hence, convexity of profit function is nevertheless 
imposed in the present study. 
Convexity can be imposed by estimating the model subject to the restriction 0% 
>0, i= 1, ..., 16. This would make the estimation process a constrained optimization 
problem. Or equivalently, by suitable reparameterization of Djj the estimation process 
can be altered to an unconstrained optimization. This latter approach is taken in the 
present study. Specifically, Dj| in the model are replaced by Dj| = exp(Sjj). This 
restricts Dj|, the Cholesky values to be non-negative. Hence, Cholesky values obtained 
after this transformation satisfy the property of convexity. These Cholesky values along 
with their t-statistics are reported in Table 6.2 under the column head, "restricted 
model." 14 of the 16 estimated Cholesky parameters are significant at all conventional 
levels of significance. As result of the reparmeterization to restrict Djj > 0, the value of 
log-likelihood decreased from -841.47 in unrestricted model to -870.41 in the restricted 
model^. 
Estimated model maintaining all theoretical restrictions fits the data reasonably 
well. R-square coefficients^ ranged from 0.33 for cotton output supply equation to 0.98 
for operating capital input demand equation (see Table 6.1). The median R-square is 
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0.84. R-square coefficients for cotton and tobacco were low at 0.33 and 0.45 
respectively. Production levels for these crops have been erratic with large fluctuations 
perhaps explaining lack of better fit. 
An overall indication of explanatory power of the entire system can be obtained 
from the "generalized R^", R*^, proposed by Baxter and Cragg (1970). The generalized 
R^ is defined as: 
R*2 - 1 . exp[2(Lo - L^a^VT], 
where, Lq is the value of the log likelihood function when all parameters but intercepts 
were constrained to zero; is the maximized value of the log-likelihood when all 
parameters are allowed to vary and T is the total number of parameters. The 
coefficient for the estimated system in Table 6.1 is 0.99, indicating that the overall 
goodness of fit is high. 
Of a total of 194 parameters estimated, 128 are significant at 5% level of 
significance. 11 out of 16 outputs and inputs are significantly related to their respective 
own prices at the 5 percent level (Table 6.1); own price coefficients for cotton, 
sugarcane, vegetables, fruits and nuts, and operating capital are not significant at 5% 
level of significance. Own price effects of all other crops and inputs are significant at 
5% level. Of course, by design (through the imposition of convexity of profit function), 
own price coefficients of outputs and inputs are positive indicating positively sloped 
product supply functions negatively sloped input demand functions. 
All the 13 crops and 4 inputs had highly significant parameters for time trend. 
This implies that global indirect Hicks neutral technical progress in inputs and outputs 
can be ruled out (Chambers, 1988). It further signifies that production during the 
sample period has been characterized by technological change of some form. 
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Price elasticities of product supply and input demand 
Output supply and input demand elasticities are presented in Tablé 6.3. 
Elasticity of ith product (Yj)with respect to jth price (EPj) is calculated by evaluating 
the following formulae at the sample means: 
^ij " ^ij * EPj/Y^ i,j = l, "•» 16, 
<il7 = - d^l • EPk/Yj i = 1, ..., 16, 
«17j = - Zkfl bjk • EPjç . EPj/Yj7 j = 1, ..., 16, and 
<1717 = Zjfi Ej=1 bjj • EPj • EPj/Yjy. 
Note that homogeneity of output supply and input demand functions implies, 
<il7 = - Zk=l «ik ^ ^ 
The elasticities in Table 6.3 correspond to the parameter estimates in Table 6.1 and are 
from the model maintaining homogeneity, symmetry, and convexity. Since elasticities 
are from a model preserving the curvature constraints, positive (negative) own-price 
elasticities of output supply (input demand) are ensured. However, curvature constraints 
do not impose restrictions on the signs of the cross price elasticities. 
The own price elasticities of all outputs are less than unity, ranging from 0.028 
for corn to 0.941 for tobacco. Own price elasticities for corn and wheat appear to be 
low at 0.028 and 0.050. Other own price output elasticities are around 0.4 to 0.5 and 
seem quite plausible. Cross price elasticities are, in general, small in magnitude. This 
implies that production of a crop is influenced the most by its own price, and prices of 
other crops have less impact. Own price elasticities for inputs range from -0.109 for 
land to -1.734 for labor. As expected land is the most inelastic input. Own price 
elasticities of operating capital and labor are the only elastic ones at -1.059 and -1.734 
respectively. 
Table 6.3 Price elasticities of product supply and input demand evaluated at sample means* 
- Elasticity with respect to — -
UHEEP RICEP COREP OCGEP SOYEP HAYEP COTEP PNTEP FXSEP SUGEP TOBEP VEGEP FUNEP RENT FERFP OPCFP WAGE 
UHEPO 0.050 0.015 
RICPO -0.104 0.280 
0.001 
0.001 0.071 -0.004 0.044 
0.093 -0.250 -0.068 -0.132 
CORPD 
OCGPO 
0.007 0.028 
0.133 -0.066 -0.130 
0.035 -0.027 
0.558 0.008 
SOYPO -0.005 -0.011 
HAYPD 0.046 -0.020 
-0.058 0.004 
0.014 0.059 
COTPD -0.014 -0.001 -0.019 -0.050 
PNTPD 0.072 -0.019 -0.098 0.086 
0.007 
0.106 
0.146 0.039 
0.037 0.081 
0.060 -0.003 
0.188 0.074 
FXSPD -0.186 
SUGPD -0.194 
TOBPD 0.212 -0.068 
0.107 0.205 -1.800 -0.319 -0.348 
0.115 -0.047 -0.226 0.092 -0.171 
0.165 -0.026 0.176 0.243 
VEGPO -0.097 0.025 -0.023 -0.343 0.133 -0.095 
FUMPD 0.064 -0.031 -0.020 0.155 -0.026 0.055 
-0.008 0.007 -0.008 -0.032 0.076 -0.042 0.037 -0.001 -0.004 -0.113 -0.060 
-0.005 -0.013 0.032 0.133 -0.173 0.078 -0.126 0.069 -0.155 0.302 0.040 
-0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.032 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.032 -0.004 -0.039 
-0.053 0.015 -0.142 ^ 0.069 0.111 -0.277 0.169 0.005 -0.192 -0.190 0.016 
0.038 0.020 -0.015 0.017 -0.010 0.063 -0.016 0.031 -0.051 -0.196 -0.039 
-0.002 0.007 -0.015 -0.029 0.092 -0.043 0.034 0.016 -0.002 -0.162 -0.114 
0.583 0.031 0.025 0.084 -0.260 0.103 -0.113 -0.032 -0.130 0.226 -0.490 
0.187 0.073 0.031 0.007 -0.102 0.166 0.000 0.036 -0.221 -0.389 -0.088 
0.342 0.070 0.892 0.057 -0.567 1.297 -0.448 -0.207 0.297 0.700 -0.093 
0.294 0.004 0.015 0.357 -0.556 0.313 -0.120 0.230 -0.190 0.305 -0.222 
-0.411 -0.027 -0.066 -0.253 0.941 -0.314 0.221 -0.044 0.455 -0.767 -0.437 
0.135 0.036 0.126 0.119 -0.261 0.427 -0.130 0.048 0.014 -0.074 -0.040 
-0.111 0,000 -0.032 -0.034 0.136 -0.096 0.157 0.059 0.115 -0.223 -0.169 
INDUS 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.002 
FERUS 0.005 0.030 -0.087 0.140 
OPCUS 0.065 -0.025 0.004 0.059 
LABUS 0.044 -0.004 0.057 -0.006 
0.019 -0.010 
0.063 0.002 
0.102 0.089 -0.074 
0.026 0.080 0.205 
0.012 -0.002 0.006 
0.101 0.029 -0.017 
0.021 -0.017 -0.029 
0.006 0.003 0.027 
0.025 0.011 -0.014 -0.023 -0.109 -0.005 
0.042 -0.223 -0.008 -0.091 -0.010 -0.588 
0.159 0.018 0.075 0.050 
0.116 0.013 0.072 0.141 
0.057 0.128 
0.086 0.526 
0.036 -1.059 0.524 
0.284 0.670 -1.734 
Variable explanations are given in Table 5.1. 
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Note that these are elasticities with respect to aggregate expected price and not 
market price per se. Of course, these two would be the same in years with no 
government program. Also, it should be noted that elasticities reported in Table 6.3 are 
not total elasticities. Specifically, in program years, the elasticities in reported Table 6.3 
do not capture the effects of price changes on participation rates. For example, a 
change in market price FPj has two distinct effects on the production of ith crop; a 
direct effect measured by b|j (and hence by £|j) and an indirect effect via PAR; 
equation. Only the direct effects are captured in-the elasticities in Table 6.3. Other 
studies fail to make this important distinction. This feature of the specification should 
be kept in mind in making comparisons with other studies. 
Care should be deployed in comparing the elasticities with the ones from other 
studies. There are few comparable studies that provide a rich collections of elasticities 
at this level of output disaggregation. Different commodity classification, rigorous 
maintenance of theoretical restrictions and structural policy implementation in the 
present study sets the present study apart and makes the comparison difficult. 
Nevertheless, comparing with other studies places the current elasticity estimates in 
perspective. Though the own price elasticities for corn and wheat are some what 
smaller, the elasticities, in general compare with the ones from Shumway et al. (1988). 
However many of the cross price elasticities, though significant, are small in magnitude. 
Nested model 
The general multioutput model allows for the interaction among all outputs, thus, 
allowing production of a crop to respond to changes in prices of all other crops. While 
this is a logical implication of a multioutput technology in general, it is possible that 
output of certain products may not depend on all prices. In the U.S. crops are grown on 
geographically different areas and it is likely that some non-jointness in production to 
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exist among certain crops. To pursue non-jointness, the model is reestimated letting 
some bjj be zero. This model is referred to as "nested model". Elasticity estimates from 
the nested model maintaining symmetry and convexity are reported in Table 6.4. It is 
hypothesized that cross price elasticity estimates from the nested model would be bigger 
in magnitude since. Surprisingly, however the elasticities from the nested model (Table 
6.4) are similar to the elasticities from the full model (Table 6.3). As Table 6.4 
indicates, 61 bjj coefficients are restricted to zero in the estimation of the nested model; 
only 34 cross price elasticities among outputs are estimated. 
To verify the validity of the nested model formally, a log-likelihood ratio test is 
employed. The likelihood ratio test statistics is determined by: 
-2 log A = - 2.[log L(g) - log L(0*)], 
where û represents the restricted maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vector Û 
and 0* denotes the corresponding unrestricted maximum likelihood estimates. 
Asymptotically, -2 log A is distributed as chi-sqqare with J degree of freedom (J 
equaling the number of independent restrictions being tested) under the null hypothesis 
that, Û is true; As a result of letting some by to zero the value of log-likelihood 
function reduced from -870.41 (in the full model) to -925.85. The calculated chi-square 
110.88 is higher than the critical value 80.24 for 5% level of significance and 61 degrees 
of freedom implying that the nested model is to be rejected in favor of the full model. 
The reason for rejecting the nested model is that too many significant bjj coefficients 
are set to zero. Perhaps by a more careful selection of restrictions, cross price 
elasticities might be made more plausible. Also, it might be beneficial to examine these 
elasticities when convexity is not imposed. 
Table 6.4. Nested model: Price elasticities of product supply and input demand 
evaluated at sample mesns^  
- Elasticity with respect to 
UHEEP RICEP COREP OCGEP SOYEP HAYEP COTEP PNTEP FXSEP SUGEP TOBEP VEGEP FUNEP RENT FERFP OPCFP WAGE 
UHEPD 0.126 ° 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 -0.022 -0.104 
RICPD 0.159 0.042 -0.009 -0.024 -0.030 -0.036 -0.102 
CORPD 0.052 -0.015 -0.016 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.019 -0.056 
OCGPO 0.001 -0.013 0.023 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.016 -0.017 -0.024 
SOYPO 0.007 -0.036 0.001 0.155 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.025 -0.010 0.022 -0.113 
HAYPD 0.002 -0.001 0.090 0.005 0.001 -0.017 -0.081 
COTPO -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.545 -0.030 -0.102 0.223 -0.635 
PNTPO -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.017 -0.014 
FXSPD -0.001 0.537 -0.169 0.112 0.108 0.042 -0.630 
SUGPD -0.001 -0.001 -0.043 0.269 -0.017 -0.039 -0.011 -0.158 
TOBPO 0.495 0.053 0.217 -0.365 -0.400 
VEGPD 0.144 -0.046 0.018 -0.015 0.032 -0.132 
FUNPO -0.034 0.132 0.014 0.015 -0.013 -0.114 
INDUS -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.015 -0.003 0.012 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.013 -0.005 -0.005 -0.070 -0.004 -0.003 0.077 
FERUS 0.011 0.006 -0.007 -0.012 0.012 -0.002 0.079 0.001 -0.006 0.009 -0.107 0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.499 0.169 0.355 
OPCUS 0.013 0.003 -0.022 0.005 -0.011 0.009 -0.073 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.076 -0.008 0.004 -0.003 0.071 -0.813 0.749 
LABUS 0.077 0.011 0.081 0.010 0.075 0.057 0.266 0.001 0.020 0.019 0.106 0.042 0.049 0.086 0.191 0.957 -2.048 
V^ariable explanations are given in Table 5.1. 
R^estricted to zero in the estimation. A total of 61 b.j parameters have been set to zero in the 
estimation of the nested model. 
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Equations for Program Participation Rate 
Estimated equations for program participation rates are presented in Table 6.5. 
These equations were estimated for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, and cotton. 
Note that by definition, the left hand side variables (WHEPAR, RICPAR, CORPAR, 
OCGPAR, COTPAR) are bounded by zero and one. The functional form used complies 
with this restriction. In particular, the participation rate approaches one as target price 
or diversion payment approaches infinity. Since observations from only those years 
which have a commodity program are used in the estimation, the sample size varied 
from equation to equation (see Table 6.5). The sample size for wheat is 17 while for 
corn and other coarse grains it was 20. The voluntary programs for rice and cotton, as 
modeled, started with the 1981 Farm Bill. Hence, the sample size to estimate the 
participation rate equations for rice and cotton is precariously low at 5. In view of these 
few observations, one is perhaps better off not estimating program participation rate 
equations for rice and cotton. But for completeness these equations were nevertheless 
estimated. Parameters estimated from these two equations should be judged accordingly. 
Results in Table 6.5 indicate that the positive signs of all the estimated 
parameters are consistent with a priori expectations. The positive sign of the estimated 
parameters indicates that the postulated variables in participation rate equations behave 
in a manner consistent with the theoretical model. Calculated t-values of the estimated 
parameters ranged from 2.467 to 14.046. All parameters are significant at 5% level of 
significance. 
Elasticities of program participation rate for the five crops with respect to all the 
right hand side variables are presented in Table 6.6. Equations (4.5a) through .(4.5d) 
indicate that elasticity expressions for the participation rate depend on the level of 
policy variables. In other words, elasticities derived are not constant. To facilitate 
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Table 6.5 Ordinary least squares estimates of commodity program 
partcipation rate equations* 
Wheat 
WHEPARt - 1 - exp(WHERR^) 
WHERRr - 1.144 • (MHETPt/WHEFP^^ , ) • (l-WHESET^-WHEDIV^^) 
(4.747) 
+ 9.731 • (WHEPDPg/WHEFP^^ i).WHEDIV,^ 
(3.157) 
R-square - 0.459 
Rice :^ 
RICPARj. - 1 - exp(RIGRRj.) 
RICRR^ - 2.028 • (RICTP^./RICFP^.j^) • (l-RICSET^.-RICDIVj.) 
(14.046) 
+ 9.490 . (RICPDPt/RICFPt i).RICDIVt 
(8.192) 
R-square - 0.928 
Corn:^ 
CORPAR^ - 1 - exp(CORRR(.) 
CORRR^ - 0.816 . (CORTPc/CORFPt.i)'(l-CORSETt-CORDIVt) 
(7.576) 
+ 1,890 . (CORPDPf/CORFPt i)*CORDIVt 
(3.341) 
R-square - 0.031 
*See Table 5.1 for variable explanations. Figures in parentheses 
are t-ratios. 
^Years: 1962-66, 1969-73, 1978-79, 1982-86; sample size - 17. 
®Years: 1982-1986; sample size - 5. 
^ears: 1961-1973, 1978-79, 1982-86; sample size - 20. 
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
Other Coarse Grains;^ 
OCGPARj. - 1 - exp(OCGRRj.) 
OCGRRt - 0.900 . (OCGTPt/OCGFPc , )• (1-OCGSETt^-OCGDIV^) 
(6.426) 
+ 2.386 . (OCGPDPt/OCGFPr •i)«CCGDIVfc 
(3.075) 
R-square - 0.369 
Cotton :° 
COTPARj. - 1 - exp(GOTRRç) 
COTRR^ - 1.729 • (COTTP^./COTFP^.j^) • (1-COTSET^-COTDIV,.) 
(6.437) 
+ 5.647 • (COTPDPr/COTFPt i)'COTDlVj^ 
(2.467) 
R-square - 0.435 
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Table 6.6 Estimated elasticities of participation rates^ 
Elasticity with respect to 
Variable TP POP SET DIV FP 
WHEPAR 0.300 0.133 -0, .038 0, 095 -0.433 
RICPAR 0.231 0.056 -0, 029 0, 027 -0.287 
CORPAR 0.434 0.052 -0, 054 -0, 002 -0.487 
OCGPAR 0.431 0.060 -0, 054 0, 006 -0.490 
COTPAR 0.317 0.054 -0, 040 0, 014 -0.371 
®A11 elasticities are evaluated at TP/FP- 1.2, 
SET - 0.1, PDP/FPt.i - 0.5, DIV - 0.1, and PAR - 0.75. 
See text for variable definitions. 
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across crop comparisons, all elasticities of program participation rates for all crops are 
evaluated aC =1.2, PDPj/FPj.j = 0.5, SETj = 0.1, DIVj = 0.1, and PAR; = 
0.75. Elasticities in Table 6.6 are fairly uniform across the five crops. Elasticities with 
respect to target price ranged from 0.231 for rice to 0.434 for corn and seem quite 
plausible. As expected, in absolute values, elasticity with respect to target price is 
higher than the elasticity with respect to set-aside requirements. This is true for all 5 
crops. Elasticity with respect to paid-diversion requirements were more diverse across 
crops. Specifically, this elasticity is negative (but small at -0.002) for corn while 
positive for other crops. Note that both signs are admissible under the specification (see 
equation (4.5d)). Overall the estimated program participation rate equations are 
satisfactory and encouraging. They indicated that a structural policy implementation can 
be fruitfully and meaningfully applied for the commodity programs in the U.S. In 
general the estimates of the participation rate equations represent a significant 
improvement over previous work (de Gorter and Paddock 1985, and Skold and Westhoff 
1988). 
Summary 
In summary, the empirical results presented in this chapter are encouraging. 
Results from the empirical work supported the findings of the theoretical model. Own 
price elasticity estimates from output supply and input demand equation are reasonable 
though the cross price elasticities are small in magnitude. Parameter estimates from the 
program participation rate equations are significant and are consistent in sign with a 
priori expectations. In general empirical results indicated that microeconomic theory of 
competitive firm behavior can be successfully integrated with a structural policy 
implementation in the U.S. agricultural sector. 
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End Notes 
1. To estimate the model without symmetry would require estimating an additional 120 
parameters. 
2. Several different starting values for parameters were tried in the estimation process. 
When estimating restricted model (imposing convexity), one particular set of starting 
values included setting D33, D44, Dgg, Dgg, D99, and to zero. 
3. R-Square coefficient for each equation is defined as the squared correlation between 
the actual and the predicted values of the left hand side variable (Maddala 1988, Page 
307). 
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CHAPTER VIL POLICY ANALYSIS 
The model structure presented in Chapter IV provides a rich framework for 
conducting policy analysis. Recall that a number of comparative static results derived in 
Chapters III and IV could not be signed in general. For instance, the effects of the 
target price and acreage restriction parameters on industry output could not be clearly 
established. The estimated output supply and input demand equations with their policy 
structure reported in Chapter VI can now be used to evaluate empirically the 
comparative static results by way of policy simulation exercises. In this chapter selected 
exogenous and predetermined policy variables are parametrically altered and inferences 
are made about the potential impacts of these variables on production, input use and 
program participation rate. 
Historical Simulation 
A criterion used to evaluate a model is the fit of the individual variables in a 
simulation context. One way to test the performance of the model is conduct an 
historical simulation (i.e., simulation through the estimated period) and examine how 
closely each endogenous variable tracks the corresponding historical data series (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981). Good simulation performance gives added confidence to the 
policy analysis done with the model it. 
The simulation uses the estimates of 13 output supply equations, 4 input demand 
equations (Table 6.1) and the five participation rate equations (Table 6.5). In addition, 
definitional identities (4.7b), (4.7c), (4.7d), (4.7f), (4.8a), and (4.8b) are used to generate 
aggregate expected price. Note however that the market price is exogenous. The 
historical simulation uses the sample data from 1951-1986 period. The performance of 
each equation is evaluated by using mean absolute percent error (MAPE) and Theirs 
forecast error measures. 
I l l  
MAPE measures the average of the absolute difference between the historical 
series (A^) and simulated series (S^) relative to the historical series and is given by: 
MAPE - (1/N) |(At-St)l/Aj. 
where, N is the number of periods of simulation. The MAPE implies a linear loss 
function; large MAPE indicating poor simulation performance. Theil's forecast error 
decomposition measures are given by (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981): 
Um = N.(/ig - /ij) / E (A(-S()^, 
Us = Mag - / E and 
Uc - 2N.(1 - p).((7g - (Tg) / E (AfSp^, 
where, /ig, Og, are the means and standard deviations of the series A^ and S(, 
respectively, and p is their correlation coefficient. The proportions Um, Us, and Uc are 
called bias, the variance, and the covariance proportions, respectively. Note that Um + 
Us + Uc » 1, hence they are called proportions. The bias proportion Um is an 
indication of systematic error, since it measures the extent to which the average values 
of the simulated and actual series deviate from each other. The variance proportion Us 
indicates the ability of the model to replicate the degree of variability in the variable of 
interest. Finally, the covariance proportion measures unsystematic error. In a perfect 
fit, Um = Us = 0, and Uc = 1. 
Mean absolute percent errors and Theirs error decomposition proportions are 
reported in Table 7.1. MAPE for all equations except flaxseed and sunflower production 
are below 15 percent. MAPE for FXSPD is relatively higher at 24.84 percent. 
Production of flaxseed and sunflower was erratic during the sample period and a good 
fit is difficult to obtain. The bias proportion and variance proportions (Um + Uc) are 
low relative to the covariance proportions (Uc). None of the bias proportions exceeded 
0.08 indicating there is little systematic bias in the model. The variance proportion for 
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Table 7.1. Simulation statistics of the estimated model* 
—Theils forecast statistics— 
Bias Variance Covariance 
Equation MAPE° (Um) (Us) (Uc) 
Output supply equations: 
UHEPD 7.97 0.002 0. ,031 0.968 
RICPD 14.02 0.002 0. 010 0.988 
CORPD 6.65 0.001 0. 014 0.985 
OCGPD 11.02 0.000 0. 014 0.986 
SOYPD 10.58 0.004 0. 001 0.995 
HAYPD 3.42 0.000 0, 001 0.999 
COTPD 13.70 0.005 0. 209 0.786 
PNTPD 9.14 0.005 0. ,016 0.979 
FXSPD 24.84 0.011 0. 078 0.911 
SUGPD 6.59 0.006 0. ,004 0.990 
TOBPD 9.53 0.000 0. 085 0.915 
VEGPD 4.27 0.000 0. ,025 0.975 
FUNPD 5.81 0.006 0. 008 0.986 
Input demand equations: 
INDUS 2.54 0.003 0. ,134 0.863 
FERUS 10.87 0.001 0. 002 0.997 
OPCUS 3.51 0.004 0. ,020 0.975 
LABUS 8.84 0.000 0. 038 0.962 
Participation rate equations: 
WHEPAR 10.542 0.035 0. 133 0.832 
RICPAR 0.332 0.083 0. 232 0.685 
CORPAR 14.166 0.011 0. 063 0.926 
OCGPAR 13.602 0.027 0. 055 0.918 
COTPAR 0.933 0.073 0. 143 0.784 
*See text for variable definitions. 
^Mean absolute percent error. 
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cotton production is higher at 0.209; the simulated series is smoother than the actual 
data. 
In general, the simulation statistics reported in Table 7.1 indicate that the 
estimated model effectively simulates historical production, input use level, and program 
participation rates. These model validation measures lend further support to the 
conclusion that the estimated structure adequately reflects the production technology in 
the U.S. crop sector. 
Scenario Analysis 
Two policy scenarios are evaluated using the estimated model reported in Chapter 
VI. These scenarios are; (1) increased target price, and (2) increased set-aside 
requirements. Results are prepared relative to a baseline scenario which embedded 
historical agricultural policies as reflected by the model structure and by the data in 
Appendix A used for exogenous variables. The simulation period used for policy 
evaluations is 1961-1986. The results reported here are obtained from deterministic 
simulations. 
Target prices 
The results of a 10 percent increase in the target prices of wheat, rice, corn, 
other coarse grains, and cotton over the periods 1960-1986 are reported in Tables 7.2 
and 7.3. Target prices are increased by 10 percent over the actual values only in the 
years a target price existed historically. To facilitate interpretation, results are reported 
in percent changes over the baserun. 
An increase in target price, as expected, results in an increase in program 
participation rate (Table 7.2) for all the five crop. Program participation rates for corn 
and other coarse grains increased the most, by an average of about 4.5 percent (over the 
baseline) during the program years. Using a simple linear model, Westhoff and Skold 
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Table 7,2. Percent changes in program participation rates under 
a 10 percent increase in target prices^ 
YEAR WHEPAR RICPAR CORPAR OCGPAR COTPAR 
1961 0, 000^ 0 .000 0. 000 0 ,000 0, 000 
1962 0. 000 0 .000 0, .000 0 .000 0 .000 
1963 0. ,000 0 ,000 4. 292 4.081 0, 000 
1964 4, 094 0 .000 3. 022 2, .524 0 ,000 
1965 3. ,166 0. 000 3. ,188 2, 817 0, .000 
1966 2. ,776 0 ,000 3. ,927 3, 824 0. 000 
1967 0. ,000 0, .000 5, 068 5, 913 0, 000 
1968 0. ,000 0, 000 3, 795 4, 107 0, 000 
1969 1. ,810 0, .000 3, 744 4, 039 0, 000 
1970 2. ,292 0. ,000 4. ,226 4, 313 0, .000 
1971 6, 666 0, 000 7, 124 6, 847 0, .000 
1972 0. ,000 0, 000 5. ,520 5, 370 0, 000 
1973 1. ,335 0, 000 6, ,519 6.404 0, .000 
1974 0, ,000 0 ,000 0. ,000 0, 000 0, .000 
1975 0, ,000 0. ,000 0. ,000 0. 000 0, .000 
1976 0, 000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1977 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 
1978 4, ,172 0. ,000 5. 068 5, .383 0, .000 
1979 5, 302 0. ,000 6. ,128 5, .676 0, .000 
1980 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, 000 
1981 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, 000 
1982 5. ,305 3, .107 6. 259 6. ,342 2, 857 
1983 2. ,507 0, 302 4. 847 4, .709 0. ,869 
1984 1, 695 3, 083 6. 700 6, .344 3, .602 
1985 1. ,716 1. ,748 6. 095 6. ,040 2. 571 
1986 3. ,330 2, 178 5. ,735 5, .610 3: 092 
Average 1. ,776 0, 401 3. ,510 3, .475 0, 500 
(2. ,716)C (2.084) (4, ,563) (4, .517) (2, ,598) 
^See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. 
^In this year, there is no target price in the baserun. 
Hence, target price is not changed. 
^Figures in parentheses are average percent changes 
over program years only. 
115 
Table 7.3. Percent changes in production and input demand 
under a 10 percent increase in target price* 
YEAR WHEPD RICPD CORPD OCGPD SOYPD HAYPD COTPD PNTPD FXSPD 
1961 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0, .00 
1962 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0, .00 0, .00 
1963 0.46 -0.92 -0.33 1.59 -0.14 0.43 -0 .36 -0, .32 -1. 11 
1964 1.12 -2.95 -0,52 3.88 -0.17 0.97 -0 .55 0 .58 -2, .67 
1965 0.87 -1.90 -0,36 1.87 -0.18 0.78 -0 .41 0, .39 -1. 86 
1966 1.17 -2.93 -0.32 3.18 -0.16 1.00 -0 .54 0, .84 -1, .65 
1967 0.35 -0.73 -0.23 1,39 -0.07 0.33 -0, .37 -0, .16 -0, 93 
1968 0.38 -0.71 -0.31 1,45 -0.07 0.37 -0 .36 -0, .17 -0, 53 
1969 0.97 -2.16 -0.31 2.51 -0.12 0.86 -0. ,57 0, .66 0, 13 
1970 0.88 -1.96 -0.27 2.35 -0.10 0.79 -0, .52 0, .62 -4, 25 
1971 0.69 -1.56 -0.02 2.08 -0.07 0.62 -0 .44 0, .46 0, .15 
1972 0.88 -1.98 -0,14 2,59 -0.09 0.79 -0, .52 0. ,48 0, ,16 
1973 0.88 -2.15 -0.01 2.81 -0,09 0.84 -0, .58 0, .59 0, 20 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0, .00 0, 00 0, 00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0, 00 0, 00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0, .00 0, .00 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0, .00 0, 00 0, 00 
1978 0.51 -1.38 -0.30 2.96 -0,04 0.60 -0 .48 0, .36 -0, 23 
1979 0.40 -1.21 -0.16 2.75 -0.03 0,49 -0, .40 0, 34 -0. 08 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0 .00 0, 00 0, 00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0, .00 0. ,00 0. ,00 
1982 0.17 0.66 0.02 0.81 0.07 0,26 4, .21 0. ,89 -0. ,02 
1983 0.25 0.42 -0.34 1.28 0.07 0.38 4, .24 1. ,05 -0, 08 
1984 0.18 0.46 -0.02 1.14 0.08 0.26 3, .64 1, 01 -0, 04 
1985 0.25 0.41 -0.01 1.46 0.07 0.37 3, .69 0, ,96 -0, 07 
1986 0.28 0.36 -0.04 1.34 0.06 0.37 3, 24 0. 88 -0. 10 
Average 0.41 -0.78 -0.14 1.44 -0.04 0.40 0, ,50 0. ,36 -0. 44 
*See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. 
116 
Table 7.3. (continued) 
YEAR SUGPD TOBPD VEGPD FUNPD LNDUS FERUS OPCUS LABUS 
1961 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0. ,00 
1962 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0, .00 
1963 -1.64 2.04 -1.88 0,71 0.00 0,11 0.41 -0, .29 
1964 -3.79 4.22 -3.25 1,57 0.00 0.43 1.19 -0, .16 
1965 -3.20 3.66 -2.13 1,04 0.01 -0.07 0.98 -0, 06 
1966 -4.23 4.22 -2.90 1.53 0.01 0.27 1.23 0, .04 
1967 -1.26 1.45 -1.43 0,56 -0.00 0.14 0,27 -0 ,24 
1968 -1.16 2.09 -1.48 0.63 -0,00 0,13 0.30 -0, .31 
1969 -3.37 4.03 -2.57 1,26 0,01 0,19 0.97 0. 01 
1970 -3.04 3.69 -2.28 1,16 0,01 0,19 0.85 0, .02 
1971 -2.30 2.90 -1.89 0,94 0.00 0,20 0,62 0. 12 
1972 -2.87 3.73 -2.45 1.19 0.00 0.23 0.83 0, .03 
1973 -3.45 3.65 -2.56 1.21 0.01 0,23 0,87 0, .18 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0, .00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0, .00 
1976 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0, .00 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0, 00 
1978 -2.56 2.96 -2.17 0.91 -0,00 0.30 0.53 -0, 17 
1979 -2.05 2.38 -1,80 0.75 -0,00 0.31 0.41 -0, 08 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0, 00 
1981 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0, 00 
1982 1.07 . -1.19 -0,30 -0.23 0.04 0.56 -0,13 2, 78 
1983 0.63 -0.76 -0.86 -0.04 0.04 0.73 -0.04 2, 62 
1984 0.89 -1.51 -0,32 -0,16 0,04 0.65 -0,09 2, 44 
1985 0.55 -0.78 -0,79 -0,05 0,04 0.65 -0,04 2, .42 
1986 0.38 -0.73 -0,86 -0.01 0.04 0.62 -0,03 2, 03 
Average -1.21 1.39 -1,23 0,50 0,01 0,23 0.35 0, 44 
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(1987) obtained a 5.53 percent drop in corn participation rate for a 10 percent drop in 
target price. With an average increase of 2,1 percent, program participation rates for 
rice increased the least among the five crops. In general, the changes in participation 
rates reflect the elasticities in Table 6.6. 
A ten percent increase in target prices has a mixed effect on production and 
input use (Table 7.3). Note that results presented in Table 7.3 are due to a simultaneous 
increase in the target prices for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, and cotton. 
Production of wheat and other coarse grains increased in all years during the period 
1961-86 by an average of 0.41 and 1.44 percent respectively. During the same period 
corn production decreased by an average of 0.14 percent. However, in the year 1982, 
corn production increased by about 0.02 percent. Similarly, rice production fluctuated 
from a decrease of 2.95 percent in year 1964 to an increase of 0.66 percent in 0.66. 
Production other crops exhibited similar fluctuations. Thus, the overall effect of a 
simultaneous increase in all target prices for crop production is mixed. Recall that the 
comparative static results in Chapter IV indicated that the overall effect of a change in 
the target price is ambiguous and results reported in Table 7.3 seem to confirm this 
argument. 
Set-aside requirements 
In this scenario, set-aside requirements (SETj) for wheat, rice, corn, other coarse 
grains, and cotton are increased by 100 percent over historical levels; for example, set-
aside parameter for corn is increased from 0.10 to 0.20 in the year 1982, That is, during 
the simulation period, new set-aside requirements are obtained by simply multiplying the 
historical set-aside parameter by 2,0, This implies, that set-aside requirements are 
changed (doubled) only in those years in which they existed. 
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Effects of 100 percent increase in set-aside parameters on program participation 
rates are reported in Table 7.4. Program participation rates decreased for all the five 
crops though the magnitude varied from year to year and from crop to crop depending 
on level of other program parameters. For example, as a result of doubling set-aside 
requirement, program participation rate for corn in year 1986 decreased by about 12.5 
percent (from 80.7 to 70.6). Changes in program participation rates are fairly uniform 
for all crops, around 8 percent, reflective of the elasticities in Table 6.6. 
Doubling of set-aside requirements had less effect on production and input use 
(see Table 7.5). Note that set-aside requirements are changed only in years after 1977. 
To reflect this feature of the impacts, separate averages over the period 1978-86 is 
provided at the bottom of the Table 7.5. Though the magnitude is small, it is interesting 
to note that the direction of change in production is not always the same. In fact, 
except for peanuts, change in production of all other crops did not have an uniform 
direction - there were years in which production increased and years in which 
production decreased. For example, as a result of increase in set-aside requirements, 
production of other coarse grains decreased in years 1978, 1979, and 1986, while 
increasing in years 1982 through 1985. This lack of conformity in the direction of 
effect of an increase in set-aside parameter is not unexpected. 
Recall from the comparative static results in Chapter IV, that an increase in set-
aside parameter has two distinct effects - first by changing the aggregate expected price 
via a change in the participation rate, and second by changing the effective rental price 
of land - acting (possibly) in opposite directions. The overall effect depends on the 
exact level of policy variables and parameters. In fact, because of these off-setting 
influences, the total effect on the production is small. This important distinction is lost 
in reduced form representations of policy variables. For example, in Shumway et al. 
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Table 7.4. Percent changes in program participation rates under 
a 100 percent increase in set-aside requirements^ 
YEAR WHEPAR RICPAR CORPAR OCGPAR COTPAR 
1961 0. 000 0, 000 0 .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1962 0, .000 0, 000 0 .000 0, .000 0, .000 
1963 0, .000 0. 000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 
1964 0, 000 0, 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, .000 
1965 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 
1966 0, .000 0, 000 0 .000 0. 000 0 .000 
1967 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, .000 
1968 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 
1969 0, 000 0, 000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 
1970 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, .000 
1971 0, .000 0, 000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 
1972 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 
1973 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 
1974 0, .000 0, 000 0. 000 0, 000 0, 000 
1975 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 
1976 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, 000 
1977 0, 000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, 000 0, 000 
1978 -10, 254 0, 000 -5. ,391 -6, 132 0, 000 
1979 -12. 503 0, 000 -6, 482 -7, 893 0. ,000 
1980 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0, .000 
1981 0, 000 0, 000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, 000 
1982 -10, .814 -13, 717 -7, 488 -7, 805 -5, 178 
1983 -7, .604 -1, 782 -9, 332 -7, 320 -4, 110 
1984 -5, .817 -25, 075 -8, 105 -7. ,964 -14, 026 
1985 -6, .104 -12. ,893 -7, .342 -7, 301 -9, 063 
1986 13, .391 -26, 691 -12, .540 -14, 483 -14, 181 
Average -2, .557 -3, 083 -2. ,180 -2, 265 -1, 791 
(-9, .498) (-16, ,032) (-8, 097) (-8, ,414) (-9, ,312: 
^See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. 
^Figures in parentheses are average percent changes 
over years 1978-79 and 1982-1986. 
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Table 7.5. Percent changes in production and input demand under 
a 100 percent increase in set-aside requirements* 
YEAR WHEPD RICPD CORPD OCGPD SOYPD HAYPD COTPD PNTPD FXSPD 
1961 0. 000 0.000 0. 000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0 .000 0 .000 0, .000 
1962 0. 000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 0, .000 0.000 0 .000 0 .000 0, 000 
1963 0. 000 0.000 0. 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0. 000 0, .000 0, 000 
1964 0. 000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 0, .000 0. 000 0. 000 0 .000 0. ,000 
1965 0. 000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 0 .000 0, 000 
1966 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1967 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0 .000 0, 000 
1968 0. 000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0. 000 
1969 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1970 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0 .000 0, 000 
1971 0. 000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1972 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1973 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0. 000 0.000 0, ,000 
1974 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0, 000 
1975 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, .000 0. ,000 
1976 0. 000 0,000 0. 000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, 000 0, 000 0. 000 
1977 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 0, 000 0, 000 0. ,000 
1978 -0. 079 0,235 0, .274 -0, 277 0, .005 -0. 094 0, .050 -0, 108 1. ,218 
1979 -0. 040 0,127 0, .107 -0. ,119 0, .001 -0. 046 0, .029 -0, 052 0. 334 
1980 0. 000 0,000 0, .000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 
1981 0. 000 0,000 0. 000 0, 000 0, .000 0. 000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 
1982 0. 003 -0,242 -0, .007 0. ,109 -0, .006 0. 004 -0. 498 -0, 085 -0. 250 
1983 0. 052 1,189 0 .626 0, 920 -0, .007 -0. 036 -1, .015 -0, 096 0. 040 
1984 0. 128 -0,701 -0, .010 0, 238 -0, .009 0. 042 -0, 900 -0. ,168 -0. 603 
1985 0. 106 0,074 -0 .007 0. ,099 -0, .015 0. 003 -1, 016 -0, 183 -0. 368 
1986 0. 027 -1,049 0.044 -1, 307 -0.000 -0. 031 -1, 239 -0, 277 0. ,681 
Avg 0. 008 -0,014 0 .040 0, 038 -0, .001 -0. 006 -0, 177 -0. ,037 0. 040 
Avg*b 0. 028 -0,052 0, .147 0. ,140 -0, .004 -0. 023 -0, 656 -0, 138 0. 150 
*See Table 5.1 for variable definitions. 
^Average over years 1978-79 and 1982-86. 
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Table 7.5. (continued) 
YEAR SUGPD TOBPD VEGPD FUNPD LANUS FERUS OPCUS LABUS 
1961 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, 000 0, .000 0. ,000 0 .000 0 .000 
1962 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 0. ,000 0, 000 0, .000 0 .000 
1963 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, 000 0.000 0. ,000 0, 000 0, .000 
1964 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0.000 0. ,000 0.000 0 .000 
1965 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. ,000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1966 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 0, .000 0 .000 
1967 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 0, .000 0, ,000 0 .000 0 .000 
1968 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1969 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1970 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 0, ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1971 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. 000 0, .000 0. 000 
1972 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0, 000 0, .000 0, .000 
1973 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1974 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1975 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0. ,000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, .000 
1976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0. 000 
1977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0.000 0, .000 0, .000 
1978 0.418 -0.448 0.263 -0, .135 -0, 000 -0. ,041 -0, .098 0, 177 
1979 0.197 -0.205 0.148 -0, .071 0, 000 -0. 033 -0, .043 0, 090 
1980 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. ,000 0, .000 0, 000 
1981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 0, 000 0. 000 0, 000 0, 000 
1982 -0.294 0.299 -0.079 0, .074 -0, 001 -0. 061 0, 043 -0. ,312 
1983 -0.027 0.030 0.031 0, .013 -0, 006 -0. 039 -0, 003 0, 100 
1984 -0.720 0.885 -0.203 0, .186 0, 005 -0. 158 0. ,119 -0, 520 
1985 -0.527 0.661 -0.126 0, .140 -0, 004 -0, 134 0. ,090 -0, 585 
1986 -0.638 0.890 0.089 0, .152 0, 012 -0. 289 0, 121 -0, 656 
Avg -0.061 0.081 .0.005 0, .014 0, 000 -0. 029 0, 009 -0, 066 
Avg*» 
-0.227 0.302 0.018 0, .051 0, 001 -0. 108 0, 033 -0. ,244 
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(1988), set-asides are represented through a effective support price resulting erroneously 
in an unambiguous negative effect of set-asides on production. 
As a result of an increase in set-asides, use of land and fertilizer inputs is down 
(Table 7.5). The effects for operating capital and labor varied, again, from year to year. 
It should be noted that these are aggregate input demands. No inferences could be made 
on crops specific input use from the model. 
Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has illustrated how the estimated output supply and input demand 
equations with their policy structure can be used for policy analysis. In addition, the 
empirical model was used to validate selected important comparative statics results in 
Chapter III. Specifically, it was shown that increasing target prices (set-aside 
requirements) would result in an increase (decrease) in program participation rate. The 
estimated model used for policy simulations, however, does not contain consumer 
demand and input supply equations. Hence, the empirical policy results reported in this 
chapter are only partial since no simultaneous price determination mechanism was 
incorporated. In fact, the policy framework of the estimated model can be fully 
exploited if incorporated in a general equilibrium model. 
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CHAPTER VIII. SUMMARY 
The present study was conducted with two overall objectives. ' The first was to 
develop a theoretical model of the producer decisions for participation in voluntary 
commodity programs and to structurally incorporate the government program variables in 
crop output supply and input demand system. The second objective was to estimate 
theoretically consistent crop supply and input demand system with a detailed policy 
structure for the U.S. crop sector. 
A theoretical model incorporating agricultural producers decision on whether to 
comply with the volunteer commodity programs was developed. This theoretical model 
formed the basis for the empirical specifications of policy structure used for the 
econometric analysis. Unlike previous studies, policy variables were directly 
incorporated in a structural framework. 
The properties of duality were exploited in constructing the empirical model. 
More specifically, a multi-output profit function technology in dual framework was used 
in the present study. A normalized quadratic profit function was used to derive product 
supply and variable input demand equations. Policy parameters were implemented 
directly in the output supply and input demand equations in a structural framework 
following the theoretical model. 
Thirteen crop supply (wheat, rice, corn, other coarse grains, soybeans, hay, 
cotton, peanuts, flaxseed and sunflower, sugarcane and sugarbeet, tobacco, vegetables, 
and fruits and nuts) and four variable input demand (land, fertilizer, operating capital, 
and labor) equations were estimated simultaneously using full information maximum 
likelihood estimation and allowing for contemporaneous correlation of additive errors. 
Annual aggregate time series data for the U.S. agriculture were used in the estimation. 
The sample period extended from years 1950 through 1986. In estimation, homogeneity 
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and symmetry of the restricted profit function were maintained. Estimates indicated 
that monotonicity of the profit function was not violated. Using Cholesky factorization, 
convexity of the restricted profit function was tested and rejected. To maintain 
theoretical consistency, convexity is nevertheless imposed. The parameter estimates 
implied plausible own price elasticities. In general, estimated cross price elasticities were 
small. 
In addition, equations for commodity program participation rates for wheat, rice, 
corn, other coarse grains, and cotton are estimated. The explanatory variables and 
functional form for these participation equations are chosen in accordance with the 
theoretical model. The estimated parameters are consistent with the theory and implied 
plausible elasticities. 
The estimated model performed well in a historical simulation. The estimated 
model was then used to conduct policy analyses. Results indicated that an increase in 
target prices (set-aside requirements) results in an increase (decrease) in program 
participation rate. Effects of an increase in target price on production and input use 
varied from crop to crop and from year to year. As a result of a simultaneous 10 
percent increase in all target prices, productions for wheat, other coarse grains, and 
cotton increased. Production for other coarse grains increased the most; by an average 
of 1.4 percent per year. Corn production decreased by an average of 0.2 percent due to 
a 10 percent increase in all target prices. Higher target prices resulted in more intensive 
use of all inputs. 
The study took a bold first step toward incorporating a policy structure in a 
theoretically sound framework for crop supply analysis. The incorporation of policy 
parameters in a structural way, as opposed to reduced form representations, combined 
with a rigorous microeconomic theory sets the present study apart and represents a 
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contribution to the areas of applied production analysis and quantitative policy 
evaluation. The empirical results are promising and indicated that microeconomic theory 
can be fruitfully and meaningfully combined with a structural implementation of policy 
parameters in the U.S. agricultural sector. 
Though the results from the present study are satisfactory in several aspects, 
some improvements can be made in the model. First, the treatment of loan rates and 
their impact on the expectations of non-participants could be made more explicit. When 
program participation rate is high, the loan rate effectively forms a lower bound to the 
market price. Hence, non-participants are also better off, since their market price is 
now at least as high as loan rate. The present study does not capture these effects 
explicitly. A rational expectations hypothesis is necessary to fully capture these market 
feedback mechanisms between participants, non-participants, and anticipated market 
price or output level. The policy structure developed in the present study can be 
elaborated to explicitly treat loan rates and base acres. To incorporate base acres, a 
dynamic specification - another aspect omitted in the present study - will be required. 
A dynamic specification is also desirable to model the production of certain crops such 
as fruits and nuts due to their perennial nature. 
Improvements can also be made to the estimated participation rate equations also. 
Specifically, it would be desirable to incorporate cross price effects in the participation 
rate equations. Also, it might prove to be beneficial to estimate the participation rate 
equations simultaneously with the rest of the system. Finally, the rich policy structure 
in the estimated supply and input demand equations, can be fully exploited for policy 
analysis, when incorporated in a general equilibrium model for the U.S. economy. 
126 
REFERENCES 
Abkin, Michael H. 1985. The intermediate United States Food and Agriculture Model 
of the IIASA/FAP Basic Link System; Summary Documentation and User's 
Guide." WP-85-30. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxemberg, Austria. 
Adelman, Irma and Alexander Sarris. 1982. "Incorporating Uncertainty into Planning of 
Industrialization Strategies for Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working 
Paper No. 503. 
Adelman, Irma and Sherman Robinson. 1985. "Macroeconomic Adjustment and Income 
Distribution: Alternative Models in Two Economies." Working Paper No. 385. 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, 
. Berkeley. 
Adelman, Irma and Sherman Robinson. 1986. "U.S. Agriculture in a General 
Equilibrium Framework: Analysis with a Social Accounting Matrix." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 1190-1207. 
Adelman, Irma and J. Edward Taylor, eds. 1986. The Design of Alternative 
Development Strategies. Rohtak, India; Jan Tinbergen Institute of Development 
Planning. 
Adelman, Irma, Alexander H. Sarris, and David M. Wells. 1986. "Modeling 
Uncertainty with Computable General Equilibrium Models." University of 
California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
Mimeo. 
Ahluwalia, Montek S., and Frank J. Lysy. 1979. "Welfare Effects of Demand 
Management Policies: Impact Multipliers Under Alternative Model Structures." 
Journal of Policv Modeling 1; 317-42. 
Andereson, Kym, and Yujiro Hayami. 1986. The Political Economv of Agricultural 
Protection. Boston; Allen and Unwin Publishers. 
Anderson, J. E. 1985. "The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas: The Cheese Case." 
American Economic Review 75; 178-190. 
Anderson, J. R., J. L. Dillon, and B. Hardarker. 1977. Agricultural Decision 
Analysis. Ames; Iowa State University Press. 
Antle, John M. 1983. "Incorporating Risk in Production Analysis." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 65: 1099-1106. 
Antle, John M. 1984. "The Structure of U.S. Agricultural Technology, 1910-78." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 414-21. 
Antle, John M. 1987. "Econometric Estimation of Producers' Risk Attitudes." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 509-22. 
127 
Antle, John M., and Stephen A. Hatchett. 1986. "Dynamic Input Decisions in 
Econometric Production Models." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
68: 939-49. 
Appelbaum, Elle. 1978. "Testing Neoclassical Production Theory." Journal of 
Econometrics 7: 87-102. 
Aradhyula, Satheesh. 1988. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price 
Uncertainty: The Case of Multiproduct Firm." Paper presented at the Annual 
Meetings of the Midwest Economic Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 21-23. 
Aradhyula, Satheesh, and Matthew T. Holt. 1989. "Risk Behavior and Rational 
Expectations in the U.S. Broiler Industry." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics Forthcoming. 
Aradhyula, Satheesh, K. Eswaramoorthy, and Klaus Frohberg. 1988. "An Application 
of the Computable General Equilibrium Model to Analyze U.S. Agriculture." 
Working Paper 88-WP26. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, Ames. 
Armington, Paul. 1969. "A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of 
Production." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 16; 159-178. 
Arrow, K. J., and G. Debreu. 1954. "Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
Economy." Econometrica 22: 265-290. 
Artus, P., and W. Guvenen, eds. 1986. International Macroeconomic Modeling for 
Policy Decisions. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher. 
Arzac, Enrique R., and M. Wilkinson. 1979. "A Quarterly Model of United States 
Livestock and Feed Grain Markets and some of its Policy Implications." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61: 297-308. 
Askari, H., and J. T. Cummings. 1977. "Estimating Agricultural Supply Response 
with the Nerlove Model: A Survey." International Economic Review 18: 257-
292. 
Baffes, J., and U. Vasavada. 1989. "On the Choice of Functional Forms in 
Agricultural Production Analysis." Applied Economics Forthcoming. 
Ball, Eldon V. 1986. "Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement in U. S. 
Agriculture, 1948-79." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 475-
486. 
Ball, Eldon V. 1988. "Modeling Supply Response in a Multiproduct Framework." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70: 813-825. 
128 
Ball, Eldon V. 1989. "Estimating Supply Response of Multiproduct Farms." Technical 
Bulletin No. 1750. Economic Research Service, United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
Ball, Eldon V., and Robert G. Chambers. 1982. "An Economic Analysis of Technology 
in the Meat Products Industry." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 
699-709. 
Ball, R. J. 1978. The International Linkage of National Economic Model. Amsterdam: 
North Holland Publishing Company. 
Ballard, Charles L., John B. Shoven, and John Whalley. 1982. "The Welfare Costs of 
Distortions in the U.S. Tax System. A General Equilibrium Approach." Working 
Paper No. 1043. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Ballard, Charles L., T. Fullerton, J. B. Shoven, and J. Whalley. 1985. A General 
Equilibrium Model for Tax Policy Evaluation. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Barclay, Thomas N. 1986. "Macroeconomic Impacts on United States Agriculture: A 
Simulation Analysis." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Oklahoma State 
University, Stillwater. 
Bamett, William A. 1983a. "New Indices of Money Supply and the Flexible Laurent 
Demand System." Journal of Business and Economic Statictics 1: 7-23. 
Barnett, William A. 1983b. "Definitions of 'Second Order Approximation' and of 
'Flexible Functional Form'." Economics Letters 12: 31-35. 
Barnett, William A. 1985. "The Miniflex-Laurent Translog Flexible Functional Form." 
Journal of Econometrics 30: 33-44. 
Baxter, N. D., and J. L. Cragg. 1970. "Corporate Choice among Long-Term 
Financing Instruments." Review of Economics and Statistics 52: 225-235. 
Beattie, Bruce R., and C. Robert Taylor. 1985. The Economics of Production New 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Bergman, L. 1982. "A System of Computable General Equilibrium Models for a Small 
Open Economy." Mathematical Modeling 3: 421-435. 
Berndt, E. R., and L. R. Christensen. 1973. "The Translog Function and the 
Substitution of Equipment, Structures, and Labor in U.S. Manufacturing, 
1929-68." Journal of Econometrics 2: 81-113. 
Blackorby, C., and W. Schworm. 1982. "Aggregate Investment and Consistent 
Intertemporal Technologies." Review of Economic Studies 49: 595-614. 
129 
Blackorby, C., and W. Schworm. 1988. "The Existence of Input and Output Aggregates 
in Aggregate Production Function." Econometrica 56: 613-643. 
Blackorby, C, D. Primont, and R. Russel. 1977. "On Testing Separability Restrictions 
with IHexible Functional Forms." Journal of Econometrics 5: 195-209. 
Blackorby, C., D. Primont, and R. Russel. 1978. Duality. Separability and Functional 
Structure: Theory and Economic Applications. New York: North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Blair, Roger, D., and Rafael Lusky. 1977. "A Note on Random Demand and Duality 
Under Competition." International Economic Review 18: 235-240. 
Blitzer, Charles R., Peter B. Clark, and Lance Taylor, eds. 1975, Economy-Wide 
Models and Development Planning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boisvert, R. N. 1986. "A General Measure of Output-Variable Input Demand 
Elasticities." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 745-746. 
Borges, A. M. 1987. "Applied General Equilibrium Models and Agricultural Policy 
Evaluation." INSEAD, Fontainebleau. 
Brandow, G. E. 1977. "Policy for Commercial Agricultue, 1945-71." In Survey of 
Agricultural Economics Literature. Edited by Lee Martin. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Branson, W. H. 1979. Macroeconomîc Theory and Policy. New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers. 
Bullock, J. Bruce. 1984. "Future Directions for Agricultural Policy." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 66: 234-239. 
Burt, Oscar R., and V. E. Worthington. 1988. "Wheat Acreage Supply Response in the 
United States." Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 13: 100-111. 
Bunch, D. S. 1988. "A Comparision of Algorithms for Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation of Choice Models." Journal of Econometrics 38: 145-168. 
Capalbo, Susan M., and Michael G. S. Denny. 1986. "Testing Long-Run Productivity 
Models for the Canadian and U. S. Agricultural Sectors." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 68: 615-625. 
Caves, Douglas W., and Laurits Christensen. 1980. "Global Properties of Flexible 
Functional Forms." American Economic Review 70: 422-432. 
Chalfant, J. A., and A. R. Gallant. 1985. "Estimating Substitution Elasticity with 
Fourier Form - Some Monte Carlo Results." Journal of Econometrics 28: 205-
222. 
130 
Chalfant, J. A., R. S. Gray, and K. J. White. 1989. "Evaluating Prior Beliefs in a 
Demand System: The Case of Meat Demand in Canada." Working Paper No. 
483. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
Chambers, Robert G. 1988. Applied Production Analysis: A Dual Approach. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Chambers, Robert G., and William E. Foster. 1983. "Participation in the Farmer-
Owened Reserve: A Discrete Choice Model." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 65: 120-124. 
Chambers, Robert G., and Richard E. Just. 1982. "Effects of Exchange Rates on U.S. 
Agriculture: A Dynamic Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
63: 294-59. 
Chambers, Robert G., and Richard E. Just. 1988. "Estimating Multioutput 
Technologies." Working Paper No. 88-19. Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park. 
Chambers, Robert G., and R. Lopez. 1984. "A General Dynamic, Supply-Response 
Model." Northeast Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 13: 142-54. 
Chang, Ching-Cheng, and Richard Shumway. 1988. "Sensitivity of Supply Elasticities 
to Model Specification." Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association, Knoxville, Tennessee, July 31 - August 3. 
Chattin, Barbara L. 1987. "Measures of Government Intervention the U.S. Wheat, Corn, 
Sugar, and Dairy Markets." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Agricultural Economics Association, East Lansing, Michigan, August 
2-5. 
Chavas, Jean-Paul, and Richard M. Klemme. 1986. "Aggregate Milk Supply Response 
and Investment Behavior on U. S. Dairy Farms." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 68: 55-66. 
Choi, E. K., and S. R. Johnson. 1987. "Demand Uncertainty and Price Stabilization." 
Working Paper 87-WP23. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Christensen, Laurits R., Dale W. Jorgenson, and Lawrence J. Lau. 1973. 
"Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers." The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 55: 28-45. 
Chung, Jae-Wan. 1987. "On the Estimation of factor substitution in the translog 
model." The Review of Economics and Statistics 69: 392-398. 
Clarete, R., and J. Roumasset. 1986. "Modeling Agricultural Development Policy: A 
General Equilibrium Approach." Discussion paper 86-7. School of Economics, 
University of the Philippines, Manila. 
131 
Clements, Kenneth W. 1977. "The Trade Balances in Monetary General Equilibrium." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago, Chicago. 
Clements, Kenneth W. 1980. "A General Equilibrium Econometric Model of an Open 
Economy." International Economic Review 21 :469-88. 
Clements, Kenneth W., and H. Y. Izan. 1981. "A Note on Estimating Divisia Index 
Numbers." International Economic Review 22; 745-747. 
Cochrane, W. W., and M. E. Ryan. 1976. American Farm Policy. 1948-1973. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Colman, David. 1983. "A Review of the Arts of Supply Response Analysis." Review of 
Marketing and Agricultural Economics 51: 201-230. 
Daal, J. v., and A. H. Merkies. 1984. Aggregation in Economic Research. Boston: 
Reidel Publishing Company. 
Deardorff, A., and R. M. Stem. 1981. "A Disaggregated Model of World Production 
and Trade: An Estimate of the Impacts of the Tokyo Round." Journal of Policy 
Modeling 3: 127-152. 
Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer. 1980. Economics and Consumer Behavior. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 
Decaluwe, Bernard, and Andre Martens. 1988. "CGE Modeling and Developing 
Economies: A Concise Empirical Survey of 73 Applications to 26 Countries." 
Journal of Policy Modeling 10: 529-568. 
de Gorter, Harry. 1987. "Assessing the Consequences of U.S. Farm Policy on World 
Markets." Paper presented at the GATT Agriculture Policy Modeling Workshop, 
Center for the Study of International Economic Relations, University of Western 
Ontario, London. 
de Gorter, Harry, and Brian W. Paddock. 1985. "The Impact of U.S. Price Support and 
Acreage Production Measures on Crop Output." International Trade Policy 
Division, Agriculture Canada. Mimeo. 
de Janvry, A., and E. Sadoulet. 1986. "Agricultural Growth in Developing Countries 
and Agricultural Imports: Econometric and General Equilibrium Analysis." 
Working Paper No. 424. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
de Melo, Jaime. 1988. "SAM-Based Models: An Introduction." Journal of Policy 
Modeling 10: 321-327. 
Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson. 1982. General Equilibrium 
Models for Development Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
132 
Devarajan, Shantayanan, Jeffrey D. Lewis, and Sherman Robinson. 1986. "A 
Bibliography of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models Applied to 
Developing Countries." Working Paper No. 400. Giannini Foundation of 
Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Gilles Michel. 1987. "On Closure Rules, Homogeneity, and 
Dynamics in Applied General Equilibrium Models." Journal of Development 
Economics 26: 65-76. 
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Sherman Robinson. 1985. "The Impact of Price Rigidities: 
A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis." Working Paper No. 375. 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Dhrymes, P. J. 1978. Introductory Econometrics. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Diewert, W. E. 1971. "An Application of the Shephard Duality Theorm: A 
Generalized Leontief Production Function." Journal of Political Economy 79: 
481-507. 
Diewert, W. E. 1973. "Functional Forms for Profit and Transformation Functions." 
Journal of Economic Theory 6: 284-316. 
Diewert, W. E. 1974. "Application of Duality Theory." In Frontiers of Quantitative 
Economics. Edited by M. Intriligator and D. Kendrick. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
Diewert, W. E. 1976. "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers." Journal of 
Econometrics 4: 115-145. 
Diewert, W. E. 1978. "Superlative Index Numbers and Consistency in Aggregation." 
Econometrica 46: 883-900. 
Diewert, W. E., and T. J. Wales. 1987, "Flexible Functional Forms and Global 
Curvature Conditions." Econometrica 55: 43-68. 
Diewert, W. E., and T. J. Wales. 1988. "A Normalized Quadratic Semi-flexible 
Functional Form." Journal of Econometrics 37: 327-342. 
Dixon, P. B., B. R. Parmenter, and R. J. Rimmer. 1984. "Extending the ORANI 
model of the Australian Economy: Adding Foreign Investment to a miniature 
version." In H. E. Scarf and J. B. Shoven eds. Applied general Equilibrium 
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Driscoll, Paul J., and Richard N. Boisvert. 1988. "Empirical Implications of 
Reconciling the Behavioral Assumptions in Dual Models of Productions." 
Working Paper No. 88-9. Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell 
University, Ithaca. 
133 
Drud, A., W. Grais, and G. Pyatt. 1986. "Macroeconomic Modeling Based on Social 
Accounting Principles." Journal of Policy Modeling 8: 111-45. 
Duncan, G. M. 1980. "Formulation and Statistical Analysis of the Mixed, 
Continuous/Discrete Dependent Variable Model in Classic Production Theory." 
Econometrica 48: 839-852. 
Eckstein, Zvi. 1985. "The Dynamics of Agiicultural Supply: A Reconsideration." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 204-214. 
Eeckhoudt, L., and P. Hansen. 1980. "Minimum and Maximum Prices, Uncertainty, 
and the Theory of the Competitive Firm." American Economic Review 70: 
1064-i068. 
Epstein, Larry G. 1981. "Duality Theory and Functional Forms for Dynamic Factor 
Demands." Review of Economic Studies 48: 81-95, 
Epstein, Larry G. 1983. "Generalized Duality and Integrability." Econometrica 49: 
655-678. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 1986. Competing in the World Market Place: 
The Challenge for American Agriculture. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City. 
Feldstein, Martin, ed. 1983. Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policv Analysis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fischer G., K. Frohberg, M. Keyzer, and K. Parikh. 1988. "Linked national models: 
A tool for international food policy analysis." Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute. 1987a. "Comparative Analysis of 
Selected Policy Options for U.S. Agriculture." Staff Report 1-87. Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute. 1987b. "Managing the Food Security 
Act of 1985: The Current Strategy and Two Alternatives." Staff Report 3-87. 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute. 1988. "Policy Scenarios with FAPRI 
Commodity Models" Working Paper No. WP88-41. Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
Fomby, Thomas B., R. Carter Hill, and Stanley R. Johnson. 1984. Advanced 
Econometric Methods. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Fox, Karl, A. 1951. "The Measurement of Price Support Costs." Journal of Farm 
Economics 33: 470-484. 
134 
Fox, Karl, A. 1965. "A Submodel of the Agricultural Sector." In The Brookings 
Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States. Edited by James S. 
Duesenbarry. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company. 
Fox, Karl, A., and Harry C. Norcross. 1952. "Some Relationships between Agriculture 
and the General Economy." Agricultural Economics Research 4: 13-21. 
Freebaim, J. W., and G. C. Rausser. 1975. "Effects of Changes in the Level of U.S. 
Beef Imports." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57: 676-688, 
Frenkel, J. A., and H. G. Johnson, eds. 1978, "The Economics of Exchange Rates: 
Selected Studies." Reading, Mass,: Addison-Wesley. 
Frohberg, Klaus, Satheesh V. Aradhyula, D. Maxwell, and S. R. Johnson. 1988. 
"CARD/BLS Model Results" Report presented at the Policy Modeling 
Symposium, Annual Meetings of the American Agricultural Economics 
Association, Knoxville. 
Fuss, M. 1977. "The Demand for Energy in Canadian Manufacturing: An Example of 
the Estimation of Production Structures with many Inputs." Journal of 
Econometrics 5: 89-116. 
Fuss, M., and M. McFadden, eds. 1978. Production Economics: A Dual Approach to 
Theory and Applications. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. 
Gadson, K. E., J. M. Price, and L. E. Salathe. 1982. "The Food and Agricultural 
Policy Simulator (FAMIM): Structural Equations and Variable Definitions." 
Staff Report AGES 820506. Economic Research Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
Gallant, Ronald A. 1981. "On the Bias in Flexible Functional Forms and an Essentially 
Unbiased Form: The Fourier Flexible Form." Journal of Econometrics 15: 211-
245 
Gallant, Ronald A. 1982. "Unbiased Determination of Production Technologies." 
Journal of Econometrics 20: 285-323. 
Gallant, Ronald A. 1984. "The Fourier Flexible Form." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 66: 204-208. 
Gallant, Ronald A., and Gene H. Gloub. 1984. "Imposing Curvature Restrictions on 
Flexible Functional Forms." Journal of Econometrics 26: 295-321. 
Gardiner, Walter, and Praveen Dixit. 1987. "The Price Elasticity of Export Demand for 
U.S. Agricultural Products; Methods and Estimates." Paper presented at the 1987 
Annual Meetings of Southern Agricultural Economics Association, February 2-4, 
Nashville, Tennessee. 
Gardner, Bruce L. 1981. The Governing of Agriculture. Lawrence: The Regents Press 
of Kansas. 
135 
Gardner, B. L. 1985. "Economic Consequences of U.S. Agricultural Policies." 
Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 
Gardner, B. L. 1987. "Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs." Journal of Political 
Economy 95: 290-310. 
Gardner, B. L., and J. P. Chavas. 1979. "Market Equilibrium with Random 
Production." Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association, Pullman. 
Glaser, Lewrene K. 1986. "Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985." Agricultural 
Information Bulletin Number 498. United States Department of Economics, 
Economic Research Service, Washington, D. C. 
Goodwin, Thomas H., and Steven M. Sheffrin. 1982. "Testing the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis in an Agricultural Market." Review of Economics and 
Statistics 64: 558-567. 
Gorman, W. M. 1968. "Measuring the Quantities of Fixed Factors." In Value. Capital 
and Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John Hicks. Edited by H. N. Wolfe. 
Chicago: Aldine Press. 
Green, H. A. J. 1964. Aggregation in Economic Analysis. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 
Griffin, R. C., J. Montgomery and E. Rister. 1987. "Selecting Functional Form in 
Production Analysis." Western Journal of Aericlutural Economics 12: 216-27. 
Groenewegen, John, and Kenneth Clayton. 1982. "Agricultural Price Supports and Cost 
of Production." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 271-275. 
Groenewegen, John, and Kenneth Clayton. 1983. "Agricultural Price Supports and Cost 
of Production: Reply." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65: 626-
628. 
Grube, Arthur, H. 1986. "Participation in Farm Commodity Programs: A Stochastic 
Dominance Analysis. Comment." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
68: 185-188. 
Hall, D. C., and G. M. Duncan. 1984. "Econometric Evaluation of New Technology 
with an Application to Integrated Pest Managment." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 66: 624-633. 
Hallam, Arne, Richard Just, and Rulon Pope. 1982. "Positive Economic Analysis and 
Risk Considerations in Agricultural Production." In New Directions in 
Econometric Modeling and Forecasting in U.S. Agriculture. Edited by G. 
Rausser. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
136 
Hamilton, C. 1986. "A General Equilibrium Model of Structural Change and Economic 
Growth, with Application to South Korea." Journal of Development Economics 
23; 67-88. 
Hanenmann, W., and Y. Tsur. 1982. "Econometric Models of Discrete/ Continuous 
Supply Decisions Under Uncertainty." Working Paper No. 195. Giannini 
Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
Hanoch, Giora. 1975. "Production and Demand Models with Direct Indirect Implicit 
Additivity." Econometrica 43: 395-419. 
Hanson, Kenneth A., and Sherman Robinson. 1989. "Data, Linkages, and Models: U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts in the Framework of a Social Accounting 
Matrix." Staff Report No. 89-5. Agriculture and Rural Economy Division, 
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 
Hanthom, M., and J. W. Glauber. 1987. "An Assessment of Marketing Loan Program 
Options." Agricultural Economics Report No. 581. Economic Research Service, 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 
Harvey, A. C. 1981. The Econometric Analvsis of Time Series. Oxford: Phillip Alan. 
Hasenkamp, G. 1976a. Specification and Estimation of Multi-outPut Production 
Functions. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Hasenkamp, G. 1976b. "A Study of Multiple-Output Production Functions: Klein's 
Railroad Study Revised." Journal of Econometrics 4: 253-262. 
Heathfield, David F., and Sorem Wibe. 1987. An Introduction to Cost and Production 
Functions. Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Heien, D. 1977. "The Cost of the U.S. Dairy Price Support Program." Review of 
Economics and Statistics 59: 1-8. 
Helms, J. L. 1985. "Errors in the Numerical Assessment of the Benefits of Price 
Stabilization." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 93-100. 
Henderson, J. M., and R. E. Quandt. 1980. Microeconomic Theorv. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Hertel, Thomas W. 1984. "Application of Duality and Flexible Functional Forms: The 
Case of the Multiproduct Firm." Indiana Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Research Bulletin 980. 
Hertel, Thomas W. 1985. "Partial vs. General Equilibrium Analysis and Choice of 
Functional Form: Implications for Policy Modeling." Journal of Policv Modeling 
7: 281-303. 
Hertel, Thomas W. 1986. "Doable General Equilibrium Models: Discussion." Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 68: 1222-1224. 
137 
Hertel, Thomas W. 1988. "Economywide Analysis of U.S. Agriculture: What Have we 
Learned and How can we Teach it?" Staff Peper No. 88-8. Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. 
Hertel, Thomas W., and Lance McKinze. 1986. "Pseudo Data as a Teaching Tool: 
Application to the Translog, Multiproduct Profit Function." Western Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 11: 19-30. 
Hertel, Thomas W., and Marines E. Tsigas. 1987. "General Equilibrium Analysis of 
Supply Control in U.S. Agriculture." Staff Paper 87-25. Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. 
Hill, B. 1982. "Concepts and Measurements of the Incomes, Wealth, and Economic 
Well-being of Farmers." Journal of Agricultural Economics 33: 311-24. 
Holt, M. T. 1987. "Uncertainty and the Microfoundations of Supply Response: Some 
Theoretical Considerations and An Empirical Application in the U.S. Corn 
Market." Unpublished Ph D. dissertation. University of Missouri, Columbia. 
Houck, J. P. 1986. Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies. Macmillan Publishing 
Company: New York. 
Houck, J. P., and M. E. Ryan. 1972. "Supply Analysis for Corn in the United States: 
The Impact of Changing Government Programs." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 54: 184-91. 
Howard, Wayne H., and Richard Shumway. 1988. "Dynamic Adjustment in the Ù. S. 
Dairy Industry." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70: 837-847, 
Hughes, Dean W., and John B. Penson. 1980. "Description and Use of a 
Macroeconomic Model of the U.S. Economy Which Emphasizes Agriculture." 
Texas A&M University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Departmental 
Technical Report 20, DTR 80-5. 
Johansen, L. 1974. A Multi-sectoral Studv of Economic Growth. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, Second Edition. 
Johnson, James D., and Sara D. Short. 1983. "Commodity programs: Who has received 
the benefits?" American Jouranl of Agricultural Economics 65: 912-921. 
Johnson, Stanley R. 1981. "Alternative Designs for Policy Models of the Agricultural 
Sector." In Modeling Agriculture for Policy Analvsis in the 1980s. Kansas City; 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Johnson, Stanley R. 1986. "Doable General Equilibrium Models: Discussion." 
American Jouranl of Agricultural Economics 68: 1217-1218. 
138 
Johnson, Stanley R., William H. Meyers, Patrick Westhoff, and Abner Womack. 1988. 
"Agricultural Market Outlook and Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Productivity, and 
Policy Changes." Working Paper No. 88-WP36. Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
Judge, George G., C. R. Hill, W. E. Griffiths, H. Lutkepohl, and T. C. Lee. 1988. 
Introduction to the Theorv and Practice of Econometrics. Second Edition. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Just, Richard E. 1974. "An Investigation of the Importance of Risk in Farmers^ 
Decisions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 56: 659-66. 
Just, Richard, E., and David Zilberman. 1983. "Stochastic Structure, Farm Size and 
Technology Adoption in Developing Agriculture." Oxford Economic Papers 35: 
307-328. 
Just, Richard, £., David Zilberman, and Eithan Hochman. 1983. "Estimation of 
Multicrop Production Functions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
65: 770-780. 
Karp, Larry and Richard Shumway. 1984. "Issues and Methods in Estimating 
Adjustment Costs." Northeast Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
13: 155-177. 
Kehoe, Timothy and Serra-Puche. 1983. "A Computable General Equilibrium Model 
with Endogenous Unemployment." Journal of Public Economics 22: 1-26. 
Kelley, A. C., W. C. Sanderson, and J. G. Williamson, eds. 1983. Modelling 
Growing Economies in Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press. 
Kim, Youn, H. "Economies of Scale in Multi-Product Firms." Economica 54: 185-206. 
King, Benjamin B. 1981. "What is a SAM? A Layman's Guide to Social Accounting 
Matrices." World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 463. 
Kmenta, Jan. 1986. Elements of Econometrics. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company. 
Koester, U. 1985. "Agricultural Market Intervention and International Trade." 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 12: 87-103. 
Kohli, Ulrich, R. 1981. "Nonjointness and factor intensity in U. S. Production." 
International Economic Review 22: 3-18. 
Kokoski, Mary F., and V. Kerry Smith. 1985. "General Equilibrium Welfare 
Measurements: A Cautionary Note." Working Paper No. 85-W-21. Vanderbilt 
University, Nashville, Tennessee. 
139 
Kokoski, Mary F., and Kerry Smith. 1987. "A General Equilibrium Analysis of 
Partial-Equilibrium Welfare Measures: The Case of Climate Change." American 
Economic Review 77: 331-341. 
Kramer, Randall, A., and Rulon D. Pope. 1981. "Participation in Farm Commodity 
Programs: A Stochatic Dominance Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 63: 119-128. 
Krelle, W. 1983. "The Aggregate Production Function and the Representative Firm." 
In Global Econometrics. Essavs in Honor of Lawrence R. Klein. Edited by 
Gerard Adams and Bert Hickman. London: The MIT Press. 
Kulatilaka, N. 1985. "Are Observed Technologies at Long-Run Equilibrium? Tests on 
the Validity of Static Equilibrium Models." Journal of Econometrics 25: 253-
268. 
Laitinen, Kenneth. 1980. A Theorv of the Multioroduct Firm. New York: 
North-Holland Publishing Company. 
Laitinen, Kenneth, and H. Theil. 1978. "Supply and Demand of the Multiproduct 
Firm." European Economic Review 11: 107-154. 
Lau, L. J. 1976. "A Characterization of the Normalized Restricted Profit Function." 
Journal of Economic Theorv 12: 131-163. 
Lau, L. J. 1978. "Applications of Profit Functions. In Production Economics: A Dual 
Approach to Theorv and Applications. Eds. M. Fuss and D. McFadden, Vol. 
1, Chapter 1.3. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 
Lau, L., and P. Yotopolous. 1972. "Profit, Supply, and Factor Demand Functions." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 54: 11-18. 
Le Blanc, M. 1982. "Estimating Input Cost Shares for Agriculture Using a Multinomial 
Logit Framework." Agricultural Economic Research 34: 23-31." 
Le Blanc, M., and J. Hrubovcak. 1986. "Dynamic Input Demand: An Application to 
Agriculture." Applied Economics 18: 807-818. 
Lee, D. R., and P. G. Helmberger. 1982. "Structural Change in Acreage Supply 
Response Response: An Economtric Analysis of U.S. Feed Grain Programs, 
1948-1980." Agricultural Economics Research Report No. 82-47. Department 
of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca. 
Lee, D. R., and P. G. Helmberger. 1985. "Estimating Supply Response in the 
Presence of Farm Programs." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 
193-203. 
Lee, Hyunok, and Robert G. Chambers. 1986. "Expenditure Constraints and Profit 
Maximization in U. S. Agriculture." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 68: 857-865. 
140 
Leong, Stephen. 1987. "Sectoral Analysis Using a Simple General Equilibrium Model." 
Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of Southern Agricultural Economics 
Association, Nashville, Tennessee, February 2-4. 
Leu, Gwo-Jiun, M., Andrew Schmitz, and Ronald D. Knutson. 1987. "Gains and 
Losses of Sugar Program Policy Options." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 69: 591-602. 
Lin, William, James Johnson, and Linda Calvin. 1981. "Farm Commodity Programs: 
Who participates and who benefits?" U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report No. 474. 
Linnemann, H., J. de Hoogh, M. A. Keyzer, and H. D. J. Van Heemst. 1979. 
MOIRA: A Model of International Relations in Agriculture. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company. 
Lopez, R. E. 1980. "The Structure of Production and the Derived Demand for Inputs 
in Canadian Agriculture." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62: 
38-45. 
Lopez, Ramon E. 1982. "Application of Duality Theory to Agriculture." Western 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 7: 353-365. 
Lopez, Ramon E. 1984. "Estimating Substitution and Expansion Effects Using a Profit 
Function Framework." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 358-67. 
Lopez, Ramon E. 1985. "Structural Implications of a Class of Flexible Functional 
Forms for Profit Functions." International Economic Review 26: 595-601. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1981. "Economectric Policy Evaluation: A Critique." In Studies in 
Business Cycle Theory. Edited by Robert E. Lucas. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press. Pages 104-130. 
Lutton, Thomas J. 1982. "Input Demand Formulations and Duality Theory." 
Agricultural Economic Research 34: 15-22. 
Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Maddala, G. S. 1988. Introduction to Econometrics. New York: Macmillion 
Publishing Company. 
Mahmud, S. F., A. L. Robb., and W. M. Scarth. 1987. "On Estimating Dynamic 
Factor Demands." Journal of Applied Econometrics 2: 69-76. 
Manne, A. S., ed. 1985. Economic Equilibrium: Model Formulation and Solution. 
Mathematical Programming Study No. 23. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
141 
Mansur, A., and J. Whalley. 1984. "Numerical Specification of Applied General 
Equilibrium Models; Estimation, Calibration, and Data." In Applied General 
Equilibrium Analysis. Eds. H. Scarf and J. Shoven. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
McCalla, Alex F., and Timothy Josling. 1985. Agricultural Policies and World Markets. 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
McCarthy, F. D., and L. Taylor. 1980. "Macro Food Policy Planning; A General 
Equilibrium Model for Pakistan." Review of Economics and Statistics 62: 
107-121. 
McKay, Lloyd, D. Lawrence, and Chris Vlastuim. 1983. "Profit, Output Supply, and 
Input Demand Functions for Multiproduct Firms: The Case of Australian 
Agriculture." International Economic Review 24: 323-339. 
McKenzie, George W. 1983. Measuring Economic Welfare: New Methods. New York; 
Cambridge University Press. 
McLaren, K. R., and R. J. Cooper. 1980. "Intertemporal Duality; Application to the 
Theory of the Firm." Econometrics 48: 1755-1762. 
Meilke, Karl D., and Garry D. Griffith. 1983. "Incorporating Policy Variables in a 
Model of the World Soybean/Rapeseed Market." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 65: 65-73. 
Melfi, C. A., and A. J. Rogers. 1988. "A Test for the Existence of Allocative 
Inefficiency in Firms." Journal of Applied Econometrics 3; 69-80. 
Meyers, William H., Michael D. Helmar, and S. Devadoss. 1986. "FAPRI Trade Model 
for Soybean Sector: Specification, Estimation, and Validation." CARD 86-SR2. 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames. 
Mittlehammer, Ron C., S. C. Matulich, and D. Bushaw. 1981. "On Implicit Forms of 
Multiproduct-Multifactor Production Functions." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 63: 164-168. 
Morey, E. R. 1986. "An Introduction to Checking, Testing, and Imposing Curvature 
Properties: The True Functions and the Estimated Functions." Canadian Journal 
of Economics 19: 207-235. 
Mortensen, D. T. 1973. "Generalized Costs of Adjustment and Dynamic Factor 
Demand Theory." Econometrica 42: 657-664. 
Morzuch, B. J., R. D. Weaver, P. G. Helmberger. 1980. "Wheat Acreage Supply 
Response under Changing Farm Programs." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 64; 29-37. 
142 
Moschini, Giancarlo. 1988a. "A Model of Production with Supply Management for the 
Canadian Agricultural Sector." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70: 
318-329. 
Moschini, Giancarlo. 1988b. "The Cost Structure of Ontario Dairy Farms: A 
Microeconometric Analysis." Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 36: 
187-206. 
Muth, John F. 1961. "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements." 
Econometrica 29: 315-335. 
Narayana, N. S. S., and K. Parikh. 1988. "Estimation of Yield Functions for Major 
Cereals in India." Indian Journal of Quantitative Economics 4: 102-112. 
Paarlberg, D. 1980. Farm and Food Policy: Issues for the 1980's. Lincoln; University 
of Nebraska Press. 
Parikh, K. S., and F. Rabar, eds. 1981. Food for All in a Substainable World: The 
IIASA Food and Agriculture Program. Laxemberg, Austria; International 
Institute for Analysis. 
Parikh, K. S., G. Fisher, K. Frohberg, and O. Gulbrandsen. 1988. Toward Free 
Trade in Agriculture. Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Piggot, John, and John Whalley, eds. 1985. New Developments in Applied General 
Equilibrium Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1981. Econometric Models and 
Economic Forecasts. New York: McGraw-Hill Book COmpany. 
Pope, Rulon D. 1980. "The Generalized Envelope Theorem and Price Uncertainty." 
International Economic Review 21: 75-86. 
Pope, Rulon D. 1982. "To Dual or Not to Dual." Western Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 7: 337-351. 
Pope, Rulon D., and Robert Chambers. 1988. "Price Aggregation when Price Taking 
Firm's Prices Vary." Mimeo. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Pope, Rulon, D., and Arne Hallam. 1988a. "Testing Separability of Production Using 
Flexible Functional Form Profit Functions." Economics Letters 26: 265-270. 
Pope, Rulon, D., and Arne Hallam. 1988b. "Testing Separability in Production 
Economics." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70: 142-151. 
Pollak, Robert A., and Terence J. Wales. 1987. "Specification and Estimation of 
Nonseparable Two-stage Technologies: The Leontief CES and the Cobb Douglas 
CES." Journal of Political Economy 95: 311-333. 
143 
Powell, M. J. D. 1971. "Recent Advances in Unconstrained Optimaization." 
Mathematical Programming 1: 26-57. 
Pyatt, Graham. 1988. "A SAM Approach to Modeling." Journal of Policy Modeling 10: 
327-352. 
Pyatt, Graham, and J. I. Round. 1977. "Social Accounting Matrices for Development 
Planning." Review of Income and Wealth 23: 339-364. 
Pyatt, Graham, and Jeffery I. Round. 1979. "Accounting and Fixed-Price Multipliers 
in a Social Accounting Matrix Framework." Economic Journal 89: 850-73. 
Pyatt, Graham, and Jeffery I. Round, eds. 1985. Social Accounting Matrices: A basis 
for Planning. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Rausser, G. C., and J. W. Freebairn. 1974. "Estimating of Policy Preference 
Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas." Review of Economics 
and Statistics 56: 437-449. 
Ray, Subash C. 1982. "A Translog Cost Function Analysis of U.S. Agriculture, 
1939-77." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 490-498. 
Robinson, Sherman. 1986. Multisectoral Models of Developing Countries: A Survey." 
Working Paper No. 401. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Robinson, Sherman, and David Roland-Hoist. 1988. "Macroeconomic Structure and 
Computable General Equilibrium Approaches." Journal of Policv Modeling 10: 
353-376. 
Robinson, Sherman, Maureen Kilkenny, and Irma Adelman. 1988. "The Effects of 
Trade Liberalization in Agriculture on the U.S. Economy: Projections to 1991." 
Working Paper No. 465. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Rossi, Nicola. 1984. "The Estimation of Product Supply and Input Demand by the 
Differential Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 368-
375. 
Rossi, Peter E. 1985. "Comparison of Alternate Functional Forms in Production." 
Journal of Econometrics 30: 345-361. 
Sakai, Yasuhiro. 1974. "Substitution and Expansion Effects in Production Theory: The 
Case of Joint Production." Journal of Economic Theory 9: 255-274. 
Sandmo, A. 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty." 
American Economic Review 61: 65-73. 
144 
Sargent, J. 1976. "A Classical Macroeconometric Model for the United States." Journal 
of Political Economy 84: 207-238. 
Scarf, H., and T. Hansen. 1973. The Computation of Economic Equilibria. New 
Haven; Yale University Press. 
Schmitz, Andrew, and Robert G. Chambers. 1986. "Welfare and Trade Effects of 
Deficiency Payments." Journal of Agricultural Economics 37; 37-43. 
Schuh, E. G. 1974. "The Exchange Rate and U.S. Agriculture." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 56; 1-13. 
Shei, Shun-Yi. 1978. "The Exchange Rate and United States Agricultural Product 
Market: A General Equilibrium Approach." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Purdue University, West Lafayette. 
Shoven, John B., and John Whalley. 1984. "Applied General Equilibrium Models of 
Taxation and International Trade." Journal of Economic Literature 22; 
1007-1051. 
Shumway, Richard C. 1983. "Supply, Demand, and Technology in a Multiproduct 
Industry; Texas Field Crops." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65: 
748-760. 
Shumway, Richard C., and W. P. Alexander. 1988. "Agricultural Product Supplies and 
Input Demands; Regional Comparisons." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 70: 153-161. 
Shumway, Richard C., and Anne Chang. 1980. "Supply Response of Texas Field Crops: 
An Evaluation of the CET Linear Supply Model." Western Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 5; 149-164. 
Shumway, Richard C., K. Jegasothy and W. P. Alexander. 1987. "Production 
Interrelationships in Sri Lankan Agriculture." Australian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 31: 16-28. 
Shumway, Richard C., Rulon Pope, and E. Nash. 1984. "Allocatable Fixed Inputs and 
Jointness in Agricultural Production: Implications for Economic Modeling." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 72-78. 
Shumway, Richard C., R. R. Saez, and P. E. Gottret. 1988. "Multiproduct Supply 
and Input Demand in U.S. Agriculture." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 70; 330-37. 
Sidhu, Surjit S., and Carlos A. Baanante. 1981. "Estimating Farm level Input Demand 
and Wheat Supply in the Indian Punjab Using a Translog Profit Function." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63: 237-246. 
Silberberg, E. 1978, The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis. New 
York; McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
145 
Skold, Karl D., and Patrick Westhoff. 1988. "An Analysis of Corn and Soybean Supply 
Response to Changing Government Programs." Working Paper 88-WP34. Center 
for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. Ames, Iowa. 
Slemod, Joel. 1983. "A General Equilibrium Model of Taxation with Endogenous 
Behavior." In Behavioral Simulation Models in Tax Policy Analysis. Edited by 
Martin Feldstein. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Sopher, C. C., and R. McCracken. 1973. "Relationships Between Individual Soil 
Properties, Managment Prctices and Corn Yields on Slelcted South Atlantic 
Coastal Plain Soils." Agronomy Journal 65; 6595-599. 
Squires, Dale. 1987. "Long-Run Profit Functions for Multiproduct Firms." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 69; 558-569. 
Srinivasan, T. N., and John Whalley. 1986. General Equilibrium Trade Policy 
Modelling. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Stamoalis, Kostas G., James, A. Chalfant, and Gordon C. Rausser. 1985. "Monetary 
Policies and the Overshooting of Flexible Prices; Implications for Agricultural 
Policy." Working Paper No. 372. Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
Stone, J. R. N. 1966. "The Social Accounts from a Consumer Point of View." Review 
of Income and Wealth 12; 1-33. 
Stone, J. R. N. 1985. "The Disaggregation of the Household Sector in the National 
Accounts." In G. Fyatt and J. I. Round, eds. Social Accounting Matrices: A 
Basis for Planning. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 
Talpaz, H., W. P. Alexander, and C. R. Shumaway. 1987. "Estimation of Systems of 
Equations Subject to Curvature Constraints." Texas Agricultural Experimental 
Station Technical Article No. 21966. College Station, Texas. 
Taylor, Lance, and Stephen L. Black. 1974. "Practical General Equilibrium Estimation 
of Resource Pulls Under Trade Liberalization." Journal of International 
Economics 4: 37-58. 
Taylor, Robert. 1984. "Stochatic Dynamic Duality: Theory and Empirical 
Applicability." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 351-358. 
Taylor, Robert. 1987a. "AGSIM: The Crop Supply Component." Staff Paper No. 87E-
386. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana. 
Taylor, Robert. 1987b. "AGSIM: User's Manual. Version 87.3." Staff Paper No. 
87E-394. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana. 
146 
Taylor, T., and M. J. Monson. 1985. "Dynamic Factor Demands for Aggregate 
Southeastern United States Agriculture." Southern Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 17: 1-9. 
Thirtle, Colin G. 1985. "Technological Change and the Productivity Slowdown in Field 
Crops: United States, 1939-78." Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 17: 
33-42. 
Thompson, Gary, D. 1988. "Choice of Flexible Functional Forms: Review and 
Appraisal." Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 13: 169-183. 
Tims, Wouter, and Jean Waelbroeck. 1982. "Global Modeling in the World Bank 
1973-83." World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 544. 
Tornquist, L. 1936. "The Bank of Finland's Consumption Price Index." Bank of 
Finland Monthly Bulletin 10: 1-8. 
Traill, W. B. 1982. The Effect of Price Support Policies on Agricultural Investment, 
Employment, Farm Incomes, and Land Values in the U.K." Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 33: 369-385. 
Trivedi, P. K. 1981. "Some Discrete Approximations to Divisia Integral Indices." 
International Economic Review 22: 71-77. 
Tyers, Rodney. 1985. "International Impacts of Protection: Model Structure and 
Results for Economic Agricultural Policy." Journal of Policv Modeling 7: 
219-251. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Statistics. Various Issues. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 1984. "History of Agricultural Price-Support and 
Adjustment Programs: Background for 1985 Farm Legislation." Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Information Bulletin No. 485. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 1985. Possible Economic Consequences of Reverting 
to Permanent Legislation or Eliminating Price and Income Supports. Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report No. 526. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 1986. "Economic Indicators of the Farm Sectors: 
National Financial Summary." Economic Research Service, ECIFS6-2. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. 1987. "Rice: Summary of 1987 Support Program and 
Related Information." ASCS Commodity Fact Sheet, Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service. 
Varian, Hal R. 1984. Microeconomic Analvsis. New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company. 
Vartia, Y. P. 1983. "Efficient Methods of Measuring Welfare Change and Compensated 
Income in Terms of Ordinary Demand Functions." Econometrica 51: 79-98. 
147 
Vasavada, Utpal, and Robert G. Chambers. 1986. "Investment ,in U. S. Agriculture." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 950-960. 
Waelbroeck, Jean. 1986. "Some Pitfalls in Applied General Equilibrium Modeling." 
Discussion Paper No. 86-01. Department of Economics, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 
Weaver, Robert D. 1983. "Multiple Input, Multiple Output Production Choices and 
Technology in the U.S. Wheat Region." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 65: 45-56. 
Westcott, Paul C., and David B. Hull. 1985. "A Quarterly Forecasting Model for U. S. 
Agriculture: Subsector Models for Corn, Wheat, Soybeans, Cattle, Hogs, and 
Poultry." Technical Bulletin No. 1700. Economic Research Service, United 
States Department of Agricultre. 
Westhoff, Patrick, and Karl D. Skold. 1987. "The Impacts of Two Policies to Reduce 
Excess Supplies of Corn and the Cost of Government Programs." Paper presented 
at the annual meetings of the American Agricultural Economics Association, East 
Lansing, Michigan, August 2-1. 
Whalley, John. 1980. Discriminatory Features of Domestic Factor Tax Systems in a 
Goods Mobile-Factors Immobile Trade Model: An Empirical General 
Equilibrium Approach. Journal of Political Economy 88: 1177-1202. 
Whalley, John. 1984. "The North South Debate and Terms of Trade: An Applied 
General Equilibrium Approach." Review of Economics and Statistics 66: 
224-234. 
Whalley, John. 1985a. Trade Liberalization Among World Trading Areas. Cambridge; 
The MIT Press. 
Whalley, John. 1985b. "Hidden Challenges in Recent Applied General Equilibrium 
Analysis. In New Development in Aoolied General Equilibrium Analysis, eds. J. 
Pigott and J. Whalley. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-44. 
Whalley, John, and Bernard Yeung. 1984. "External Sector Closing Rules in Applied 
General Equilibrium Models." Journal of International Economics 16: 123-138. 
Winters, Alan L. 1987. "The Economic Consequences of Agricultural Support: A 
Survey." CPE/WPl (87)3, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Paris. 
Yanagida, John F., A. Azzam, and D. Linsenmeyer. 1987. "Two Alternative Methods 
of Removing Price Supports: Implications to the U.S. Corn and Livestock 
Industries." Journal of Policy Modeling 9: 331-320. 
Zalai, Erno. 1982. "Computable General Equilibrium Models: An Optimal Planning 
Perspective." Mathematical Modeling 3: 437-451. 
148 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to express my deep sense of appreciation to my major professor Dr. 
Stanley R. Johnson for his immense contribution to my academic training and 
professional development. His constant encouragement and inspiration are invaluable. 
Dr. William Meyers, my co-major professor, deserves a special thanks. I thank Dr. Fox, 
Dr. Fuller, and Dr. Falk for serving on my committee. They have been very helpful. 
Dr. Klaus Frohberg deserves special gratitude. He has been a constant source of 
help and assistance through out the study. I am thankful to Dr. Giancarlo Moschini for 
his generous help. I would also like to thank my friends K. Eswaramoorhty, Matthew 
Holt, and Patrick Westhoff for their help. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University for providing 
me with financial assistance during the course of this research. 
Finally, I wish to express my appreciation and thanks to my wife Ranga for her 
love and compassion. She is just marvelous. But for her patience, understanding, and 
encouragement I would not have completed this dissertation. 
149 
APPENDIX A 
Table A.l. Data used for estimation^ 
YEAR WHEFD RICPD CORPD OCGPD SOYPD HAYPD COTPD PNTPD FXSPD 
1950 1019 38.82 2764 1349.42 299 103. ,82 4804.8 2035 134. .50 
1951 988 46.09 2629 1187.10 284 109. .50 7272 .0 1679 116, .04 
1952 1306 48.19 2981 1042.49 299 106. ,39 7267 .2 1356 100. .94 
1953 1173 52.83 2882 1053.53 269 108. ,25 7905 .6 1574 125. .93 
1954 984 64.19 2708 1369.10 341 107. ,83 6576 .0 1008 138. ,03 
1955 937 55.90 2873 1545.00 373 112. ,81 7065 .6 1548 135. .19 
1956 1006 49.46 3075 1266.68 449 107. ,98 6388 .8 1607 157. .35 
1957 956 42.94 3045 1780.13 483 120, ,04 5260 .8 1436 84. .16 
1958 1458 44.76 3356 1896.64 580 120. ,10 5524 .8 1814 125. .23 
1959 1118 53.65 3825 1588.93 533 110. ,98 6988 .8 1523 71. .28 
1960 1355 54.59 3907 1733.00 555 118. ,16 6849. .6 1718 101. ,92 
1961 1233 54.20 3598 1472.64 678 116. ,96 6873, .6 1657 74. .51 
1962 1092 66.05 3606 1549.03 669 121. ,76 7137 .6 1719 108. ,21 
1963 1147 70.27 4019 1551.58 699 117. ,54 7358, .4 1942 105. ,23 
1964 1283 73.17 3484 1386.04 701 118. ,78 7272 .0 2099 82. .88 
1965 1315 76.28 4103 1616.94 846 125. ,61 7171 .2 2390 110. .24 
1966 1305 85.02 4167 1574.87 928 120. ,93 4588, .8 2416 81. ,88 
1967 1507 98.28 4860 1585.60 976 125. ,13 3571 .2 2477 80. ,15 
1968 1557 104.14 4450 1707.78 1107 124.24 5246. .4 2547 100. .11 
1969 1443 91.90 4687 1723.90 1133 126. ,03 4795. .2 2535 127. ,86 
1970 1352 83.81 4152 1641.99 1127 126. ,97 4891. .2 2983 110. ,39 
1971 1619 85.77 5646 1864.78 1176 129. ,12 5030. .4 3005 88, ,82 
1972 1546 85.44 5580 1634.11 1271 128. ,57 6576. .0 3275 87. ,91 
1973 1711 92.77 5671 1735.07 1547 134.22 6225 .6 3474 102. .35 
1974 1782 112.39 4701 1275.72 1216 126. 38 5539. ,2 3668 82, ,92 
1975 2127 128.44 5841 1505.53 1548 132. ,40 3984. .0 3847 103. ,96 
1976 2149 115.65 6289 1404.95 1289 120. ,13 5078. 4 3739 78. .68 
1977 2046 99.22 6505 1652.53 1767 132. 21 6907. ,2 3715 219, ,92 
1978 1776 133.17 7268 1535.04 1869 143. ,82 5212. .8 3952 269. ,52 
1979 2134 131.95 7928 1507.78 2261 147. ,31 7022 .4 3968 498, ,64 
1980 2381 146.15 6639 1212.44 1798 130. 74 5337. .6 2303 262. ,17 
1981 2785 182.74 8119 1635.77 1989 142. ,52 7512. ,0 3982 306, ,46 
1982 2765 153.64 8235 1694.43 2190 149. 24 5740. .8 3440 370. ,40 
1983 2420 99.72 4175 1271.53 1636 140. 76 3729. .6 3296 224, ,75 
1984 2595 138.81 7674 1726.07 1861 150. ,65 6230. .4 4405 259, ,51 
1985 2425 134.91 8877 1978.50 2099 148. 60 6446.4 4122 227. ,59 
1986 2087 134.42 8253 1742.02 2007 155. ,27 4670, .4 3700 209. ,72 
^see Table 5.1 for variable explanations. 
Table Â.l. continued 
YEAR SUGPD TOBPD VEGPD FUNPD LNDUS FERUS OPCUS lABUS 
1950 316.80 2029.56 15.20 1188 -360 23 -4 06 -2657 .8 -6922 
1951 268.91 2331.59 16.76 1260 -371 00 -4 73 -2681 3 -7204 
1952 277.52 2256.07 16.37 1203 -364 61 -5 20 -2848 .2 -6850 
1953 313.73 2059.23 16.95 1246 -368 51 -5. 65 -2938 7 -6627 
1954 332.19 2243.74 16.26 1234 -363 50 -5 90 -2960 5 -6238 
1955 313.66 2192.85 16.65 1263 -362 80 -6, 12 -3187 5 -6012 
1956 319.33 2175.26 19.11 1303 -352 86 -6 06 -3395 6 -5574 
1957 353.26 1667.54 16.95 1275 -338 19 -8 14 -3075 3 -5001 
1958 330.36 1736.42 19.03 1237 -332 07 -6. 51 -3308 1 -4818 
1959 373.05 1796.42 17.26 1358 -335.43 -7 41 -3662 7 -4771 
1960 366.75 1944.18 18.40 1298 -330 02 -7. 46 -3701 6 -4590 
1961 411.05 2061.40 18.85 1345 -340.07 -7, 84 -3784.3 -4370 
1962 419.07 2314.78 20.04 1353 -344 90 -8 45 -3907 6 -4190 
1963 523.16 2343.80 19.02 1300 -343 24 -9. 51 -4103 8 -4088 
1964 537.86 2227.93 18.66 1300 -347 46 -10. 40 -4232 7 -3867 
1965 480.30 1854.57 19.26 1425 -353 03 -10. 99 -4230 3 -3416 
1966 487.51 1884.63 19.56 1536 -350 26 -12. 44 -4242 7 -3142 
1967 494.56 1967.91 21.12 1609 -345.49 -13. 97 -4714 4 -3104 
1968 561.33 1710.35 23.40 1477 -347 61 -15. 04 -4706 5 -3013 
1969 580.18 1803.27 20.47 1794 -353 12 -15. 52 -4722 5 -2973 
1970 548.30 1906.45 20.66 1711 -357 08 -16. 07 -5133 1 -2788 
1971 569.60 1704.88 21.28 1839 -351 88 -17. 17 -5874 9 -2757 
1972 628.69 1749.09 21.82 1664 -366 96 -17. 22 -5836 1 -2621 
1973 555.98 1742.11 22.57 1991 -346 81 -18. 03 -6465 8 -2667 
1974 516.46 1989.73 23.81 1970 -337 34 -19. 34 -6521 3 -2657 
1975 641.23 2182.30 25.53 2113 -342 70 -17. 56 -6007 0 -2630 
1976 633.46 2136.67 23.56 2113 -349 76 •- 20 85 -6463 5 -2556 
1977 565.63 1914.12 25.35 2174 -358 14 -22. 11 -6446 8 -2530 
1978 566.87 2024.82 24.46 2091 -369 34 -20. 57 -7255 4 -2449 
1979 524.73 1526.52 26.06 2150 -373 00 -22. 57 -7771 1 -2432 
1980 •545.20 1786.23 24.15 2485 -366 89 -23. 08 -7414 8 -2442 
1981 600.19 2063.59 24.27 2250 -374 66 -23. 68 -7064 4 -2442 
1982 540.48 1994.49 21.54 2172 -382 21 -21. 42 -6636 3 -2369 
1983 529.75 1428.97 20.17 2176 -398 66 -18.10 -7028 6 -2135 
1984 532.23 1727.96 22.87 2018 -389 20 -21.79 -7068 4 -2266 
1985 545.77 1511.64 22.69 1976 -387. 81 -21. 66 -7178. 0 -2170 
1986 599.67 1165.93 22.27 1957 -386 20 -19. 70 -6412 0 -2074 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR WHEFP RICFP CORFP OCGFP SOYFP HAYFP COTFP PNTFP FXSFP 
1950 2.00 5.09 1.53 1.26 2 .47 21.10 0. ,40 0.109 1, ,000 
1951 2.11 4.82 1.66 1.36 2 .73 25.70 0, ,38 0.104 1, .114 
1952 2.09 5.87 1.53 1.39 2, .72 26.90 0. ,35 0.109 1, ,116 
1953 2.04 5.19 1.49 1.25 2 .72 21.90 0. 32 0.111 1, .090 
1954 2.12 4.56 1.43 1.19 2 .46 21.90 0. 34 0,122 0, ,913 
1955 1.98 4.81 1.35 0.99 2 .22 22.50 0. 32 0.117 0, ,868 
1956 1.97 4.86 1.29 1.13 2 .18 22.20 0, ,32 0.112 0, ,895 
1957 1.93 5.11 1.11 0.99 2 .07 19.30 0. ,30 0.104 0, ,880 
1958 1.75 4.68 1.12 0.98 2 .00 18.80 0. ,33 0.106 0, ,806 
1959 1.76 4.59 1.05 0.97 1 .96 22.30 0. ,32 0.096 0, ,898 
1960 1.74 4.55 1.00 0.92 2 .13 21.70 0. 30 0.100 0, ,794 
1961 1.83 5.14 1.10 1.05 2 .28 20.70 0.33 0.109 0.976 
1962 2.04 5.04 1.12 1.02 2, .34 21.80 0. 32 0.110 0, ,849 
1963 1.85 5.01 1.11 1.00 2 .51 24.60 0. 32 0.112 0, ,826 
1964 1.37 4.90 1.17 1.05 2 .62 23.90 0, ,31 0.112 0, ,843 
1965 1.35 4.93 1.16 1.04 2 .54 23.20 0. 29 0.114 0, ,840 
1966 1.63 4.95 1.24 1.09 2 .75 25.00 0. 22 0.113 0, ,870 
1967 1.39 4.97 1.03 1.06 2 .49 24.50 0, ,27 0.114 0, ,872 
1968 1.24 5.00 1.08 0.98 2 .43 23.60 0. 23 0.119 0. ,825 
1969 1.25 4.95 1.16 1.02 2 .35 24.70 0. 22 0.123 0, ,785 
1970 1.33 5.17 1.33 1.09 2, ,85 26.10 0. 22 0.128 0. ,723 
1971 1.34 5.34 1.08 1.04 3, .03 28.10 0. 28 0.136 0. ,724 
1972 1.76 6.73 1.57 1.30 4 .37 31.30 0. ,27 0.145 0. ,840 
1973 3.95 13.80 2.55 2.13 5, .68 41.60 0. 45 0.162 1. ,811 
1974 4.09 11.20 3.02 2.77 6 .64 50.90 0. 43 0.179 2, ,649 
1975 3.55 8.35 2.54 2.43 4 .92 52.10 0, 51 0.196 1. ,799 
1976 2.73 7.02 2.15 2.27 6, ,81 60.20 0. 64 0.200 1. ,880 
1977 2.33 9.49 2.02 1.84 5, .88 53.70 0. 52 0.210 1, ,575 
1978 2.97 8.16 2.25 2.01 6, ,66 49.80 0. 58 0.211 1. ,699 
1979 3.80 10.50 2.48 2.33 6. .29 59.40 0. 63 0.206 1. ,450 
1980 3.99 12.80 3.12 2.91 7 .60 71.00 0. 75 0,251 1, ,768 
1981 3.69 9.05 2.47 2.54 6, ,07 67.30 0. 54 0.269 1. ,712 
1982 3.45 8.11 2.55 2.43 5, ,71 69.30 0. 59 0.251 1. ,397 
1983 3.51 8.76 3.21 2.69 7 .83 75.80 0. 66 0.241 2. ,073 
1984 3.39 8.06 2.63 2.46 5, ,84 72.40 0. 58 0.279 1. ,723 
1985 3.08 6.62 2.23 2.03 5 ,05 67.60 0. 57 0.243 1. ,216 
1986 2.42 3.93 1.55 1.60 4, ,80 60.10 0. 52 0.288 1. ,076 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR SUGFP TOBFP VEGFP FUNFP RENT FERFP OPCFP WAGE 
1950 1.000 0.52 54.849 1.00 3. 71 213.79 1, ,000 0. 69 
1951 0.940 0.51 63.338 0.92 4. 10 202.75 1, ,049 0. 77 
1952 0.988 0.50 68.252 0.91 4. 22 207.31 1, ,109 0. 81 
1953 0.992 0.52 59.956 0.96 4. 21 194.51 1, ,082 0. 82 
1954 0.942 0.51 61.039 0.99 4. 36 192.54 1. 051 0, 81 
1955 0.933 0.53 63.670 1.01 4. 63 180.72 1, ,052 0. 82 
1956 1.046 0.54 60.108 1.04 5. 10 177.56 1, ,036 0. 86 
1957 0.956 0.56 67.074 1.01 6. 32 132.19 1, ,056 0. 88 
1958 1.007 0.60 56.068 1.13 6. 87 170.97 1.053 0. 92 
1959 0.966 0.58 62.807 1.12 7. 58 167.07 1. 045 0. 95 
1960 0.997 0.61 61.121 1.18 8. 35 167.83 1. ,051 0. 97 
1961 0.993 0.64 64.197 1.20 8. 33 171.30 1.059 0. 99 
1962 1.090 0.59 63.242 1.17 8. 63 171.12 1. ,062 1. 01 
1963 1.145 0.58 64.856 1.29 9. 13 168.24 1.071 1. 05 
1964 0.970 0.59 70.266 1.39 9. 68 170.39 1, ,068 1. 08 
1965 1.024 0.65 73.854 1.16 10. 38 170.79 1 .  076 1. 14 
1966 1.105 0.71 80.285 1.14 11.43 168.65 1. ,074 1. 23 
1967 1.169 0.67 79.633 1.13 12. 54 165.86 1. ,092 1. 33 
1968 1.181 0.70 76.294 1.38 14. 86 154.46 1, ,112 1. 44 
1969 1.146 0.72 82.933 1.21 17.44 142.33 1. ,122 1, 55 
1970 1.270 0.73 79.545 1.21 19. 89 145.61 1. ,077 1. 64 
1971 1.321 0.79 88.296 1.25 19. 61 149.27 1. ,040 1. 73 
1972 1.363 0.83 95.040 1.54 20. 75 152.15 1. ,107 1. 58 
1973 2.386 0.90 106.712 1.73 25. 15 188.69 1. ,238 1. 73 
1974 4.402 1.09 118.225 1.75 30. 38 304.96 1. ,598 2. 25 
1975 2.194 1.03 125.178 1.69 37. 40 • 370.50 1. ,884 2. 43 
1976 1.620 1.13 129.316 1.76 44. 20 300.00 1. 993 2. 66 
1977 1.875 1.19 130.056 2.12 47. 89 285.30 2. 118 2. 87 
1978 2.000 1.32 149.685 2.76 55. 78 309.24 2. 209 3. 09 
1979 2.680 1.41 153.939 3.01 71. 38 312.89 2. 430 3. 39 
1980 3.841 1.52 168.025 2.64 88. 94 392.85 2, 925 3. 66 
1981 2.425 1.71 189.765 2.93 96. 87 378.67 3. 298 4. 02 
1982 2.763 1.76 164.956 3.15 101. 07 358.96 3. 462 4. 00 
1983 2.894 1.75 181.220 2.79 95. 38 373.76 3. 233 4. 11 
1984 2.788 1.81 180.679 3.35 84. 28 327.58 3. 342 4. 36 
1985 2.710 1.65 174.916 3.46 77. 70 319.85 3. 306 4. 44 
1986 2.738 1.53 185.010 3.53 71. 04 280.00 3. 132 4. 70 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR WHEEP RICEP COREP OCGEP SOYEP HAYEP GOTEP PNTEP FXSEP 
1951 2.60 6.61 1.99 1. 64 3.21 27.40 0.52 14.94 1, .30 
1952 2.60 5,95 2,05 1. 68 3.37 31.73 0.47 14.81 1, .37 
1953 2.55 7.16 1.87 1. 69 3.32 32.80 0.43 14.51 1, .36 
1954 2.52 6,41 1.84 1, 55 3.36 27,04 0.40 15.06 1, .35 
1955 2.59 5.56 1.74 1, 45 3.00 26,71 0.41 14.88 1, .11 
1956 2.30 5.59 1,57 1, 15 2.58 26.16 0.37 13.60 1, .01 
1957 2.24 5.52 1,47 1, 28 2.48 25.23 0.36 12,73 1, .02 
1958 2.10 5.55 1.21 1. 08 2.27 20.98 0.33 11.59 0, .96 
1959 1.84 4.93 1,18 1. 03 2.11 19.79 0.35 11.16 0, ,85 
1960 1,81 4,73 1,08 1. 00 2.02 22.99 0.33 10.37 0, .93 
1961 1.76 4,60 1.11 0. 98 2.32 21.92 0.30 11.16 0, .80 
1962 1.94 5.09 1.14 1. 04 2.26 20.50 0.33 10.96 0, ,97 
1963 1.94 4.80 1.13 0. 97 2,23 20.76 0.30 10.67 0, ,81 
1964 1.82 4.64 1,09 0, 93 2.32 22.78 0.30 10.37 0, ,76 
1965 1.65 4.30 1,07 0. 92 2.30 20.96 0.27 9.82 0, ,74 
1966 1.91 4.01 1,00 0. 84 2.07 18.86 0.24 9.27 0, ,68 
1967 1.23 3,72 0.96 0. 82 2.07 18.80 0:17 8.53 0, ,65 
1968 0.97 3,45 0,83 0. 74 1.74 17.01 0.19 8.34 0, ,61 
1969 1.67 3.23 0,79 0. 67 1.57 15.23 0.15 7.99 0, ,53 
1970 1.60 3.02 0,77 0, 64 1,43 15,06 0.13 7.77 0. ,48 
1971 1.65 2.99 0,78 0, 64 1.65 15,09 0.13 7.76 0.42 
1972 1.86 3,38 0,84 0, 74 1.92 17,78 0.18 9.02 0. ,46 
1973 1.93 3,89 0,93 0, 76 2.53 18.09 0.16 9.50 0. ,49 
1974 1.76 6,13 1,13 0. 95 2,52 18.49 0.20 8.13 0. ,80 
1975 1.68 4,61 1,24 1. 14 2.73 20.95 0.18 8.12 1. ,09 
1976 1,33 3,14 0,95 0. 91 1.85 19.59 0.19 7.78 0. ,68 
1977 0.95 2,45 0,75 0. 79 2.37 20.98 0.22 7.50 0. ,66 
1978 1,06 3.07 0,67 0. 68 1.90 17.38 0.17 6.80 0. ,51 
1979 0,96 2,41 0.66 0. 63 1.96 14.69 0.17 6.22 0. ,50 
1980 1.04 2.87 0,68 0, 64 1.72 16.23 0.17 6.22 0.40 
1981 0.99 3.18 0,78 0. 72 1.89 17.66 0,19 6.24 0.44 
1982 0.96 2.61 0.63 0. 64 1.52 16.83 0,17 6.88 0. ,43 
1983 0.95 2,76 0.65 0, 60 1.39 16.86 0.18 6.69 0. ,34 
1984 0.91 2,62 0.74 0. 62 1.80 17.39 0.18 6.31 0. ,48 
1985 0.91 2.59 0.65 0. 57 1.32 16.31 0.17 6.28 0. ,39 
1986 0.87 2,45 0.61 0. 50 1.07 14.38 0.17 6.47 0. 26 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR SUGEP TOBEP VEGEP FUNEP 
1951 1.30 0.68 71.23 129.87 
1952 1.16 0.63 78.19 113.58 
1953 1.20 0.61 83.23 110.98 
1954 1.22 0.64 74.02 118.52 
1955 1.15 0.62 74.44 120.73 
1956 1.08 0.62 74.03 117.44 
1957 1.19 0.61 68.30 118.18 
1958 1.04 0.61 72.91 109.78 
1959 1.06 0.63 59.02 118.95 
1960 1.00 0.60 64.75 115.46 
1961 1.01 0.62 61.74 119.19 
1962 0.98 0.63 .63.56 118.81 
1963 1.04 0.56 60.23 111.43 
1964 1.06 0.54 60.05 119.44 
1965 0.85 0.52 61.64 121.93 
1966 0.83 0.53 60.04 94.31 
1967 0.83 0.53 60.36 85.71 
1968 .0.81 0.47 55.30 78.47 
1969 0.76 0.45 49.22 89.03 
1970 0.70 0.44 50.57 73.78 
1971 0.73 0.42 45.98 69.94 
1972 0.84 0.50 55.88 79.11 
1973 0.79 0.48 54.94 89.02 
1974 1.06 0.40 47.43 76.89 
1975 1.81 0.45 48.65 72.02 
1976 0.82 0.40 47.06 63.53 
1977 0.56 0.40 45.06 61.32 
1978 0.61 0.40 42.09 68.61 
1979 0.59 0.39 44.15 81.42 
1980 0.73 0.40 42.06 82.24 
1981 0.96 0.40 41.80 65.67 
1982 0.61 0.43 47.44 73.25 
1983 0.67 0.43 40.14 76.64 
1984 0.66 0.40 41.56 63.99 
1985 0.63 0.41 40.69 75.45 
1986 0.58 0.35 37.22 73.62 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR WHETP RICTP CORTP OCGTP COTTP TOBTP 
1950 0.00 4.56 0.00 0.000 0.28 0.46 
1951 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.000 0.30 0.51 
1952 0.00 5.04 0.00 0.000 0.31 0.51 
1953 0.00 4.84 0.00 0.000 0.31 0.48 
1954 0.00 4.92 0.00 0.000 0.32 0.47 
1955 0.00 4.66 0.00 0.000 0.32 0.47 
1956 0.00 4.57 0.00 0.000 0.29 0.49 
1957 0.00 4.72 0.00 0.000 0.29 0.52 
1958 0.00 4.48 0.00 0.000 0.31 0.55 
1959 0.00 4.38 0.00 0.000 0.30 0.57 
1960 0.00 4.42 0.00 0.000 0.29 0.57 
1961 0.00 4.71 0.00 0.000 0.32 0.57 
1962 0.00 4.71 0.00 0.000 0.32 0.57 
1963 0.00 4.71 1.25 1.000 0.32 0.58 
1964 2.00 4.71 1.25 1.000 0.33 0.58 
1965 2.00 4.50 1.25 1.000 0.33 0.59 
1966 2.57 4.50 1.30 1.032 0.30 0.60 
1967 2.61 4.55 1.35 1.077 0.31 0.61 
1968 2.63 4.60 1.35 1.077 0.32 0.63 
1969 2.77 4.72 1.35 1.077 0.34 0.65 
1970 2.82 4.86 1.35 1.077 0.37 0.68 
1971 2.93 5.07 1.35 1.112 0.35 0.71 
1972 3.02 0.00 1.41 1.202 0.36 0.74 
1973 3.39 0.00 1.64 1.315 0.42 0.78 
1974 2.05 0.00 1.38 1.177 0.38 0.85 
1975 2.05 0.00 1.38 1.177 0.38 0.95 
1976 2.29 8.25 1.57 1.337 0.43 1.08 
1977 2.90 8.25 2.00 2.110 0.48 1.16 
1978 3.40 8.53 2.10 2.145 0.52 1.23 
1979 3.40 9.05 2.20 2.231 0.58 1.31 
1980 3.63 9.49 2.05 2.262 0.58 1.46 
1981 3.81 10.67 2.40 2.429 0.71 1.62 
1982 4.05 10.85 2.70 2.459 0.71 1.73 
1983 4.30 11.40 2.86 2.543 0.76 1.73 
1984 4.38 11.90 3.03 2.610 0.81 1.73 
1985 4.38 11.90 3.03 2.610 0.81 1.60 
1986 4.38 11.90 3.03 2.610 0.81 1.47 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR UHELR RICLR CORLR OCGLR SOYLR PNTLR 
1950 1.99 0.00 1.47 1.117 2,06 0.11 
1951 2.18 0.00 1.57 1.155 2,45 0.12 
1952 2.20 0.00 1.60 1.256 2.56 0.12 
1953 2.21 0.00 1.60 1.285 2.56 0.12 
1954 2.24 0.00 1.62 1.204 2.22 0.12 
1955 2.08 0.00 1.58 0.976 2.04 0.12 
1956 2.00 0.00 1.50 1.048 2.15 0.11 
1957 2.00 0.00 1.40 0.981 2.09 0,11 
1958 1.82 0.00 1.36 0.971 2.09 0,11 
1959 1.81 0.00 1.12 0.802 1.85 0.10 
1960 1.78 0.00 1.06 0.802 1.85 0.10 
1961 1.79 0.00 1.20 0.995 2.30 0.11 
1962 2.00 0,00 1.20 0.995 2.25 0,11 
1963 1.82 0,00 1.07 1.000 2,25 0,11 
1964 1.30 0.00 1.10 0.960 2,25 0,11 
1965 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.895 2,25 0,11 
1966 1.25 0.00 1.00 0.866 2.50 0.11 
1967 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.926 2.50 0.11 
1968 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.926 2.50 0.12 
1969 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.909 2.25 0.12 
1970 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.909 2,25 0.13 
1971 1.25 0.00 1.05 0.887 2,25 0.13 
1972 1.25 5.27 1.05 0.904 2.25 0.14 
1973 1.25 6.07 1.05 0.904 2.25 0,16 
1974 1.37 7.54 1.10 0.937 2.25 0.18 
1975 1.37 8.52 1.10 0.937 0.00 0,20 
1976 2.25 6.19 1.50 1.269 2,50 0,21 
1977 2.25 6.19 2.00 1.719 3,50 0,22 
1978 2.35 6.40 2.00 1.719 4,50 0,21 
1979 2.50 6.79 2.10 1.806 4,50 0,21 
1980 3.00 7.12 2.25 1.934 5.02 0.23 
1981 3.20 8.01 2.40 2.062 5.02 0,23 
1982 3.55 8.14 2.55 2.190 5.02 0,28 
1983 3.65 8.14 2.65 2.276 5,02 0.28 
1984 3.30 8.00 2.55 2.190 5.02 0.28 
1985 3.30 8.00 2.55 2.190 5.02 0,28 
1986 2.40 7.20 1.92 1,646 4.77 0,30 
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Table A.l. continued 
YEAR WHEPAR CORPAR OCGPAR RICPAR COTPAR 
1950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 
1951 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0 .000 
1952 0.000 0.000 0,000 0,000 0, .000 
1953 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 
1954 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1955 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 
1956 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 
1957 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, ,000 
1958 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 
1959 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, .000 
1960 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0, ,000 
1961 0.000 0.508 0.654 0.000 0, .000 
1962 0.751 0.506 0.465 0.000 0, ,000 
1963 0.460 0.513 0.475 0.000 0, ,000 
1964 0.741 0.516 0,498 0.000 0. ,000 
1965 0.820 0.559 0.534 0.000 0, ,000 
1966 0.820 0.488 0,496 0.000 0. ,000 
1967 0.000 0.388 0,472 0.000 0. 000 
1968 0.000 0.521 0,571 0.000 0. ,000 
1969 0.880 0.564 0,518 0.000 0. 000 
1970 0.879 0.546 0,507 0.000 0. 000 
1971 0.949 0.553 0.614 0.000 0. ,000 
1972 0.953 0.752 0.799 0.000 0. 000 
1973 0.968 0.499 0.535 0.000 0. 000 
1974 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1975 0.000 6.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1978 0.878 0.504 0.877 0.000 0. 000 
1979 0,627 0.235 0.578 0.000 0. 000 
1980 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1981 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 
1982 0.428 0.261 0.306 0.779 0. 840 
1983 0.524 0.427 0.351 0.977 0. 930 
1984 0.509 0.478 0.291 0.845 0. 700 
1985 0.635 0.646 0.407 0.901 0. 820 
1986 0.764 0.807 0.557 0.931 0, 930 
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Table Â.l. continued 
YEAR WHEDIV RICDIV CORDIV OCGDIV COTDIV 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.26 
0.28 
0.13 
0.16 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 ' 
0.39 
0.23 
0.34 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.12 
0.12 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.31 
0,00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.43 
0.46 
0.37 
0.48 
0,48 
0.54 
0.46 
0.54 
0.53 
0.53 
0.29 
0.37 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,08 
0 .06  
0.00 
0,00 
0,00  
0,17 
0,00 
0,00  
0,03 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,46 
0,46 
0,37 
0,49 
0,47 
0,52 
0.35 
0.50 
0,54 
0.52 
0.29 
0,37 
0,16 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,03 
0 .02  
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0 ,16 
0.00 
0.00  
0.03 
0.00  
0 .00  
0 .00  
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0,00  
0 ,00  
0.00 
0,00  
0 ,00  
0.00  
0.00  
0 .00  
0 .00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 .00  
0 ,00  
0 .00  
0 .00  
0 ,00  
0 .00  
0 .00  
0 ,00  
0 ,00  
0 .29  
0 .00  
0 ,09  
0 .00  
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Table Â.l. continued 
YEAR WHEDPA RICDPA CORDPA OCGDPA COTDPA 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
1.21 
0.88 
0.26 
0.20 
0.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.14 
0.00 
0.22 
0.45 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.65 
2.70 
2.64 
1.66  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00.  
0 .00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6 . 6 1  
0 .00 
3 . 2 2  
0 .00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 . 6 2  
0.61 
0.41 
0.56 
0.55 
0.34 
0.25 
0.33 
0.35 
0.31 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.05 
0.96 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 .60  
0.56 
0.33 
0.48 
0.46 
0 . 2 6  
0.12 
0.25 
0 . 2 2  
0.21 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00  
1.32 
1.33 
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
1.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0,70 
0,00  
0,00  
0,00 
0.00  
0 .00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0.00  
0.00  
0.00 
0 .00  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.53 
0.00 
0.26 
0.00 
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APPENDIX B 
Mapping of b^j parameters into Choleslqr parameters (L^j and : 
^11 "12 '»1m 
''21 ''22 ''2m 
''ml ''m2 ''mm 
°11 '•21°11 
'•21°11 '-2l''2l''l1*°22 
'•ml'^ll '•2l'-ml''l1*'-m2°22 
'•2l'-m1°1l'^'-m2°22 
'•2l''2l''ll*'-22'-22''22** ' 
B L D L' 

